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Abstract 
This dissertation explores the nature and extent of amicus curiae participation and 
impact at the Roberts Court.  While previous literature has addressed amicus activity and 
influence in prior eras of the Court, in specific issue areas, and in specific cases, none has 
focused in a systematic way on the Roberts Court.  Compiling data from the 2007-08 through 
2011-12 terms of the Roberts Court, this study first examines the levels and categories of amicus 
participation during this time period.  Amicus activity at the Roberts Court is ubiquitous, and 
exhibits an “arms race” phenomenon, being relatively ideologically balanced.   
Second, this study analyzes the impact of amici on the ideological direction of the 
justices’ votes at the Roberts Court.  To address this topic, a number of statistical models are 
estimated, controlling for other known influences on judicial decision-making.  The results 
demonstrate that amicus briefs positively impact the direction of justice votes across the 
ideological spectrum in both routine and politically salient cases.  When, how, and to what 
degree amicus briefs matter depends on the level of amicus brief disparity, the ideology of the 
justice, the issue area of the case, and the prestige of the amicus participants involved.  The 
greater the amicus brief advantage in a case, the greater the amicus influence.  Moderate justices, 
as a rule, are more influenced by amicus briefs than more ideologically extreme justices.  
However, unlike amicus briefs, an advantage of amicus cosigners in a case typically does not 
impact the direction of the justices’ votes.  
 These findings shed light on the larger debate in the judicial behavior literature regarding 
whether justice votes are simply a result of judicial attitudes (attitudinal model), or if legal rules 
and arguments (legal model), and/or public opinion (interest group model) shape judicial 
decision-making.  While affirming that judicial attitudes are the most significant predictors of the 
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justices’ votes, the results indicate that the legal persuasion model best describes amicus 
influence.  Amicus curiae briefs matter for the relevant information they provide to the justices, 
and most justices, regardless of ideology, are impacted by this information. 
.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction and Literature Review 
 
The federal courts were intended by the Founders to be the protectors of fundamental 
rights and independent, dispassionate arbiters of constitutional meaning.  The contention of the 
Founders was that courts would be the “least dangerous branch” (lacking force and will, but 
merely possessing judgment) (Federalist No. 78, Hamilton 1788), and the history of federal 
judiciary shows that it has been the least powerful of the three branches (Mondak and Smithey 
1997; Silverstein and Ginsburg 1987).  The federal courts are constrained by presidential 
appointment power and congressional control over their jurisdiction, organization, and size.  
Thus, the Judiciary is dependent upon its own mythology (Casey 1974), popular support 
(Adamany and Grossman 1983; McGuire and Stimson 2004), and the support of the other 
branches to compensate for its political weaknesses (Dahl 1957; Flemming and Wood 1997). 
Because of this, federal courts have generally acquiesced to the expansion of federal power 
(Silverstein and Ginsburg 1987), and the ideological orientation of the Supreme Court generally 
corresponds to attitudes/mood of the electorate (Dahl 1957; Funston 1975; Mishler and Sheehan 
1993; Flemming and Wood 1997; McGuire and Stimson 2004).  Inconsistent with its popular 
countermajoritarian reputation, the literature shows that the Supreme Court is often a part of the 
dominant national political coalition (Dahl 1957; Funston 1975), and its decisions are most often 
consistent with public preferences, even when they protect minority interests (Barnum 1985).  
Accordingly, despite the Judiciary’s status as an independent institution, it is evident that justices 
adjust their decisions at the margins “toward a compromise that avoids active political opposition 
and pays some attention to what the public wants” (Flemming and Wood 1997, 494).    
Scholars have long known that judges are influenced by a number of political and extra-
legal actors, including the other branches of government, the media, public opinion, and, most 
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germane to this study, interest groups.  Ambiguities in the law and conflicting legal precedents 
allow judges to exercise significant discretion in reaching decisions (Samuels 2004, 1-2).  This 
context makes the United States Supreme Court (USSC) ripe for amicus curiae influence.  
The most controversial and closely watched case of the Roberts Court era – National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012),
1
 involving the constitutionality of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) – is illustrative of the impact that amici 
curiae can have on the USSC in an uncertain and hotly contested legal context.  In an unforeseen 
move to most USSC observers, the Roberts Court ruled 5-4 that, although the PPACA’s 
individual mandate, which required an individual to purchase health insurance or pay a fine, was 
not a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, the mandate was constitutional under 
Congress’s taxing power.  Yet, also as part of the holding, the Roberts Court ruled 6-3 that the 
PPACA’s Medicaid expansion exceeded Congress’s powers by unduly coercing states to adopt 
such an expansion.    
The consolidated PPACA case was full of intrigue, involving the signature legislative 
achievement of Barack Obama’s presidency, and decided in the height of a hotly contested 
presidential election.  The case attracted a record-breaking 136 separate amicus briefs, plus two 
USSC-appointed amici.
2
  It was not surprising that the case split 5-4 amongst the justices 
                                                 
1
  National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012) was the lead docket (11-393) of the broader 
consolidated PPACA case, including Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida (11-398) 
(2012), and Florida vs. Department of Health and Human Services (11-400) (2012).  
 
2
 A flavor of the variety of amici curiae participating in the in the PPACA consolidated case: the American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), American Academy of Actuaries, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts, Cato Institute, Montana Shooting Sports Association, U.S. Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), U.S. 
Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH), U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Lambda Legal Defense Fund, Inc., Governor of Washington 
Christine Gregoire, AFL-CIO, Benjamin Rush Society, Alliance Defense Fund,  American Nurses 
Association, American Center for Law and Justice, Foundation for Moral Law, Liberty Legal Foundation, 
Rutherford Institute, state of Oklahoma, state of Maryland, Independent Women’s Forum, National 
Restaurant Association,  American Medical Student Association, American Cancer Society, Christian 
Medical and Dental Association, Washington and Lee University School of Law Black Lung Clinic, Tax 
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regarding the primary constitutional question of the case.  What was of great surprise, however, 
was the fact that Chief Justice John Roberts – and not the usual “swing justice” Anthony 
Kennedy – served as the pivotal 5th vote, joining with the four liberal justices to form the 
majority.
3
  The decision in the PPACA case was widely viewed as a defining moment for the 
Roberts Court and for the Chief Justice.  Roberts was praised by many observers, particularly 
those who agreed with the decision, for tactfully and wisely rising above partisan concerns, 
avoiding judicial overreach, and recognizing the importance of maintaining the legitimacy of the 
USSC.   Others noted that Roberts strategically planted seeds of conservative victories in 
federalism cases down the line in his opinion by soundly rejecting the Obama administration’s 
arguments basing the constitutionality of the PPACA on Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  Seen in this light, the Chief Justice was not a traitor to the conservative cause, but a 
Trojan horse who allowed liberals to achieve a Pyrrhic victory, with the aim of winning the 
longer war.  
The two Court-appointed amici were requested to advocate positions not supported by 
any of the parties in the case, but which the USSC wished to consider.  The first Court-appointed 
amici – H. Bartow Farr, III – was asked to advance the position that the individual mandate 
could be completely severed from the rest of the PPACA, saving the remainder of the legislation 
if the individual mandate was struck down.   Given the majority’s opinion upholding the 
individual mandate, it was not necessary for the majority to address this position.  The second 
                                                                                                                                           
Foundation, along with many individual economists, constitutional law scholars and law professors, 
physicians,  and state legislators, among numerous others. 
 
3
 This phenomenon only occurred one time in the Roberts Court era prior to the 2011 term (Howard 2012, 87) 
(See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 239 (2006)). Interestingly, this same voting alignment appeared once 
more in the 2011 term, in the much anticipated case of Arizona v. United States (2012), in which Chief 
Justice Roberts joined with the four liberal justices in striking most sections of Arizona’s immigration law 
based upon the doctrine of federal preemption.  
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Court-appointed amici – Robert A. Long, Jr. – was requested to advocate the position that the 
Anti-Injunction Act deprived the USSC of jurisdiction to hear challenges to the constitutionality 
of the individual mandate.   Ultimately, the majority opinion considered and rejected the 
arguments of Robert Long regarding the Anti-Injunction Act serving as a jurisdictional bar.  
In addition to the two Court-appointed amici, by my count, the justices explicitly cited or 
referenced 13 different amicus briefs in their majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in the 
PPACA case:  Brief of United States (multiple times); Brief for America's Health Insurance 
Plans et al. (once).; Brief for Economists (twice); Brief for Sen. Harry Reid et al. (once); Brief 
for Service Employees International Union et al. (once); Brief for David Satcher et al. (once); 
Brief for National Health Law Program et al. (once); Brief for State of Maryland and 10 Other 
States et al. (twice); Brief for Barry Friedman et al. (once); Brief for Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts (twice); Brief for American Association of People with Disabilities et al. (twice); 
Brief for Governor of Washington Christine Gregoire (once); and Brief for Health Care for All, 
Inc., et al. (once).   Of these amicus briefs, the Brief of the United States provided by the 
Solicitor General was, not surprisingly, given the most attention in the justices’ opinions.  While 
many of these 13 amicus briefs were cited or quoted to support the justices’ opinions, others 
were cited or quoted by the justices to argue against the position which the brief advanced.   
However, it seems that the amicus curiae briefs which had the most impact on the 
holdings of the PPACA case were briefs that were not explicitly cited by the justices.  Two 
amicus briefs in particular stand out in this regard.   First, Vanderbilt University Law Professor 
James Blumstein’s amicus brief has been credited with shaping that portion of the USSC’s 
decision pertaining to the constitutionality of the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion (Patterson 2012; 
Greenblatt 2012).   The rationale of Chief Justice Roberts in his majority opinion supporting the 
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position that the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion mandate on the states was unenforceable seemed 
to be directly drawn from the legal arguments advanced in Blumstein’s brief.  Under the terms of 
the PPACA, the states were obligated to expand their Medicaid coverage for all those whose 
incomes were under 133 percent of the federal poverty line, significantly increasing the costs of 
coverage for the states.  If states did not accept the mandated expansion of coverage eligibility, 
they would no longer be eligible to receive Medicaid matching funding from the federal 
government.   
Blumstein was the driving force behind persuading the state of Florida to make the 
Medicaid challenge a part of their litigation before the USSC.   In his amicus brief (2012, 2), he 
argued that “Medicaid, enacted under the federal government’s spending power, is much in the 
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally 
imposed conditions.”  Citing precedent in his brief that the USSC had previously held that the 
relationship between the states and the federal government was analogous to a contract, 
Blumstein argued that it was coercive for the federal government to change the terms of the 
contract by conditioning the receipt of funding for existing Medicaid programs on acceptance of 
new terms (2-3).  Blumstein’s brief goes on to argue that the Medicaid expansion was a form of 
bait-and-switch that the states could not have reasonably foreseen when they originally signed up 
for Medicaid:  “[a]cting as a contract modification, [the PPACA Medicaid mandate] is coercive 
because it puts states to a set of choices that the federal government may not impose on states” 
(3).  Referring to prior legal precedent, Blumstein adds that the Medicaid expansion “also 
violates the Pennhurst clear-notice obligation because that obligation accrues in this case at 
contract formation, not contract modification" (3).  
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In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts essentially adopted this contractual argument 
advanced by Blumstein (45-51).  The Chief Justice argued that the legitimacy of Spending 
Clause legislation depends upon whether a state voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of 
such a program.  Roberts went on to argue that a state could hardly anticipate that Congress’s 
reservation of the right to “alter” or “amend” the Medicaid program included the power to 
transform it so dramatically.  Thus, Roberts concluded that the Medicaid expansion violates the 
Constitution by threatening states with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline 
to comply with the expansion (51-55).    
Secondly, one amicus brief in particular – Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars Jack M. 
Balkin, Brian Galle, Edward Kleinbard, Gillian E. Metzger, and Trevor W. Morrison (2012) – is 
viewed as providing the intellectual ammunition for that portion of Chief Justice Robert’s 
opinion upholding the individual mandate as within Congress’s taxing power (Mauro 2012).  
Rosen (2013) has speculated that, even if this Balkin et al. brief did not decisively influence 
Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion, it did at least provide a way for Roberts to take the long 
view and ostensibly put the institutional interests of the USSC  above ideological agendas.  That 
is, the brief provided the Chief with a greater array of options for how to decide the case 
consistent with his strategic goals.  The Balkin et al. brief was the only amicus brief, along with 
the Brief of Service Employees International Union, of the 136 briefs that were submitted in the 
PPACA case, which argued that Congress had the power to impose a tax on those without health 
insurance under the Spending Clause.  The basic structure of the argument set forth in Balkin et 
al.’s amicus brief is as follows.  According to a long-line of precedent, Congress’s taxing power 
is broad, and the individual mandate falls within this expansive taxing power.  The minimum 
coverage provision of the PPACA (i.e., you must have health insurance or pay a “fine”) serves 
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the general welfare, is reasonably related to raising revenue, and does not infringe on 
constitutionally protected rights.  Finally, the minimum coverage provision should be treated like 
a tax because Congress did not clearly intend otherwise, even though Congress did not call the 
provision a “tax.” 
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts adopts the essentials of the foregoing 
argument.  He argues that the minimum coverage provision is akin to a tax, even if it is labeled a 
“penalty” by Congress.  In effect, Roberts argues that failure to purchase insurance under the 
minimum coverage provision is a choice, not an unlawful act: “[t]hat Congress apparently 
regards such extensive failure to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress 
did not think it was creating four million outlaws.  It suggests instead that the shared 
responsibility payment merely imposes a tax citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of 
buying health insurance” (35-40).  While the degree to which the Chief Justice relied on these 
two amicus briefs cannot be conclusively demonstrated, the evidence suggests that these two 
particular amicus briefs played a significant role in shaping the most high-profile decision of the 
Roberts Court era.   
As a further indicator of the influence of amici curiae, Franze and Anderson (2012, 3) 
show that during the 2011-12 term of the Roberts Court, amici curiae were cited by justices in 63 
percent of cases with only a five or six member majority coalition.  In contrast, the justices only 
cited amici curiae in 29 percent of the cases where the decision was unanimous or 8-1.  This 
finding suggests that amicus briefs may have a greater effect on the USSC in the most 
controversial and salient cases.  While amicus citation rates are admittedly a blunt indicator, of 
amicus impact, they do show that the justices pay attention to the briefs, keeping the arguments 
provided by amici curiae in their arsenal when writing their opinions.  At a minimum, the 
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foregoing statistics and anecdotal evidence provide a reasonably strong inference that amici 
curiae matter and that they can play a powerful role in shaping the course of our nation’s legal 
and public policy.   
What follows is an exploration of nature, extent, and influence of amicus curiae 
participation on the Roberts Court.  While a large body of literature has addressed the topic of 
amicus curiae activity and influence in prior terms and eras of the Court, in specific issue areas, 
and in specific cases, none has focused in a systematic way on the Roberts Court.  Further, this 
study will shed light on the larger debate in the judicial behavior literature as to whether justice 
votes are simply a result of judicial attitudes/ideology (attitudinal model), or if legal rules and 
arguments (legal model) and/or public opinion (interest group model) shape judicial decision-
making at the USSC.  Each of these views leads to different hypotheses about the expected 
influence of amici, and this study will provide information as to which view better captures the 
reality of amicus influence on the Roberts Court. 
 
A. What Is an Amicus Curiae and What Is Its Function? 
Amicus curiae
4
 – Latin for “friend of the court” – refers to the tradition of courts 
permitting third parties to litigation to submit their opinions on issues pertaining to the case at 
hand (Krislov 1963, 694).  Black’s Law Dictionary (1979, 75) defines “amicus curiae” this way: 
“[a] person with a strong interest in or views on the subject matter of an action [who] …. 
petition[s] the court for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party, but actually to 
suggest a rationale consistent with its own views.”  Amici curiae have long been of interest to 
                                                 
4
 “Amicus curiae” is the singular form of the term.  “Amici curiae” is the plural form (“friends of the court”).  
Throughout this work, I will use “amicus curiae” or “amicus” to refer to a single third party friend of the 
court; likewise, I will use “amici curiae” or “amici” to refer to two or more third party friends of the court.   
While these terms are often used interchangeably in the literature, I strive to be accurate in my usage of the 
terms in this study.  
 9 
 
judicial researchers.  Amici curiae serve to link broad interests in society to individual parties of 
interest in court cases (Vose 1958).  While scholarly opinion regarding the propriety and efficacy 
of amici is mixed, the conventional wisdom is that amicus participants can influence the judicial 
process.  
“Interest groups” (or “organized interests”) – broadly defined – are the primary filers of 
amicus briefs.  This study adopts Schlozman and Tierney’s (1986, 11) classic definition of 
organized interests: “a variety of organizations that seek joint ends through political action.”  As 
such, interest groups can include corporations, businesses, governments, public interest law 
firms, public advocacy organizations, professional and trade associations, nonprofits, 
universities, churches, and unions, among others.  Even individuals who collaborate together to 
cosign amicus briefs can loosely fit within this broad definition if they are a group of individuals 
jointly pursuing political activity.  Throughout the remainder of this study, I use the terms 
“organized interest,” “group,” or “interest group” interchangeably. 
Interest groups are active as litigation participants, by either sponsoring “test cases” 
brought in the name of private parties, or by filing amicus curiae briefs (Vose 1958; Barker 
1967; Rushin and O’Connor 1987).  Vose (1958), who undertook the first systematic study of 
interest groups’ use of the courts, contends that organizations or “pressure groups” support legal 
action because individuals lack the necessary, time, money, and skill to influence cases.  Krislov 
(1963, 711) argues that amicus briefs can become very important “when there is evidence of 
some weakness in the legal talent arrayed by the principal party,” but also acknowledges that 
amicus briefs can play an important “subsidiary role” by drawing the USSC’s attention to the 
wider interests implicated in the case and by providing useful social science data.   As Barker 
(1967, 60) suggests, “[t]he amicus brief, in a sense, also allows the Court to weigh ‘political’ 
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information in a judicial way.”  Judges make policy choices just as legislators do, and these 
choices involve more than strictly legal considerations. Thus, the involvement of third parties in 
litigation is an example of the blurring of the separation of powers doctrine. 
 Amicus participation goes as far back as Ancient Rome (Simmons 2009, 192; Krislov 
1963, 694; Harper and Etherington 1953).   Originally, amicus curiae briefs were designed to aid 
judicial decision-making by providing a court with impartial legal information outside of its 
knowledge or expertise (Simmons 2009, 192; Krislov 1963).  In the fourteenth century, judges 
began to use amicus briefs as mechanisms to give voice to those interests that were left 
unrepresented in the adversarial system.  English common law viewed amicus curiae as a 
“selfless servant of the court” (Kaye 1989, 10).  The amicus played the role of the impartial 
informant: often amici would serve the function of “oral shepardizing” – informing the judges of 
case law that the parties ignored or overlooked; pointing out “manifest error” in the cases; 
informing the court of legislative intent; and remedying defects in the adversarial process 
(Krislov 1963, 695-697; Samuels 2004, 7; Roberts 2009, 9).  Such assistance was welcomed 
because of the presumption that “it is for the honor of a court of justice to avoid error” (Krislov 
1963, 695). 
The first amicus curiae to participate in a case before the USSC was Henry Clay, who 
represented the state of Kentucky in a case involving federal supremacy and Kentucky land titles 
– Green v. Biddle (1823) (Krislov 1963, 700).  Initially, the state of Kentucky was without 
representation in the case, and Clay, acting on behalf of Kentucky, successfully petitioned for 
rehearing and was allowed to argue as amicus. Notably, Clay’s appearance as amicus was in a 
dual role:  both advisor to the USSC and advocate.  Throughout the 1800s, amici curiae were 
virtually always lawyers representing government (federal or state) interests.  It was not until the 
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1900s that the USSC allowed private litigants to participate as amici (Samuels 2004, 7-8).  The 
case of Ah How (alias Louie Ah How) v. United States (1904) presented the first instance of the 
appearance of an amicus curiae brief filed by a nongovernmental interest group in the USSC. 
The Chinese Charitable and Benevolent Association of New York filed the brief, urging the 
USSC to reverse the lower court’s decision ordering removal of the appellants from the United 
States back to their Chinese homeland.  In its amicus brief, the group highlighted alleged abuses 
of Chinese immigrants in New York City by the government (Collins 2008, 40-41).  However, 
the filing of this brief did not have the intended effect, as the USSC affirmed the lower court 
ruling. 
Another shift in the amicus role also occurred during the early 1900s: traditionally, the 
authoring attorney was viewed as the amicus, not the organization he represented; however, by 
the 1930s the emphasis on the professional role of the amicus dissipated and briefs came to be 
openly identified with the sponsoring group (Roberts 2009, 10).  Throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century, widespread involvement by private interest groups in litigation or amicus 
activity was not typical, with the notable exceptions of church-state litigation (Pfeffer 1981), 
racial minority groups (most notably the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP)), some prominent civil rights groups (most notably the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American Jewish Congress), railroad interests, labor groups, 
and securities and insurance interests (Krislov 1963).   It was not until the 1950s and 1960s that 
amicus activity became truly prevalent.   
The entrance of private parties as amici inaugurated a dramatic evolution in the amicus 
role over time.  As noted by Barker (1967) and Krislov (1963), the amicus role has evolved from 
a neutral friendship to a partisan advocacy of specific positions, and amicus participation has 
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made our adversarial system of justice “multi-sided.”  In recent decades, litigation at the USSC 
has taken on an appearance of group warfare as organized interests lobby the USSC to support 
their preferred policy positions.  Epstein (1985, 156) describes a situation in which the USSC 
now effectively serves as a mediator between competing interest groups due to the proliferation 
of amicus activity.  In fact, some scholars now contend that “friend of a party” is a more accurate 
term than “friend of the court” to describe amicus activity. (Simmons 2009, 192; Munford 1999; 
Caldeira and Wright 1990).   No longer neutral informants, amici are now seen as defenders of 
third party rights and interests (Simard 2007-08, 676; Krislov 1963).
5
  Justice Antonin Scalia lent 
credence to this viewpoint when, in his dissenting opinion in Jaffee v. Redmond (1996, 35-36)
6
 
he wrote that there is “no self-interested organization out there devoted to the pursuit of truth in 
the federal courts.” 
This evolving function of amicus curiae can be attributed, in part, to evolving 
jurisprudential norms.  As legal realism supplanted legal formalism as the dominant 
jurisprudential paradigm during in the 20
th
 century, the courts increasingly embraced extra-legal 
facts and social science evidence provided by progressive amicus participants in politically 
charged cases (Simmons 2009, 195).
7
   This trend was inaugurated in Muller v. Oregon (1908) 
when Louis Brandeis submitted his famous “Brandeis Brief” on behalf of the state of Oregon 
presenting the USSC with statistical evidence regarding the detrimental mental and health effects 
that result from women working long hours (Collins 2008, 41).   The growth of amicus 
                                                 
5
 See however, Banner (2003, 113), who examines amicus activity in the nineteenth century in the United States 
and concludes that there never was a time in American jurisprudence that amici acted in a solely neutral 
and advisory capacity; instead the partisan role of the amicus has always been the norm (Collins 2008, 40). 
 
6
 518 U.S. 1 
 
7
 Legal formalists argue that the USSC is not inherently political or subject to interest group pressures that 
plague the other branches of government; rather judges can be constrained by legal doctrine and objective 
in their application of it.  In contrast, legal realists assert that ideology and contextual factors are the driving 
force behind judicial decision-making, not simply doctrine (Simmons 2009, 188 fn.6). 
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participation can also be attributed to the proliferation of the bureaucracy and the emergence of 
the modern welfare state, serving as a catalyst for group organization as governmental policies 
increasingly affected various stakeholders (Krislov 1963).  Lastly, the relatively recent 
emergence of the public law model of litigation, first described by Chayes (1976), which focuses 
on the vindication of constitutional and statutory policies rather than private disputes, has created 
an environment ripe for interest group participation and influence in the judicial process. 
By the 1950s, the use of amicus briefs became so prevalent at the USSC that some 
scholars perceived them to be a “genuine problem” for the USSC, characterizing the briefs as 
“repetitious at best and emotional explosions at worst” (Harper and Etherington 1953, 1172).  To 
these scholars, amicus participation created the impression that the USSC was a “political 
legislative body, amenable and responsive to mass pressures from any source” (Harper and 
Etherington 1173).   It is no surprise then that many observers view amicus participation with 
suspicion, often characterizing it as “judicial lobbying” (e.g., Harper and Etherington 1953; 
Rushin and O’Connor 1987; Frey 2006).  This concern has persisted among scholars and 
practitioners over the last sixty years,
8
 yet most scholars have now accepted this proliferation and 
perceived influence as normal and emblematic of the representative and responsive nature of the 
USSC.   
Rather than viewing amicus activity as a threat to judicial independence and individual 
rights, it can be argued that a strong and varied amici presence before the USSC is 
quintessentially American in character, as it affords a tangible opportunity for freely associating 
individuals to petition government for the achievement of common goals (e.g., Vose 1958, 31).  
                                                 
8
 For example, Kurland and Hutchinson (1983, 647) assert that amicus briefs are a “waste of time, effort, and 
money in a useless function.”   See also, Richard Posner, Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, who writes that amicus briefs filed in his court provide little or no assistance to judges because 
they largely duplicate the positions and arguments advanced by the parties (Ryan v. Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner,J., in chambers). 
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Viewed in this light, amicus participation is an expression of the values that underlie the First 
Amendment – i.e., freedom of speech, freedom of association; freedom to petition government 
for redress of grievances (e.g., Garcia 2007).  In a similar vein, Simmons (2009, 190) argues that 
amicus activity serves an important symbolic role that buttresses the democratic nature of the 
USSC: 
[A]micus curiae participation is a form of political symbolism reflecting the [USSC’s] 
irreconcilable role in American democracy as a quasi-representative policy making 
institution. Specifically, the political symbolism of amicus curiae participation reassures 
the public, particularly vulnerable groups, of the Court’s democratic character. Amicus 
participation dispels external public criticism that the Court is detached and indifferent to 
the public, without significantly undermining the Court’s independence. Ultimately, the 
Court’s institutional legitimacy rests upon the dual pillars of independence and inclusion. 
Amicus participation contributes significantly to the latter. 
 
In sum, the history of amicus curiae evolution has shown it to be a flexible legal tool to 
address the shortcomings of the adversarial litigation process.  It has played roles as varied as 
friend of the court, lobbyist, advocate, and vindicator of the politically powerless (Lowman 
1992, 1244).   
At its essence the amicus brief is a mechanism by which various types of information are 
brought to the attention of the court.  Most agree that this informational aspect lies at the heart of 
amicus influence (Barker 1967; Hansford 2004a; Collins 2008; Ennis 1984; Samuels 2004).   
Comparato (2003, 40) argues that the two most important sources of information available to 
justices making a decision are information received directly from litigant briefs and information 
from amicus briefs.  Organized groups seek out situations in which the USSC has less than 
optimal information when deciding whether or not to file an amicus brief, because it is in these 
low-information settings that groups are most likely to exert some influence over policy 
decisions of the USSC (Hansford 2004a). By participating as amici curiae, interest groups can 
assist courts with their fact-finding and legal interpretation roles by raising issues not addressed 
 15 
 
by the direct parties to the litigation, and by presenting broad political, social, historical, and 
scientific information to the USSC.  Thus, amici inform the courts of the broader policy 
implications of their decisions (Barker 1967; Collins 2008).   
Amici provide information to courts by supplementing legal arguments, by signaling the 
preferences of external actors, and by informing courts of the likely impact of their decisions 
(Barker 1967; Pfeffer 1981; Ennis 1984; Caldeira and Wright 1988; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; 
Epstein and Knight 1999; Collins 2004; Collins 2008).
9
   Amici usually provide new legal 
authorities beyond those cited in party briefs (Collins 2008, 66).  About 70 percent of amicus 
briefs offer justices information that is not found in the party briefs (Collins 2008, 66; Spriggs 
and Wahlbeck 1997).  Amicus briefs may also present alternative legal arguments or suggest 
alternative dispositions that the parties may have failed to consider or are constrained from 
addressing (Flango, Bross, and Corbally 2006, 182; Puro 1971).   
Apart from the quality or persuasiveness of the arguments presented, the simple act of 
filing an amicus brief provides the justices with an indication of the array of social forces at play 
in the litigation (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Flango, Bross, and Corbally 2006).  The simple 
presence of a number of amici groups can focus the USSC’s attention by highlighting case 
salience or broader public opinion (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Caldeira and Wright 1988; 
Kearney and Merrill 2000).   
 
 
                                                 
9
 See also Puro (1971, 21), who describes three basic functions of amicus briefs: (1) to strengthen, through 
repetition and endorsement, the arguments of one of the litigants; (2) to supplement the arguments by using 
materials or slants that are not purely legal and might not be suitable for the principal’s use; and (3) to 
frame arguments that raise legal issues of broader implication than those raised by the counsel for the 
principal.  
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B. Who Participates and How Often? 
At the USSC, interest groups can participate as litigants, litigant sponsors, or amicus 
curiae (this latter form is most common) (Vose 1958; Rushin and O’Connor 1987; Samuels 
2004).  Very few groups act as litigant sponsors because of the costs and procedural obstacles 
inherent in this course of action (Samuels 2004, 7).
10
  Further, amicus curiae participation can 
take place at three stages before the USSC: (1) at the agenda-setting stage (i.e., petitions for writ 
of certiorari); (2) at the merits stage; and (3) at oral argument.  Amicus participation is most 
common on the merits, less so during agenda-setting,
11
 and rarest at oral argument.
12
   
The USSC’s liberal rules governing amicus participation (Simmons 2009; Kearney and 
Merrill 2000, 761-65) encourage such participation.  It is rare for the USSC to reject a petition to 
file an amicus brief.
13
  The USSC promulgated its first rule governing amicus participation in 
1938.  USSC Rule 37 requires groups and individuals that want to be amici to obtain permission 
from both parties involved in the litigation, and this permission is typically granted.  If either 
party refuses permission, the entity wishing to participate must file a motion for leave to file an 
amicus curiae brief.  Despite its discretionary power to do so, the USSC rarely denies a motion 
for leave to file an amicus brief (Simmons 2009, 196; O’Connor and Epstein 1983).  Unlike 
private entities, governmental entities (e.g., Solicitor General, states, and local governments) do 
                                                 
10
 However, see Barker (1967), who details the dramatic participation of interest groups in the areas of racial 
segregation and legislative redistricting. In particular, Barker highlights the success of the NAACP in its 
litigation sponsorship strategy in a series of segregation cases to achieve its policy goals, culminating in 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954). 
 
11
 Caldeira and Wright (1990) show that all types of amici (except the United States and counties) participated 
more often at the merits stage than at the certiorari stage. 
 
12
 Gibson (1997) shows that from 1953 to 1997, amici presented oral argumentation in less than six percent of 
orally argued cases before the USSC. 
 
13
 For example, O’Connor and Epstein (1983) report that, from 1969 to 1981, the USSC denied permission to 
file in only eleven percent of motions for leave. 
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not need either party’s permission to file an amicus brief.  Further, the USSC does not permit 
amicus briefs to be filed by non-lawyers or those lawyers who are not members of the Supreme 
Court Bar (Simpson and Vasaly 2004, 17). 
 After the adoption of its 1938 rule governing amicus participation, the USSC often 
received briefs that did not follow the simple rules of the USSC, that were perceived as being of 
low quality and containing meritless propaganda, and that burdened the USSC.  Therefore, in 
1949, the USSC amended its formal rules governing amicus curiae filings to emphasize that the 
consent of all parties was required for a private amicus to file and reasserting the proper 
procedures for filing a motion for leave to file if consent was denied (Kearney and Merrill 2000, 
763).  Further, the USSC adopted an unwritten policy of denying virtually all motion for leave to 
file when party consent was withheld (Collins 2008, 43).  However, comments made by Justices 
Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black in their opinions in On Lee v. United States (1952) ultimately 
caused the USSC to reverse course and jettison this unwritten policy.
14
  By the early 1960s, the 
USSC was granting motions for leave to file amicus briefs in the vast majority of cases once 
again (Collins 2008 44-45; Krislov 1963, 715-16). 
Nevertheless, in 1990 the USSC issued a rule discouraging the gratuitous filing of amicus 
briefs after it was inundated with eighty amicus briefs in an abortion case (Simpson and Vasaly 
2004).  Supreme Court Rule 37(1) states: "An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of 
the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of 
considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens 
the Court, and its filing is not favored."  
                                                 
14
 Justice Black stated, “the Court’s rule regarding the filing of briefs amici curiae should be liberalized” (343 
U.S. 924, at 925). Justice Frankfurter’s opinion suggested the same and implied that amicus briefs improve 
the decision-making of the justices. 
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While written advocacy via the submission of amicus briefs is the most common method 
by which amici participate in the judicial process, it is not the only one.  Amici also participate in 
oral arguments before the USSC.  In order to participate as an amicus at oral argument, the 
consent of both parties must typically be obtained, or an invitation must be extended by the 
USSC.  While it is relatively rare for amici to participate in this fashion,
15
 they can have a 
statistically significant impact on case outcomes and justice votes (Roberts 2009).  
Additionally, one other special category of amicus activity should be noted:  invitation by 
the USSC.  While it is rare for the USSC to invite a private group to participate as amicus curiae, 
the USSC regularly invites the Solicitor General (SG) to participate in a case in this fashion, and 
occasionally invites administrative agencies of the federal government as well.  Such invitations 
are viewed more as a summons and are virtually always accepted (Salokar 1992, 143). 
According to Pacelle (2006, 322), when the SG’s amicus briefs are divided into voluntary and 
invited briefs, one finds a clear distinction in the arguments of the SG: in cases where the SG 
was invited, the arguments provide neutral information and are not statistically connected to 
presidential ideology, while the opposite is true for cases where the SG’s involvement is 
voluntary (Roberts 2009, 15). 
The USSC has seen a dramatic rise of amicus briefs and also an increase in the number of 
cosigners
16
 of these briefs since the early 1960s (Kearney and Merrill 2000; Collins 2004; 
Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Hansford 2004).   O’Connor and Epstein (1982, 318) declare that 
“amicus curiae participation by private groups is now the norm rather than the exception.”  
                                                 
15
 According to Roberts (2009, 51-52), between 1953 – 1985 433 amici presented oral arguments before the 
USSC in 347 different cases.  The United States accounted for 276 of these appearances. 
 
16
 The term “cosigners” is sometimes used to distinguish the individual or group that initiated the brief from 
others that signed onto it.  Following Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson (2012) and Gibson (1997), I use 
the term to refer to every amicus participant listed on the brief. 
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However, this has not always been the case.  According to Kearney and Merrill (2000, 753), 
amici curiae participated in only about 23 percent of cases from 1945 to 1956.  At the genesis of 
the Burger Court (1969), amici participated in fewer than four in every ten cases, but by 1985 
participation had almost doubled to seven in ten cases.  Between 1986 and 1995, this number 
rose even higher to 85 percent participation (Franze and Anderson 2012).  By 2001, during the 
Rehnquist Court, USSC amicus participation rose as high as about 95 percent of cases.  In recent 
terms this trend has remained steady, as amicus briefs have accompanied more than 90 percent of 
USSC cases (Owens and Epstein 2005; Kearney and Merrill 2000).   In the 2010-2011 term, the 
USSC had 93 percent participation in cases with signed opinions, and during the 2011-12 term,  
95 percent of cases with signed opinions included at least one amicus brief at the merits stage.  
Due to this high level of amicus participation, 2011 has been called the “year of the amicus” 
because of the prominent role amicus briefs played during this term (Franze and Anderson 2012, 
1).    
Not surprisingly, as the percentage of amicus participation has continued on its upward 
trajectory over the last 60 years, so have the absolute numbers of briefs filed per case and per 
term.  Between 1946 and 1955, the USSC averaged fewer than one amicus brief per case, but by 
the 1990s the USSC was averaging about five amicus briefs per case (Kearney and Merrill 2000, 
752-54, 765).  This average doubled in the 2011-12 term to about 10 amicus briefs per case 
(Franze and Anderson 2012, 1).  More detailed information is included below in Chapter 4 
regarding levels of amicus participation during the Roberts Court era. 
As one would expect, politically salient cases (e.g., cases involving abortion, eminent 
domain, free speech, capital punishment, and affirmative action) typically attract the highest 
levels of amicus participation (Simmons 2009, 197; Kearney and Merrill 2000, 754-56). During 
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the Rehnquist Court years, the case that attracted the highest level of amicus curiae participation 
– and set the all-time USSC record up to that point – was Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), involving 
affirmative action in higher education admissions, attracting more than 80 briefs from a wide 
range of organized interests.  This record was broken most recently in the 2011-12 consolidated 
health care case over the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
which saw a record-breaking 136 amicus briefs, plus two court-appointed amici (Franze and 
Anderson 2012, 1).     
At one time, the political disadvantage theory of interest group litigation was widely 
accepted within the discipline (Olson 1990).  This theory holds that that interest group litigation 
mainly concerns groups that are disadvantaged in majoritarian politics because of their lack of 
resources, or unpopular views or behaviors, or their experience of discrimination.  These groups 
depend, therefore, on the judicial processes to pursue their policy interests, which they cannot 
achieve in the electoral process.   In essence, groups litigate because they lack access to 
traditional political forums and find a safe haven in the courts (Collins 2008, 20).  Early scholars 
studying interest group activity in the courts, such as Vose (1955) and Barker (1967), promoted 
this understanding.  
However, a number of studies of amicus participation call this theory into question by 
showing that the USSC is not biased towards any one type of interest. Rather it is remarkably 
accessible to a diverse array of organized interests at both the certiorari and merits stage of 
decision (Caldeira and Wright 1990; Collins 2008; Collins and Solowiej 2007).  The levels of 
conservative and liberal amicus participation have been essentially the same at the USSC 
between 1946 – 2001 (Collins 2008).  Corporations and professional associations do not 
dominate the Court’s amicus activity.  While amicus participation is most frequent in civil rights 
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and liberties cases, all issue areas draw considerable amicus attention (Collins 2008).  In terms of 
amicus participation, state governments, trade associations, public advocacy organizations, and 
businesses tend to be the most involved categories of interest groups (Collins and Solowiej 2007; 
Calderia and Wright 1990).  Thus, amicus participation is pluralistic both in terms of types of 
organizations that appear before the USSC, and in terms of the ideological spectrum of amicus 
participants (Collins 2008).  This supports the pluralist theory of interest groups, i.e., a diverse 
array of interest groups find a voice at the USSC (Collins 2008; Calderia and Wright 1990).  In 
sum, Schattschneider’s (1960) description that “the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
crust accent,” does not properly apply to amicus participation at the USSC.  The interest group 
system in the USSC “reflects a much more diverse set of interests than Washington lobbying 
activity more generally” (Collins 2008, 63).  This conclusion enhances the institutional 
legitimacy of the USSC by lending credence to the notion that the USSC is a quasi-
representative institution that, at least procedurally, embodies the norm of democratic inclusion 
(Simmons, 2009).
17
 
The research of Dunworth, Fischman, and Ho (2009) provides a detailed picture of the 
most active amicus groups during the 1979 to 2006 terms of the USSC.  Using semi-automated 
information extraction software, the authors compile a database of over 14,000 briefs filed on the 
merits during this time period by over 600 of the most active amicus participants before the 
USSC.  Unlike most prior studies, Dunworth et al.’s database is able to provide data on the actual 
amici groups that participate, rather than merely raw brief counts.  Focusing only on amicus 
                                                 
17
 Despite a countermajoritarian reputation, the literature shows that the USSC is often a part of the dominant 
national political coalition (Dahl 1957; Funston 1975) and its decisions are most often consistent with 
public preferences, even when they protect minority interests (Barnum 1985).  Accordingly, despite the 
Judiciary’s status as an independent institution, it is evident that justices adjust their decisions at the 
margins “toward a compromise that avoids active political opposition and pays some attention to what the 
public wants” (Flemming and Wood 1997, 494).   
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briefs filed by interest groups, as opposed to those filed by governments or individuals,  
Dunworth et al. are able to compile a list of the top 100 most active amicus participants from 
1979-2006 in terms of number of briefs on which they appeared in cases on the merits.  Table 1.1 
lists the 15 most active amici groups from 1976-2006 according to Dunworth et al. 
  
Table 1.1. Top 15 Amici Groups, 1976-2006 USSC Terms 
Rank Amicus Group 
Number of 
Briefs 
1 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 430 
2 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(NACDL) 
262 
3 National Association of Counties 242 
4 National League of Cities 236 
5 U.S. Conference of Mayors 234 
6 International City Management Association 227 
7 Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) 206 
8 Council of State Governments 191 
9 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America (CofC) 
179 
10 National Conference of State Legislatures 175 
11 AFL-CIO 169 
12 National Governors Association 159 
13 
National Association for Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) and NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
156 
14 Criminal Justice Legal Foundation 139 
15 Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) 138 
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Chandler (2013) conducted a recent study of amicus participation at the certiorari stage 
from May 2009 to August 2012 at the USSC to determine which interest groups were certiorari-
stage amicus “all-stars”(1).  Chandler finds that 1,750 organizations filed amicus briefs at the 
certiorari stage during the three year time period (up approximately 65 percent from May 2004 – 
August 2007).
18
  Table 1.2 lists Chandler’s results regarding the “Sweet Sixteen” – i.e., those 
groups most frequently filing certiorari stage briefs, along with each of their success rates. 
 
Table 1.2.  “Sweet Sixteen”:  Cert-Stage Amicus All-Stars, May 2009- August 2012 
Rank Party Briefs Grant % 
1 1 Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 54 55 32.0% 26.0% 
2 2 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 41 33 25.6% 31.3% 
3 4 Pacific Legal Foundation 37 25 20.0% 28.0% 
4 --- Cato Institute 30 2 22.2% --- 
5 3 Washington Legal Foundation 29 26 24.0% 39.1% 
6 --- Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence 21 1 30.0% --- 
6 
 
DRI - The Voice of the Defense Bar 21 0 23.8% 
 
8 5 National Association of Manufacturers 19 23 5.6% 31.6% 
9 --- National Federation of Independent Business 16 4 26.7% --- 
10 8 International Municipal Lawyers Association 15 10 7.7% 30.0% 
11 15 AARP 13 8 10.0% 25.0% 
11 11 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 13 9 23.1% 25.0% 
13 --- Allied Educational Foundation 10 6 28.6% --- 
13 --- American Bankers Association 10 5 11.1% --- 
13 --- American Center for Law and Justice 10 3 10.0% --- 
13 8 Mountain States Legal Foundation 10 10 50.0% 22.2% 
* Table reproduced from Chandler (2013, 1). Figures from May 2004 – August 2007 are shaded.  
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 Chandler excludes governmental entities and individuals from his analysis. 
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Chandler makes a couple of notable observations from his findings regarding the “Sweet 
Sixteen.”  First, the Chamber of Commerce filed the most certiorari stage briefs, and they had the 
second highest grant rate (highest grant rate was Mountain States Legal Foundation).  Second, 
the ideological cast of the new entrants on the list from that of five years ago is more 
conservative, anti-regulatory, and pro-business (2).  
Even though the top amici participants lists of Dunworth, Fischman, and Ho (2009) and 
Chandler (2013) deal with different time frames (1979 – 2006 vs. 2009-2012) and relate to 
differing stages of USSC litigation (merits vs. certiorari), it is notable the groups that appear in 
the top 15 of both lists:  National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL); Chamber 
of Commerce (CofC); Washington Legal Foundation (WLF); and the Pacific Legal Foundation 
(PLF).  These four groups in particular fit the category of experienced, repeat amicus players 
before the USSC. 
Individuals also participate as amici before the USSC.  While these individuals vary 
greatly, they are typically academics, attorneys, legislators, former government officials, or 
scientists. While Caldeira and Wright (1990) find that only six percent of amici during the 1982 
term were individuals, Collins and Solowiej (2007, 967) show that individuals accounted for 
over 22 percent of amici in the 1995 term.  Analyzing the 1950, 1968, 1982, and 1995 terms of 
the USSC, Collins (2008, 61), finds that individuals file 7.4 percent of amicus briefs, account for 
12.1 percent of amicus participants, and appear in 20.9 percent of cases. 
Amicus participation is increasingly marked by coalition formation (Collins and Solowiej 
2007).  Experienced lawyers often seek to build coalitions of amici (McGuire 1994).  Amici tend 
to coordinate to reinforce one another’s arguments (Caldeira and Wright 1990), to stretch thin 
resources to maximize their effect (Wasby 1983), and to be efficient (Hojnacki 1997).   This 
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collaboration and coordination is most evident when organizations choose to become amicus 
participants as amicus brief cosigners.  Collins (2008, 58 fn.59) provides a number of reasons 
why this is an attractive option:  “groups may do so to lighten the financial burden that 
accompanies filing an individual brief, to build relations with like-minded organizations, and/or 
as a low-cost means of pursuing organizational maintenance.”   
Given the advantages of collaboration, it is perplexing that, based on their study of all 
amicus briefs filed during the 1982 term of the USSC, Calderia and Wright (1990) conclude that 
patterns of alliance among amici revealed little formal coalition activity.  The dominant pattern 
they found, instead, was for organizations to file multiple and separate briefs rather than to 
coalesce on a single brief.  Calderia and Wright think this tendency supports the theory that 
amicus briefs must involve costly signaling in order to be useful to the Court.  This finding also 
provides some support for the informational hypothesis of amici influence, discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 3, which states that the influence of amici springs not primarily from their 
simple presence, but instead from the information that their briefs impart.   
Collins and Solowiej (2007) reach similar conclusions to Calderia and Wright (1990) 
based on their study of the 1995 term of the USSC regarding coalition activity among groups.  
However, they show that two particular categories of amici – states and individuals – do 
evidence strong coalitional activity in comparison to other categories of amici. 
 
C. Why Do Interest Groups File Amicus Briefs? 
Organizations or “pressure groups” support legal action because individuals often lack 
the necessary, time, money, and skill to influence cases (Vose 1958).  By filing amicus briefs, 
interest groups “lobby” the USSC in an effort to influence legal policy (Barker 1967). The main 
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goal motivating the lobbying choices made by interest groups is the desire to have the justices 
endorse policies favorable to those groups’ interests (Collins 2008; Collins 2007; Hansford 
2004a; Solberg and Waltenburg 2006; Wasby 1983).  In order to achieve their goals, interest 
groups file briefs that inform the justices of the broad legal and policy ramifications of the 
Court’s decisions (Collins 2008).  Wasby (1984, 114) noted three reasons amici typically seek 
out a case: (1) to reinforce a litigant’s position by adding their voice to others; (2) to reframe a 
party’s case to better fit the amicus’ needs or preferences; and (3) to offer supplemental 
information or arguments that go beyond those of the party. Through repeated use of the courts, 
interest groups can become “repeat players” who have an advantage in the choice of cases they 
pursue, the forum in which they pursue them, and their ability to manipulate the law to their own 
advantage (Wasby 1983; Galanter 1974).   
In addition to the desire to influence policy, prior literature has suggested multiple 
rationale for interest group involvement in litigation:  to counteract political disadvantage 
(political disadvantage theory); because they have resource advantages or want to equalize the 
litigation playing field (party capability theory) (Solowiej and Collins 2009; Solberg and 
Waltenburg 2006); to protect gains already won in other venues (Kobylka 1987); because of the 
peculiar characteristics of the group (Wasby 1983); and for organizational maintenance purposes 
(to attract and retain membership support) (e.g., Solberg and Waltenburg 2006; Hansford 2004a; 
Wasby 1983). 
Further, other prior studies (e.g., Collins and Solowiej 2009; Wasby 1983; Holyoke 2003; 
Solberg and Waltenburg 2006; Hansford 2004a; 2004b) have shown that a range of factors 
influence amicus participation and strategy: Solicitor General invitation; political salience; 
political atmosphere (court’s substantive rulings, public opinion, legislative and administrative 
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actions); case complexity; available venue (e.g., federal or state court); type of case; area of law; 
ideological proximity of the court to the filing party; attorney experience; media coverage; 
likelihood of winning; litigant resources; group resources (budget, funds, attorneys, size of 
membership, etc.); intraorganizational factors; timing of a group’s involvement (e.g., earlier the 
participation, the greater the control); group’s longevity and continuity; group’s ideological 
commitment; size of group’s legal staff; organizational structure (membership vs. 
nonmembership group); interorganizational factors; number of groups litigating in particular 
policy area; and level/magnitude of cooperation/competition among groups in particular policy 
areas.  
Studies are mixed regarding whether the probability of litigation success influences the 
decision to participate as amicus curiae.  Amici may appear to have influenced the USSC’s 
decision on the merits, when in fact the USSC’s probable decision direction instead influenced 
the amici’s choice to participate in the case.  This is the causal challenge of the findings 
(Hansford 2004a).  Participating in cases that have a good chance of success can help with a 
group’s membership base because it can lead to a demonstrated track record of success (Epstein 
1991; Hansford 2004a; Kearney and Merrill 2000; Collins 2004).  
This selective behavior confounds the question of amicus influence. Solberg and 
Waltenburg (2006) and Hansford (2004a) show that the likelihood of success influences a 
group’s calculation of whether or not to file briefs and engage the courts.  However, Collins’ 
(2007; 2004) findings suggest that amicus influence is not a function of selective behavior – i.e., 
groups do not file briefs in cases they are more likely to “win.”  Rather, groups file amicus briefs 
on behalf of litigants they genuinely support, regardless of their probability of litigation success 
(Collins 2004).   
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The presence of counteractive lobbying – or the arms race phenomenon (Solowiej and 
Collins 2009; Collins and Solowiej 2007; Hansford 2011; Solberg and Waltenburg 2006; Farber 
2007) – has been recognized among amici. Amici frequently file on opposite sides of an issue, 
competing directly with one another.  Collins and Solowiej (2009) show that organized interests 
supporting the respondent respond to the number of amicus curiae briefs supporting the 
petitioning party. As the number of amicus briefs filed for the petitioner increases, so too does 
the number of amicus briefs filed for the respondent (responsive counteractive lobbying 
hypothesis). Organized interests supporting the petitioner will anticipate the number of amicus 
curiae briefs supporting the respondent party. As the number of amicus briefs filed for the 
respondent increases, so too does the number of amicus briefs filed for the petitioner 
(anticipatory counteractive lobbying hypothesis).  This counteractive lobbying phenomenon can 
confound those who seek to determine amicus influence on judicial decision-making, as the 
relative advantage of amicus participants on one side versus another dissipates. 
Litigant resources are another factor influencing amici participation. Solowiej and Collins 
(2009) find that as the resource status of the respondent party decreases, the number of amicus 
briefs supporting that party increases. This finding shows organizations’ willingness to file 
amicus briefs when they perceive that the respondent party might be incapable of marshaling the 
best arguments as a result of a lack of resources and/or expertise.  In addition, the number of 
amicus briefs supporting the respondent increases in tandem with the resources available to the 
opposing party. This suggests that rather than target cases based on their perceptions of a case’s 
“winnability,” respondent amici are more likely to challenge high-resource litigants, presumably 
in an attempt to negate the persuasion attempts forwarded by high-status litigants, thus leveling 
the playing field (e.g., Songer, Kuersten, and Kaheny 2000).  The implication is that the theory 
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of friendly lobbying found in Congressional lobbying literature – i.e., interest groups are more 
likely to lobby their friends – may not apply in the context of the USSC.  A theory of 
counteractive lobbying – in which interest groups lobby for the purpose of negating the advocacy 
effects of their opponents – seems more accurate in the context of interest group activity in the 
litigation area (Solowiej and Collins 2009). 
Thus, the decision to file an amicus brief is a function of the presence of other opposing 
amici, the anticipated receptiveness of the USSC, the USSC’s need for information, and the 
potential for this form of advocacy to allow membership-based groups to attract support 
(Hansford 2004a and b).  An interest group is more likely to submit amicus curiae briefs to the 
USSC if the USSC is receptive and if the interest group has had previous interactions with the 
USSC (Hansford 2004b).  Interest groups are less likely to submit briefs when the parties in a 
case are represented by experienced attorneys (Hansford 2004a).  Likelihood of media coverage 
has the largest substantive effect on the probability of a membership-based interest filing an 
amicus brief (Hansford 2004b).  Hansford’s (2004a and b) studies suggest that the information 
function is probably the most significant factor underlying a group’s decision of whether or not 
to participate as an amicus curiae:  organized groups seek out situations in which the USSC has 
less than optimal information when deciding whether or not to file an amicus brief, because it is 
in these low-information settings that the group is most likely to exert some influence over 
policy decisions of the USSC.   
 
D. Do Amicus Participants Influence Judicial Decision-making at the USSC?  
It is thought that the USSC justices use amicus briefs to aid their efforts to reach the best 
and most accurate legal conclusions.  Due to the time and resource constraints USSC justices 
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face, due to the subjective and indeterminate nature of the law, and due to the USSC’s 
permissive attitude towards amicus participation, the environment is ripe for interest group 
influence on the justices (Collins 2008).  
However, evidence of amicus impact is inconclusive and sometimes contradictory.   For 
example, Ennis (1984, 603) argues that amicus briefs are impactful in shaping case outcomes: 
sometimes judges decide cases on a grounds suggested by an amicus, not the parties; and 
sometimes judicial rulings are narrower or broader than the parties urged because of persuasive 
amicus briefs.  This leads Ennis to conclude that amicus briefs are not simply “icing on the 
cake,” but instead “are often the cake itself” (603).  Caldeira and Wright (1990, 786) point to the 
fact that the USSC seldom limits amicus participation as a sign that amicus briefs are valuable to 
the justices.  Yet, the authors of one of the leading studies regarding amicus participation and 
influence at the USSC concede that “attitudes within the legal community about the utility and 
impact of amicus briefs vary widely” and that the existing studies seeking to determine the 
impact of the briefs on the USSC “reach strikingly inconsistent conclusions” (Kearney and 
Merrill 2000, 745,769).  Various studies acknowledge that it is not entirely clear the causal 
effect, if any, amicus briefs have on the USSC’s decisions (Collins 2007; Songer and Sheehan 
1993; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997).  As mentioned previously, the tendency of amicus briefs to 
be evenly distributed on both sides of a case (“arms race phenomenon” or “counteractive 
lobbying”) may explain, in part, why it is often difficult to detect the substantive impact of 
amicus briefs on case outcomes (Kearney and Merrill 2000).  Or, it may be that this amicus 
proliferation and arms race phenomenon does not merely mask, but instead dilutes, amici’s 
effectiveness.  This may be related to the indication that judges’ interest in reading briefs is 
inversely proportional to the sheer number of briefs filed (Simpson and Vasaly 2004, 15). 
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Individual amicus briefs may be influential in particular cases, even if aggregate studies 
of amici determine that, on balance, they are not.  Much anecdotal evidence of amicus brief 
influence in particular cases certainly exists.  For example, scholars have noted the impact of 
amici in such landmark USSC cases as the following:  Brown v. Board of Education (1954) – in 
which the USSC cited information provided by amici that segregation generates a feeling of 
inferiority among persons of color; Mapp v. Ohio (1961) – in which the USSC extended the 
exclusionary rule to the states based upon an argument raised solely in the ACLU’s amicus brief 
(Collins 2008, 142); Roe v. Wade (1973) – in  which the USSC expressly referred to positions 
urged by amici and  relied upon information supplied by amici describing the risks of abortion 
and discussing beliefs regarding the beginning of life (Simard 2007-08, 671) – and companion 
case Doe v. Bolton (1973) – in which the majority expressly relied on data provided by amici 
showing that facilities other than hospitals are adequate to perform abortions (Sungaila 2010, 3); 
Epperson v. Arkansas (1968) – in which the USSC struck down a state statute prohibiting the 
teaching of human evolution in public schools based on grounds raised solely in an amicus brief 
by the ACLU and the American Jewish Congress (Pfeffer 1981, 108); Metromedia, Inc. v. San 
Diego (1981) – in which Justice White authored a plurality opinion striking down San Diego’s 
billboard ban due to the influence of the ACLU’s amicus brief (Ennis 1984, 607; Hedman 1991, 
190); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) – an abortion rights case with 85 amicus 
briefs; Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) companion cases – in which the 
USSC relied upon information supplied by high ranking retired military personnel, including 
General Norman Schwarzkopf, about the importance of diversity among military officers coming 
from the service academies and the universities to national security (Simpson and Vasaly 2004, 
9); and Lawrence v. Texas (2003) – a gay rights case in which the USSC noted the filing of 
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“scholarly amicus briefs” and cited those briefs in deciding to strike down an anti-sodomy law 
(Simpson and Vasaly 2004, 10).  
Similarly, some studies have attempted to discern the impact of amici on specific areas of 
litigation, including church-state relations (Ivers 1992; Ivers 1990; Pfeffer 1981), gender 
discrimination (Wolpert 1991), women’s rights (O’Connor 1980), privacy (Samuels 2004), rape 
(Coleman 2008), environmental protection (Hedman 1990), affirmative action (O’Neill 1985), 
abortion (Kolbert 1989; Behuniak-Long 1991), free speech (Rushin and O’Conner 1987), race 
relations (Wasby 1995), obscenity law (McGuire 1990), federalism (Chen 2006), and business 
interests (Franklin 2009), or involving certain amicus participants, including the Solicitor 
General (Solimine 2012; Segal 1988; Deen, Ignagni, and Meernik 2003; O’Connor 1983), the 
ACLU and Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (Ivers and O’Conner 1987), and the 
Chamber of Commerce (Franklin 2009). While important and informative, it is difficult to draw 
generalizable conclusions regarding amicus influence from these contextualized studies. 
Prominent judges themselves have occasionally commented on the usefulness and 
efficacy of amicus briefs.  As noted by Simard (2007, 681), Justice Stephen Breyer has described 
the amicus brief as a valuable tool in educating judges, particularly on technical matters (NY 
Times 1998).  Likewise, Justice Samuel Alito has written that "an amicus who makes a strong 
but responsible presentation in support of a party can truly serve as the court's friend” (293 F.3d 
128, 131 (3d Cir. 2002)).  And former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has acknowledged that 
“[t]he friends who appear today usually file briefs calling our attention to points of law, policy 
considerations, or other points of view that the parties themselves have not discussed. These amicus 
briefs invaluably aid our decision-making process and often influence either the result or the 
reasoning of our opinions” (O’Connor 1996, 9).  On the other hand, USSC Justice Antonin Scalia 
has suggested that amici curiae are a form of interest group lobbying, and has expressed concern 
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that overrepresentation by well-organized interest groups has the potential to impact USSC 
decisions, adding that “[t]here is no self-interested organization out there devoted to the pursuit 
of truth in the federal courts” (Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1996)).  Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner has been critical of the inefficiencies created by amicus 
briefs, noting that "[t]he vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and 
duplicate the arguments made in the litigants' briefs,” “have not assisted the judges,” and are an 
“abuse” of non-party participation. (125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997)).  
One of the first empirical studies to investigate the efficacy of amici on the USSC was a 
1971 doctoral dissertation by Steven Puro.  His dataset included amicus briefs filed in USSC 
cases from 1920-1966.  Puro determined the “success rate” (i.e., those that supported the winning 
side) of amicus briefs and concluded that these briefs had a success rate of 55 percent, and that 
this rate had increased over time.  Puro noted that the Solicitor General, ACLU, and AFL-CIO 
had success rates higher than the amicus average.
19
  However, Puro’s methodology was 
incapable of showing whether or not a causal relationship existed between amicus briefs and 
judicial decision-making.  That is, calculating overall success rates for amicus filers merely 
shows that such briefs happened to be filed in support of the winning side, not necessarily the 
degree of amicus influence. 
Some studies call into question the ability of organized interests generally, and amici 
specifically, to influence judicial decision-making.  First, Hakman (1966-67, 50) reviewed 
amicus participation at the USSC from 1958-1965 and concluded that amici influence was not 
significant and that their purported influence was an example of “Political Science Folklore.”  
Second, although not related directly to amicus briefs, Epstein and Rowland (1991) show that 
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 Puro (1972, 101,103-04) found that the Solicitor General had a success rate of 77 percent, the ACLU 65 
percent, and the AFL-CIO 66 percent. 
 34 
 
there is no statistical difference in the litigation success rates of groups and nongroups at the U.S. 
trial court level, calling into question the legal clout of organized interests more generally.  
Third, Songer and Sheehan (1993) show that the presence of an amicus brief in support of a party 
has no effect on the likelihood of winning a case at the USSC when the other party has no 
amicus support; neither does a greater presence of amicus briefs on one side compared to another 
(3 to 0) enhance the likelihood of success.  Specifically, Songer and Sheehan’s methodology 
examines match-paired cases from a twenty year period (1967-87) that involve one case that has 
at least one amicus brief filed and another case that has no briefs filed and that display no 
significant difference in the outcome. The matched pairs were decided in the same term, 
involved parties of the same status, and involved the same issue.  They remove from 
consideration cases in which amicus briefs were filed by the government or private individuals, 
cases in which briefs were filed on both sides, and cases where there were no briefs on either 
side.  Songer and Sheehan find that the success rate of parties supported by amici was identical 
to those without support.  Songer and Sheehan’s findings bolster University of Chicago 
constitutional law scholar Kurland’s (1983) earlier conclusion that amicus briefs are, by in large, 
ineffective and a waste of time. 
Yet, other studies validate the influence of amicus briefs on judicial decision-making. In 
an analysis of the 1982 term of the USSC, Caldeira and Wright (1988) show that the filing of 
amicus briefs in opposition to a petition for certiorari actually increases the likelihood that the 
USSC will grant review.  Thus, an important factor in deciding whether or not certiorari is 
granted is the presence or absence of an amicus brief per se, not the direction of the substantive 
arguments presented.  For Caldeira and Wright (1988), when organized interests file amicus 
briefs for or against the granting of certiorari, they serve as costly signals about the policy 
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significance of the case.  In this way, certiorari stage amici primarily function as interest 
articulators by providing information to the justices about the array of forces in play in the 
litigation.    
However, in a recent follow-up study of amicus certiorari stage influence, Caldeira, 
Wright, and Zorn (2012) reach some differing conclusions which qualify the earlier findings of 
Caldeira and Wright (1988). Analyzing the 1968, 1982, 1990, and 2007 terms of the USSC, 
Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn (2012) find that certiorari petitions with amicus briefs are granted at 
a much higher rate than those without.  However, they also find that there has been a steady 
decline in the influence of amicus briefs in support of certiorari between 1968 and 1990, with 
this decline holding steady through the 2007 term. Moreover, in contrast to the earlier study, the 
authors find no evidence that the number of briefs filed in opposition to certiorari influences the 
USSC’s grant rate.  These findings lead Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn (2012, 9) to conclude that 
“[a]t the same time the number of amicus filings on certiorari have grown – and perhaps owing 
to it – the influence of those briefs has steadily declined.”  Therefore, the authors conclude that, 
despite increasing amici presence, the USSC appears to be less influenced by organized interests 
than they have been in the past at the certiorari stage. 
But what about amicus impact on USSC decisions on the merits?  McGuire (1994, 1990) 
shows that the probability of success increases for parties supported by amicus curiae who 
provide experienced attorneys, and that the probability of success in obscenity cases is 
significantly related to the level of amicus support received by the party.  More impressive is an 
extensive empirical study of amicus influence on the USSC from 1946-1995 by Kearney and 
Merrill (2000), in which the authors conclude that amicus briefs do impact USSC case 
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outcomes.
20
  Notably, their study assesses the efficacy of amicus briefs through the lens of three 
basic models of judicial decision-making:  the legal model, the attitudinal model, and the interest 
group model.  Using a benchmark rate of success for both respondents and petitioners without 
amicus support as their baseline for comparison, they reach six primary conclusions from their 
analysis:  (1) amicus briefs supporting respondents enjoy higher success rates than do amicus 
briefs supporting petitioners -- this greater success rate associated with amicus briefs supporting 
respondents can be explained by the supposition that respondents are more likely than petitioners 
to be represented by inexperienced lawyers in the USSC and thus are more likely to benefit from 
supporting amici; (2) small disparities of one or two briefs for one side with no briefs on the 
other side may translate into higher success rates but larger disparities do not; (3) amicus briefs 
cited by the USSC appear to be no more likely to be associated with the winning side than briefs 
not cited by the USSC;  (4) amicus briefs filed by more experienced lawyers may be more 
successful than briefs filed by less experienced lawyers; (5) the Solicitor General enjoys much 
higher success as an amicus filer than the average amicus filer; (6) the ACLU and AFL-CIO, and 
the States, also enjoy somewhat higher success rates than the average amicus filers, but not to the 
same degree as the Solicitor General; and (7) it appears that amicus briefs filed by institutional 
litigants and by experienced lawyers – filers that have a better idea of what kind of information is 
useful to the USSC – are generally more successful than are briefs filed by irregular litigants and 
less experienced lawyers.    
Kearney and Merrill cautiously interpret their results as supportive of the legal model of 
judicial decision-making, which will be discussed in more detail below.  It is important to note, 
                                                 
20
 Kearney and Merrill’s (2000) study is based upon counts of the total number of amicus briefs filed on behalf 
of the petitioner and the respondent from 1946-1995.  The study also tracks the success rates of four 
institutional litigants – Solicitor General, ACLU, AFL-CIO, and the States – and compares them to the 
benchmark rate of success. 
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however, that Kearney and Merrill’s research is frequency based and does not control for other 
variables influencing judicial decision-making. 
Lynch (2004) conducts a comprehensive study surveying 70 former USSC law clerks 
from 1966 to 2001 to determine the impact of amici on the USSC.  Lynch’s study addresses four 
primary questions:  (1) when are amicus briefs most useful?; (2) does the identity of the amicus 
filer or author matter?; (3) what is the impact of a collaborative amicus brief?; and (4) what is the 
role of social science data?   Based upon the law clerks answers to the previous questions, Lynch 
concludes that amicus briefs can have an impact in certain circumstances.  First, amicus briefs 
are most useful in cases involving highly technical and specialized areas of law, as well as in 
complex statutory and regulatory cases.  Second, amicus briefs are helpful in cases where the 
parties’ merits briefs are deficient.  Third, since majority of law clerks agreed that “most amicus 
briefs filed with the Court are not helpful and tend to be duplicative, poorly written, or merely 
lobbying documents not grounded in sound argument,” (44) briefs that do not evidence these 
qualities will likely be given greater attention.   
Fourth, close consideration of amicus briefs is highly dependent on the brief’s quality, 
and a brief’s perceived quality is often related to the source of the brief.  Solicitor General 
amicus briefs are given higher levels of consideration than those from any other source because 
they are generally considered of the highest quality, followed by amicus briefs filed by the 
ACLU and state and local governments.  The clerks also indicated that briefs filed by prominent 
academics and reputed attorneys are given greater consideration.   
Fifth, there is an advantage to amicus collaboration (multiple groups signing the same 
brief) and coordination (groups filing separate briefs each tackling different arguments by 
design):  90 percent of clerks expressed a preference for collaborative amicus briefs, with one 
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clerk commenting that "the more groups that come together on a brief, the more impressive it is 
that they hold the same view" (57-58).  Still, collaboration and coordination by themselves are 
not definitive, but rather the groups who are collaborating make the most difference in the 
consideration likely to be given the brief.   Particularly likely to be given consideration are briefs 
in which organizations who are not traditional ideological allies collaborate.  Sixth, a slight 
majority of clerks indicated that briefs providing social science data can be particularly helpful 
because such briefs often provide new information not contained in the party briefs. 
Based upon this survey data, Lynch offers the following recommendations to maximize 
the effectiveness of amicus briefs.  First, “to the greatest extent possible, avoid repeating the 
information presented in the merits brief of the party it supports and in the other amicus briefs. 
Clerks cited verbatim iteration to be the fatal flaw of an amicus brief. A serviceable brief must 
be additive to the party discussion” (Lynch 2004, 67).  Second, keep the brief short.  Third, make 
sure the brief is well written.  Finally, the name on the brief matters, as greater attention is given 
to frequent and prominent amicus filers (“repeat players”), such as institutional litigants.   
Collins (2007) concludes that amicus briefs do play a significant role in shaping the 
ideological direction of the USSC’s decisions.  Analyzing amicus influence during the 1946-
1995 terms of the USSC, and controlling for other known variables influencing the USSC (e.g., 
Solicitor General; justice ideology; litigant resources, lower court conflict), Collins finds that the 
provision of liberal briefs enhances the probability of a liberal decision by the USSC, and the 
provision of conservative briefs by amici enhances the probability of a conservative decision by 
the USSC.   This is particularly true when the case is accompanied by lopsided amicus 
participation.   Also, counter to conventional wisdom, Collins finds that groups do not file more 
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amicus briefs in cases that they think they are likely to win, but that actually the opposite trend 
exists. 
Collins (2008) provides the most extensive and theoretically rich study to date on the 
influence of amici on the USSC.   In this study, Collins purposefully chooses not to focus upon 
the influence of amicus briefs on the USSC’s decision outcomes (using litigation success as the 
dependent variable (i.e., win or lose) and treating the USSC as a unitary actor).  Instead, Collins 
undertakes to address a different and more theoretically interesting question:  do amicus briefs 
influence the ideological directional of the votes of the individual justices (i.e., liberal or 
conservative)?  He demonstrates that amicus briefs have a discernible impact on how individual 
justices vote on the merits of a case, even when controlling for judicial ideology.   
For the overwhelming majority of the court, ideology does not act as a mediating variable 
conditioning how the justices process the information contained in amicus briefs.  That is, 
regardless of ideology, the justices become more likely to vote liberally as the number of liberal 
amicus briefs increases, and more likely to vote conservatively as the number of conservative 
briefs increases.  However, Collins shows that justices who sit at or near the ideological center of 
the USSC are especially susceptible to the persuasive legal arguments contained in amicus briefs.   
Such evidence bolsters the utility of targeting the median (swing) vote through amicus briefs 
(Collins 2008).  This is a particularly significant finding, as studies have shown the median 
justice is the most influential player in determining USSC case outcomes and opinion content 
(e.g., Martin, Quinn, and Epstein 2005; Schmidt and Yalof 2004).   In addition, Collins finds that 
increasing numbers of amicus briefs in a case increase a justice’s likelihood of writing or joining 
a concurring or dissenting opinion, as these briefs highlight the uncertain and indeterminate 
nature of the law. 
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Since it has been shown that amici can influence judicial behavior, another important 
question concerns whether or not all amici are created equal in influence.  The short answer is 
“No.” Generally, it is already known that experienced advocates enjoy greater success at the 
USSC and are more likely to have their arguments adopted by the USSC in their written opinions 
(McAtee and McGuire 2007; McGuire 1994; McGuire 1995).  As discussed previously, scholars 
have posited and found some support for the notion that the prestige and experience of the 
amicus participant may influence judicial behavior (e.g., McGuire 1994; Kearney and Merrill 
2000; Lynch 2004; Collins 2004; Simard 2007; Chandler 2013).  Repeat players, or institutional 
litigants, before the USSC typically have resource, expertise, and credibility advantages over 
other amicus participants.   
Kearny and Merrill (2000, 788-89) choose to set aside and separately track the amicus 
curiae participation of four “institutional litigants” – the Solicitor General, the ACLU, the AFL-
CIO, and the States – that had been identified in previous literature21 as being especially 
successful in influencing the USSC via amicus curiae briefs.  These institutional litigants were 
frequent amicus participants during the scope of Kearney and Merrill’s 50 year study and, at 
least in the case of the Solicitor General, ACLU, and AFL-CIO, known for their high quality 
briefs.  Kearney and Merrill find that each of these four institutional litigants achieved litigant 
success rates modestly above the benchmark average, and the positive effect was strongest in the 
case of the Solicitor General.  Lynch’s (2004) survey results of former USSC law clerks accords 
with this finding regarding the influence of the Solicitor General, the ACLU, and the state 
governments, as does Simard’s (2007) survey of appellate judges, which shows that judges are 
more likely to value prestigious briefs.   
                                                 
21
 See e.g., Ivers and O’Conner (1987), studying the success rate of the ACLU; also Puro (1971), discussing the 
success rates of each of these four amici. 
 41 
 
In Simard’s (2007) survey, three USSC justices indicated that they are moderately 
influenced by the identity, prestige, and experience of the amicus curiae (688).  Of particular 
note is Simard’s revelation of her telephone interview of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in which 
Justice Ginsburg said  that “her clerks often divide the amicus briefs into three piles: those that 
should be skipped entirely, those that should be skimmed, and those that should be read in full” 
(688).  Those amicus briefs featuring experienced attorneys were most likely to be placed in the 
high priority pile. 
Thus, group influence varies based upon the reputation of the group and the perceived 
quality of the information provided in their brief.  This makes good sense, as busy justices and 
law clerks who are inundated with petitions, party briefs, and amicus briefs, are most likely to 
pay attention to those briefs that come from the most prestigious and reputable sources. 
A continual refrain in the literature, and made clear in the foregoing discussion, is this: 
the Solicitor General is the most prominent and influential amicus participant (e.g., Puro 1972; 
O’Connor 1983; Segal 1988; Kearney and Merrill 2000; Lynch 2004; Franze and Anderson 
2012; Corley, Collins, and Hamner 2013).  The SG plays a dual role:  the chief advocate before 
the USSC for the executive branch, as well as an informal advisor to the USSC.   Due to the 
SG’s prominence, some even refer to the SG as the “tenth justice” (Wohl 1996, 48). Reviewing 
the 1952 -1982 terms of the USSC, Segal (1988) found that the SG's amicus filings supported the 
winning side approximately 75 percent of the time.  This finding accords with that of Salokar 
(1992), who reviewed all amicus cases decided by the USSC between 1959 and 1986 and found 
that the SG supported the winning side in 72 percent of the cases in which he filed an amicus 
brief, with no significant variations from one administration to the next.  Further, briefs 
submitted by the SG are much more likely to be cited (e.g., Franze and Anderson 2012; Kearney 
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and Merrill 2002), and the arguments contained therein more likely to be adopted in the USSC’s 
opinion (Corley, Collins, and Hamner 2013), than any other amicus participant. 
The research of Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt (2013) adds important insights 
to these prior studies on amicus prestige and experience.  Their research is notable because, 
unlike the studies mentioned above, it does not base its measure of amicus power on whether the 
amicus has a prestigious reputation or on whether the amicus has a success rate before the USSC 
higher than other groups.  Instead, drawing from the insights of network theory, Box 
Steffensmeier et al. measure amicus power based upon the degree to which the amicus group is 
central to a network of groups appearing before the USSC.   They propose that amici that are 
central to the network of groups appearing before the USSC will be considerable more likely to 
exert influence. The authors posit the amicus influence hypothesis:  “for an amicus brief to 
influence a justice, two conditions must be met: first, the brief must attract the attention of the 
justice and her clerks enough to merit a close reading; second, the brief must contain novel, high-
quality information and advocacy that does not replicate the arguments of the litigants’ briefs” 
(4).   High status amici are much more likely to meet these two conditions than other amici.  
Given that briefs are expensive to produce (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Lynch 2004), high status 
amici have an advantage in that they are generally in a better position to retain experienced 
counsel and support the necessary research to produce high quality briefs (Box-Steffensmeier et 
al., 4).  Collins (2008, 183) affirms the perspective: “[a]s applied to amicus briefs, this [i.e., the 
advantage of those with higher status and resources] implies that courts might be particularly 
attentive to the arguments advanced by highly experienced advocates, giving those briefs 
favorable attention.” 
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 Box-Steffensmeier et al. design an empirical study to test whether or not all amici are 
created equal at the USSC – i.e., whether the interest groups with more power make a difference 
in the justices’ behavior.  Controlling for other variables known to influence justice voting 
behavior (justice ideology, lower court decision direction, litigant resources, and the presence of 
the SG as amicus), Box-Steffensmeier et al. measure the influence of all interest groups 
appearing as amici from 1946 to 2010 by operationalizing interest group power using a 
foundation network centrality statistic.  The methodology of arriving at the measure is quite 
sophisticated,
22
 but in essence, the centrality of a group within a network serves as a measure of 
its power.  Powerful groups are those groups that are more connected with other interest groups 
and collaborate with other well-connected groups.  This centrality score is represented as a 
continuous variable of the maximum power of interest groups that signed briefs on each side 
(liberal or conservative) of a case.  Because networks vary over time along with interest group 
power, the authors use different scores for each decade instead of using a single score to measure 
interest group power.  This enables the authors to capture the reality that some interest groups are 
more powerful and present in some periods rather than in others (8).
23
   
                                                 
22
 The authors use eigenvector centrality to capture the notion that the groups best positioned in the network are 
pivotal actors before the USSC. As explained by Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2013, 6-7),  “[e]igenvector 
centrality refers to the value of the first eigenvector of the network with respect to the sum of the interest 
groups to which it is connected in every decade …. it weights relationships between nodes according to 
their centralities, not just the number of connections, which means that both direct and indirect 
relationships are accounted for with this measure.  In the context of our interest group network, measuring 
power with eigenvector centrality suggests that the quality of ties are an important consideration, not just 
the number of them. Interest groups that are tied to well-connected groups are taken to be more powerful 
than groups who have a similar number of connections to less connected groups.” 
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 Interestingly, the authors find that the five most powerful (i.e., highest eigenvector centrality scores) groups 
in the 2000’s are as follows: (1) American Farm Bureau; (2) American Soybean Association; (3) Oregon 
Cattlemen’s Association; (4) New Mexico Cattle Grower’s Association; and (5) Wyoming Stock Growers.  
Each of these five groups are agricultural, and none would likely be identified either in legal circles or in 
the common public discourse as among the most powerful and influential amici.   Likewise, the five most 
powerful amicus groups in the 1990’s are as follows: (1) American Association of University Women; (2) 
Northwest Women’s Law Center; (3) California Women’s Law Center; (4) National Council of Jewish 
Women; and (5) Connecticut Women’s Educational and Legal Fund.  Notably, each of these are women’s 
groups.  Given that none of these ten groups would likely be recognized by legal practitioners, scholars, or 
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The results of their study suggest that when there is a big (at least three brief) ideological 
advantage in terms of amicus briefs, interest group power has little direct relation to justice vote.  
However, when the two sides have relatively equal amicus participation, the power measures are 
statistically significant (10).  Given that the majority of cases before the USSC have roughly 
equal amicus participation on both sides, this is a significant finding.   Further, Box-
Steffensmeier et al. find that the influence of interest group power is attenuated by justice 
ideology:  liberal justices are more likely to vote liberally when powerful liberal interest groups 
are present than conservative justices, and conservative justices are more likely to vote 
conservatively when powerful conservative interest groups are present than liberal justices.  And 
interestingly, for the more conservative justices, the presence of a powerful liberal amicus 
actually decreases their probability of casting a liberal vote.  Yet, this same phenomenon does 
not hold true for the more liberal justices:  the presence of a powerful conservative amicus 
decreases their probability of casting a liberal vote (11).   
In sum, Box-Steffensmeier et al.’s study demonstrates that differences in the power and 
prestige of interest groups can explain why some groups find more success in achieving their 
political objectives than others as amicus participants.  Stated differently:  who files a brief may 
be as important as how many briefs are filed or how many amici participate.  Groups that exhibit 
both higher informational resources and greater credibility should be more likely to persuade the 
USSC and emerge victorious on the merits (Box Steffensmeier et al. 3).  
However, this finding comes with two crucial qualifications.  First, the influence of 
powerful groups seems to be only operative when amicus participation is relatively balanced in a 
case.  Second, the influence of powerful interest groups is not uniform amongst the justices. 
                                                                                                                                           
common folk as among the most powerful and influential interest groups, I interpret the findings of Box-
Steffensmeier et al. (2013) with caution. 
 45 
 
Liberal and conservative justices respond differently to the presence of powerful interest groups 
of the opposing ideology.  At least for the more conservative justices, the presence of a powerful 
liberal amicus group can act as a signal to vote against the party that group supports.  This 
particular finding undermines the legal persuasion model of decision-making and supports the 
attitudinal model.
24
  At the same time, liberal justices are less likely to vote liberally in cases 
involving a powerful conservative amicus.  This finding is supportive of the legal persuasion 
model. 
Another pressing question is whether the USSC is more influenced by the simple 
presence of amicus curiae or by the actual amicus briefs themselves.  The literature does not 
provide a definitive answer, although some empirical studies have attempted to test this question.  
One theory – the interest group theory (discussed in greater length below) – posits that the 
number of amicus participants (filers and cosigners) matters because “having a large number of 
participants listed on a brief signals to the court that a greater number of groups, and by 
implication their members, will be impacted by the decision” (Collins 2004, 811-12).  That is, 
even though amicus cosigners do not add any legal or social scientific information, the number 
of cosigners can provide a crude barometer of public opinion (Collins 2004; Kearney and Merrill 
2000).   
As mentioned above, Caldeira and Wright (1988) find that mere amici presence matters 
when the USSC is deciding whether or not to grant certiorari (i.e., the agenda-setting stage):  the 
more amicus participation, the more likely the USSC is to grant certiorari, regardless of whether 
or not the amicus is urging the USSC to grant or deny cert.   However, empirical studies of amici 
at the merits stage of the USSC have failed to demonstrate that the number of groups cosigning 
                                                 
24
 The legal (and legal persuasion), attitudinal, and interest group models of judicial decision-making are 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
 46 
 
an amicus brief has a statistically significant impact on USSC decisions on the merits (Collins 
2004, 822; Caldeira and Wright 1990, 800; Collins 2008, 179– 80).  Likewise, survey data 
provided by Lynch (2004, 59) also provides moderate support for the view that the sheer number 
of amicus brief cosigners is not a significant factor for consideration according to 50 percent of 
the former USSC clerks surveyed.  Instead, Lynch generally found that the identity of the amicus 
participants was more important than the number of groups involved. 
Another potential mechanism of amicus influence that scholars have studied is the degree 
to which judges reference or cite amicus briefs in their opinions.  Kearney and Merrill (2000) 
show that USSC justices have been increasingly citing amicus briefs over time.  O'Connor and 
Epstein (1983, 42) show that non-governmental amicus briefs are cited in majority, concurring or 
dissenting opinions in 18 percent of the cases decided by the USSC from 1969 to 1981. Epstein 
and O’Connor (2005) show that during the Rehnquist Court years, the USSC’s majority opinion 
references at least one amicus brief in 38 percent of the cases in which at least one amicus brief 
was filed.   Most recently, in its 2010-11 and 2011-12 terms, the USSC cited amicus briefs in 63 
and 46 percent of cases with amicus participation, respectively (Franze and Anderson 2012, 2).  
This is a notable increase over prior years, as the USSC majority, plurality, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions combined referenced amicus curiae briefs in just 24 percent of cases between 
1946-85 (Kearney and Merrill 2000 at 758).  Majority opinions in cases involving privacy rights 
and civil rights are most likely to reference amicus briefs, whereas cases involving federal 
taxation and criminal procedure are least likely to cite such briefs.   Further, Spriggs and 
Wahlbeck (1997, 373-74) point out that the USSC is more likely to cite arguments raised in 
briefs supporting the petitioner than those supporting the respondent. 
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It could be simply that the USSC is referencing more amicus briefs than ever before 
because more briefs are being filed than ever before; alternatively, the USSC could be 
referencing more briefs than before because briefs are having more influence than before.  Either 
way, simply looking to the number of citations (explicit references) of amicus briefs in judicial 
opinions is at best a “blunt indicator” of amicus influence (O’Connor and Epstein 1983) and 
potentially problematic because it may understate or overstate the influence of amici (Franklin 
2009; Samuels 2004).   For example, focusing on privacy cases, Samuels (2004, xii) found that 
the USSC regularly made use of arguments and information provided by amici without providing 
proper attribution.
25
  Even if it appears that the USSC is adopting arguments presented by amici, 
this could be simply because the amici are reinforcing the arguments already made by the parties.   
Further, amicus briefs are often cited by the justices simply to describe, or even rebut, an 
argument.  And a citation itself conveys little about whether the justices would have arrived at 
the same idea independently (Franklin 2009, 1027-28). 
Studies are mixed regarding whether the USSC is more likely to use information from 
amicus briefs that repeat the parties’ arguments or rather those briefs that provide original 
information.  Spriggs and Wahlbeck (1997) examine the 1992 term of the USSC and 
demonstrate that amicus briefs usually provide information that is not contained in the party 
briefs, in addition to reiterating the arguments made in the party briefs and reinforcing the party 
positions.  This finding accords with Collins’ (2008) finding that more than 70 percent of amicus 
briefs offer justices information that is not found in the party briefs.  Notably, however, Spriggs 
and Wahlbeck show that the USSC is more likely to use information from amici that repeat 
                                                 
25
 Another example:  in Romer v. Evans (1996, 517 U.S. 620), a case involving a Colorado voters’ initiative 
barring the enactment of laws protecting homosexuals from discrimination, majority opinion author Justice 
Kennedy adopted arguments put forward by amici Laurence H. Tribe, along with several other 
constitutional scholars.  However, Justice Kennedy never cited Tribe’s amicus brief in his opinion 
(Simpson and Vasaly 2004, 14). 
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existing arguments rather than those that provide original information.  Briefs that exclusively 
reiterate arguments were referred to 63 percent of the time compared to only 26 percent for those 
that exclusively added (379–80).  Spriggs and Wahlbeck conclude that reiteration of parties’ 
arguments is more important to the justices than new information provided by amici.   This 
finding accords with prior research (Pfeffer 1981).  Yet it goes against the findings of survey 
data of federal judges and former USSC clerks that caution amici against merely restating party 
arguments (Lynch 2004; Simard 2007), as well as against the advice of other scholars who 
caution against wisdom of amici providing redundant arguments and information (e.g., Ennis 
1984; Sungaila 2010). 
Perhaps the most pertinent question of all pertaining to amicus impact on the USSC is 
whether or not amici affect the content of the justices’ opinions, and by extension, the evolution 
of legal rules and precedent.  Surprisingly, only a small amount of empirical literature has 
pursued an answer to this question (e.g., Epstein and Kobylka 1992; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 
1997; Samuels 2004).  Epstein and Kobylka (1992) show that amici have played an important 
role in shaping abortion and death penalty litigation.  Corley, Collins, and Hamner (2013) 
provide the most systematic and comprehensive attempt to answer this question by using 
plagiarism detection software to investigate USSC majority opinion content during the 2002-
2004 terms.  Specifically, Corley et al. (2013) analyze the instances in which the USSC 
incorporated arguments made by amici into their majority opinions.  They find that arguments 
from amicus briefs that are cognitively clear and that use plain language are more likely to be 
incorporated into the USSC’s majority opinion than other amicus briefs.  They also find that the 
USSC majority opinion is more likely to incorporate arguments from amici that repeat the 
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arguments of the litigant briefs and other amici.  This finding accords with that of Spriggs and 
Wahlbeck (1997), discussed above.   
Consistent with the attitudinal model, the authors find that liberal majority opinions are 
more likely to incorporate the arguments of liberal amicus briefs, and conservative majority 
opinions are more likely to incorporate the arguments of conservative amicus briefs.   
Additionally, majority opinions in salient cases are less likely to incorporate arguments of amici 
than in others.  Lastly, Corley et al. (2013, 19) find that the SG is the most influential amicus in 
terms of having its arguments incorporated in the majority opinion of the USSC.  Compared to 
other amici, majority opinions adopt 367 percent more language from amicus briefs filed by the 
SG.  This finding is consistent with those of Kearney and Merrill (2000, 760), who term the SG 
the “king of the citation-frequency hill” because the SG is cited more frequently than all other 
amicus participants – in about 40 percent of the cases in which the SG appears as amicus.26 
In conclusion, although consensus is lacking, various studies have shown that amici 
influence exists on the USSC, and that this influence depends upon multiple factors:  the nature 
and salience of the case (Lynch 2004; Unah and Hancock 2006; Corley, Collins, and Hamner 
2013); the prestige and experience of the amicus participant (McGuire 1994; Kearney and 
Merrill 2000; Lynch 2004; Simard 2007; Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt 2013); the 
resources of the party whom the amicus supports (McGuire 1994; Collins 2008); whether the 
brief supports the respondent or the petitioner (Kearney and Merrill 2000); the disparity in the 
number of briefs offered by each side (Kearney and Merrill 2000; Collins 2008; Collins 2007); 
the ideology of the justice reading the brief (Collins 2008; Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and 
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 This finding also is consistent with the those of Franze and Anderson (2012, 2) who find that the justices 
cited the SG’s amicus briefs in 79 percent of cases in which the SG filed a brief during the 2010 term, and 
44 percent of such cases in the 2011 term.  This compares to the justices citing only 13 percent of amicus 
briefs filed by state and local governments and 11 percent of amicus briefs filed by nongovernment groups 
during the 2011 term. 
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Hitt 2013) – with those at the ideological center being persuadable (Collins 2008); the quality of 
the brief itself (Lynch 2004; Simard 2007; Collins, Corley, and Hamner 2013; Box-
Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt 2013); whether the amicus collaborated with others (Lynch 
2004; Box-Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt 2013); and whether the brief reiterated the 
parties’ arguments or provided new information (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Collins 2008). 
    
E. Amicus Participation and Influence in Lower Federal Courts and State Courts 
While most studies of amicus participation and influence focus on the USSC, fewer 
studies have examined amicus activity in state courts (e.g., Epstein 1994; Comparato 2003; 
Corbally, Bross and Flango 2004; Flango, Bross and Corbally 2006; Songer and Kuersten 1995; 
Laroche 2009) and lower federal courts (e.g., Martinek 2006; McIntosh and Parker 1986; 
Harrington 2005; Collins and Martinek 2010; Simard 2007; Rice 2012).   
In the U.S. Courts of Appeals (USCA), amicus participation is rather anemic compared to 
the USSC.   Martinek (2006) shows that the percentage of cases in the USCA with at least one 
amicus filer in the time period from 1960-1996 hovers between 2 and 7 percent.  Still, due to the 
sheer caseload volume in the USCA, amicus participation is not insignificant.  In fact, in raw 
numbers, amicus participation at the USCA exceeds that at the USSC.  For example, Harrington 
(2005) reports that in 2003 there were 413 cases with at least one amicus brief in the USCA.  It is 
notable that more cases involve amicus support for appellants than for appellee at the USCA, and 
cases involving economic activity and regulation attract the most absolute amicus participation 
(Collins and Martinek 2010, 401).  
Some USCA judges have criticized the lack of scrutiny in granting leave to file amicus 
briefs and the Seventh Circuit has articulated a policy limiting the types of amici it will allow 
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(Simard 2007, 672-73).  However, the Third Circuit has been more supportive of an open door 
policy giving wide latitude to amicus filings, rejecting concerns that amici must be impartial and 
devoid of pecuniary interest in the case (Simard, 673). 
Collins and Martinek (2010) employ a probit model to determine the influence of amici 
on the USCA from 1997-2000.  Their results indicate that amicus curiae briefs supporting the 
appellant enhance the litigant’s likelihood of success; however, those amicus briefs supporting 
the appellee do not make a difference.   Collins and Martinek contend that this finding makes 
sense given the strong propensity for the USCA to affirm lower court decisions (ruling in favor 
of the appellee around 70 percent of the time), because amicus briefs supporting the appellant are 
able to level the playing field between appellants and appellees (411). 
Simard (2007) surveyed three USSC Justices, 60 USCA judges coming from every 
circuit, and 227 federal district court judges to gather their insights and thoughts regarding the 
usefulness and efficacy of amici curiae.  U.S. district court (USDC) judges reported nominal 
amicus participation (from 0 to less 5 percent of their docket), and USCA judges reported 5 to 15 
percent of their docket involved amici curiae (685-86).   All three USSC justices, and the 
majority of USCA and USDC judges, acknowledged that they are influenced by the identity, 
prestige, and experience of the amicus curiae.  The three USSC justices unanimously agreed that 
the number of amicus briefs filed had zero influence on their decision, while only one agreed that 
the number of amici curiae (including cosigners) had some moderate influence.  The vast 
majority of USCA and USDC judges (around 80 percent) indicated that neither the number of 
amicus briefs filed in a case nor the number of amicus curiae cosigners had any influence on 
their decision-making.   Taken at face value, these findings seem to strike a blow to the interest 
group theory of amici influence on judicial decision-making.   However, judges may be reticent 
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to admit such influence out of concerns for the integrity of the legal process, while still being 
subjected to such influence. 
Simard also found widespread agreement among USSC, USCA, and USDC judges that 
amici can be helpful when they offer legal arguments that are absent from the parties’ briefs, and 
when they focus the court’s attention on matters that impact a direct interest that is likely to be 
materially affected by the case (692).  A majority of USCA and USDC judges also claimed that 
amici are helpful when they support a party who is not adequately represented.   In addition, all 
three levels of federal judges surveyed indicated that the government is the most helpful amicus 
curiae, particularly the SG.   A majority of all levels of federal judges also found interest groups 
and law professors to be useful as amici.  From her survey of federal judges, Simard (711) 
concludes – similar to Lynch (2004) – that “me too" briefs which merely repeat arguments that 
have already been fully vetted and briefs containing skewed or unreliable information offer no 
significant utility to the court, while briefs that educate the court on complex technical matters or 
inform the court of potential impacts of a decision on non-parties can influence the decision-
making process.  
State courts have traditionally been less open to amicus participation than the federal 
courts (Laroche 2009, 708).  State rules governing amicus participation vary widely today.  
Epstein (1994) studied the filing of amicus briefs in sixteen state courts between 1965 and 1990 
to determine if interest group involvement in courts has been increasing over time. Just like the 
pattern in federal courts, the filing of amicus briefs in state courts increased over this time frame 
dramatically, tripling from 4.3 filings per state before 1975 to 12.7 per state in the 1980s.  While 
Epstein found evidence of a wide range of organized interests as amicus filers, she noted that the 
amicus activity was uneven amongst the states.  Brace and Butler (2001, 253) extended that 
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research to all states and found that in a third of the states less than 5 percent of the cases 
involved amici participation, whereas in California, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and 
Oregon over a quarter of all cases had amici participation.   
Corbally, Bross, and Flango (2004, 53) confirm that the filing of amicus briefs in state 
courts of last resort has been on an upward trend over the past 40 years, and that there is a great 
variation in the extent to which amicus briefs are used in different states.  Using a sample of 
cases from all state courts of last resort from 1998-2000, Corbally, Bross, and Flango (2004) 
show that a small number of states accounted for the majority of amicus filings.  The ten states 
with the highest levels of amicus participation (in alphabetically order) were Alabama, 
California, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and 
Washington  They also show that amicus filings were most common in tort cases, followed by 
criminal cases.  Further, Corbally, Bross and Flango find that one third of the cases in their 
sample cited or acknowledged amicus briefs, and that in 82 percent of this subset, the court both 
directly cited and discussed arguments made in the amicus briefs. 
Other studies have attempted to more directly assess the efficacy of amici in state courts.  
Songer and Kuersten (1995) explored the success of amici in three state supreme courts’ 
(Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina) decisions on the merits from 1983 -1990.  They 
employed three different methodologies gauging success: (1) simple win/loss ratios; (2) 
matched-pairs analysis in which cases involving the same issue and type of litigant, yet without 
amicus support, were compared with those with amicus support; and (3) a multivariate logit 
model.  Each of the three methodologies employed produced the same result: amicus support 
significantly increases the chances of litigant success in state supreme courts, regardless of 
whether the amici supports the appellant or respondent. 
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Songer, Kuersten, and Kaheny (2000) provide an answer to the question of why amicus 
support increases a litigant’s chance of success.  Consistent with party capability theory, they 
show that interest groups who partner (as amicus) with individuals with low levels of resources 
(the “have nots”) in state supreme courts greatly increase the chances of success for the “have 
nots.”   In contrast, however, repeat players (i.e., institutional litigants) do not appear to benefit 
from the additional support of amici.   Thus, amici support appears to overcome the normal 
disadvantages of one-shot litigants with inferior resources.   
Essentially, Songer, Kuersten, and Kaheny demonstrate that adding an experienced, 
talented amicus to the representation of a “one-shotter” can effectively turn the one-shot litigant 
into a repeat player.  However, the addition of amicus representation to repeat players (like big 
business and government), does not impact the success rate of such litigants, probably because 
the amicus adds little additional expertise or experience to the repeat player.  The implication is 
that who is supported may have as much to do with the chances of amicus success at the state 
level as the characteristics of the group that files an amicus brief.  
Flango, Bross, Corbally (2006) surveyed the chief justices or appellate court clerks of 39 
state courts of last resort in 2001 regarding the efficacy of amicus briefs in their courts and 
determined that moderate support existed for the usefulness of amicus briefs.  In response to the 
request – "please check the percentage range that most accurately describes the number of 
amicus curiae briefs in your court which are influential" – 27 percent of the justices and 
appellate court clerks regarded fewer than a quarter influential, 32 percent considered between a 
quarter and one half influential, and 36 percent considered between one half and three quarters 
influential (185).  Amicus briefs were found to be most useful to state courts of last resort when 
they provide legal citations, policy considerations, social science data, and economic data that 
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would not otherwise be brought to their attention (185).  While most survey respondents 
welcomed amicus participation, they did indicate that consolidation of briefs and coordination 
among the parties and amicus participants to avoid repetition is a welcome and wise practice.  
This finding accords with Lynch’s (2004) survey research of former USSC clerks. 
Laroche (2009) studies amicus participation and influence at the New York State Court 
of Appeals (NYSCA – New York’s state court of last resort) by examining all cases at the 
NYSCA with published opinions from 1998-2007, as well as 1959, 1969, and 1979.  Noting the 
NYSCA open door policy towards amicus participation, Laroche shows that amicus participation 
steadily increased during 1998-2007, averaging 62 briefs per year during this period (711-12).  
The most frequent amici participant was the New York State Attorney General, and criminal 
cases were the category most likely to have amicus participation (14 percent).   Amicus briefs 
were cited by the NYSCA in 16 percent of the cases with at least one amicus brief (721).  
Regarding amicus influence on the NYSCA, Laroche (2009, 751-52) reaches three 
conclusions: (1) filing an amicus brief does influence the decision of the NYSCA as amicus 
support increases both the respondent and appellant’s win rate compared to the benchmark rate 
without amicus support; (2) the New York Attorney General has the greatest influence of any 
amicus filer (in terms of success rate when controlling for other variables); and (3) the 
information hypothesis (legal model) is the most likely mechanism of amicus influence, and the 
affected groups hypothesis (interest group model) is also moderately supported.   
In sum, although fewer studies explore amicus activity and influence in the state and 
lower federal courts than in the USSC, similar conclusions have been reached about amicus 
influence in such courts:  the prestige and experience of the amicus participant can make a 
difference;  amicus support can increase the chances of litigant success by leveling the playing 
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field between litigants with less resources and those with more resources; and adding new 
information is seen as more valuable than reiterating information already provided by the parties.  
 
F. What Model of Judicial Decision-making Best Explains Amicus Influence? 
i. Attitudinal Model: “Attitudinal Congruence” Hypothesis 
The prevailing view among judicial scholars studying USSC decision-making is the 
attitudinal model, which predicts that judges will vote consistent with their ideological 
preferences, and not necessarily with the side who makes the most persuasive legal arguments in 
a case (Collins 2008; Kearney and Merrill 2000).  Simply put, the attitudinal model holds that 
judges make decisions based upon their attitudes and values, which spring from their life, 
rearing, education, and experience.  The lead proponents of the attitudinal model, Segal and 
Spaeth (2002), describe the attitudinal model as asserting that justices make decisions based on 
their own political values vis-à-vis the case facts.  This model equates “the ideological attitudes 
and values of the justices” with their political leanings (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 86).   The 
attitudinal model is the opposite of the legal model, which depicts judicial decision making as the 
product of the interplay between law and fact (Segal and Spaeth, 48).  The attitudinal model 
posits that judges have fixed ideological preferences, and that case outcomes are a product of the 
summing of the preferences of the participating judges, with legal norms serving only to 
rationalize outcomes after the fact (Kearney and Merrill 2000, 748; Segal and Spaeth 1993).  
Many scholars hypothesize that if the attitudinal model is correct, then no amicus influence 
should be detected because judges simply vote their attitudes and ideologies (e.g., Kearney and 
Merrill 2000; Laroche 2009).  
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Collins (2008) explains that the attitudinal model may still allow for amicus influence 
insofar as the amicus brief reinforces or bolsters judges’ pursuit of their policy preferences.  
Collins cites social psychology research in support of this claim.  For example, “when confronted 
with ideologically congruent information, receivers are less motivated to develop 
counterarguments or ignore this information and instead use this information to develop thoughts 
favorable to their ideological predispositions” (93).  Yet, when confronted with information that 
contradicts their predetermined attitudes, receivers tend to ignore or discount that information.  
Thus, Collins posits the “Attitudinal Congruence Hypothesis:  As the number of liberal 
(conservative) amicus curiae briefs increases, so too will the likelihood of observing a liberal 
(conservative) justice cast a liberal (conservative) vote” (93).   Notably, however, under the 
attitudinal congruence hypothesis, justices will not be more likely to vote against their policy 
preferences simply because more briefs are filed supporting the position that the judge is not 
inclined to agree with. 
Also of note, the attitudinal model applies mainly to those justices who have relatively 
extreme policy preferences, and thus, is less predictive of the moderate justices on the Court.   
Under the attitudinal model, the expected influence of amicus briefs on moderate justices is the 
same as the in the information/legal persuasion hypothesis.  This is because the preferences of 
moderate justices should not be extreme enough to mediate the influence of amicus briefs.   
Instead, moderate justices are expected to respond to the presence of amicus briefs by becoming 
more likely to vote consistent with the positions advocated by the briefs (Collins 2008, 96-97).   
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ii. Legal Model:  “Information” or “Legal Persuasion” Hypothesis 
Simply put, the legal model states that sources of law, precedents, and legal arguments 
influence judicial decision-making (Kearney and Merrill 2000).  The traditional view of the legal 
model understands judges to be neutral decision-makers who set their personal preferences aside 
when rendering their decisions.  The justices are thus expected to rule consistent with their legal 
training by attempting to discover correct legal answers (Collins 2008, 9).  Under the legal 
model, amicus briefs are influential to the extent they provide quality information related to the 
legal issues presented in a case (Simard 2007, 682). 
A nuanced variant of this model is proposed by Collins (2008) – the “legal persuasion” 
model – in which the justices are influenced by the information they receive from amici, 
including information about both the legal and broader policy consequences of their decisions.   
Collins contends the legal persuasion model is more realistic in that in takes into account the 
indeterminate nature of the law, without discounting the importance of the law to judicial 
decision-making.  The USSC justices look to amicus briefs to provide social science evidence 
along with policy and other extra-legal arguments by which to gauge the impact of their 
decisions upon society.  Collins argues that amicus briefs “present the justices with numerous 
alternatives or reframed legal arguments … [which] serve to persuade the justices that the 
amici’s preferred disposition is the decision most consistent with their legal training” (pg. 90).   
In this way, justices use amicus briefs to aid their efforts to reach the best and most 
accurate legal conclusions.  It is the subjective and indeterminate nature of the law that opens the 
door for interest groups to influence judicial choices via the submission of amicus briefs.  Under 
the legal persuasion model, amicus briefs are effective because they provide courts with added 
information that buttress the arguments of the direct litigants (Collins 2004, 815; Simard 2007).  
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Such information can come in many forms:  the presentation of legal arguments from another 
perspective; the presentation of policy consequences of particular legal interpretations; providing 
common interpretation of relevant laws; and presenting social science information that is lacking 
from the appellate record (Simard 2007-08, 682).  The information/legal persuasion hypothesis 
flows out of the legal model: a positive correlation should exist between the number of briefs 
filed in a particular ideological direction, and the justice’s likelihood of voting in that direction, 
regardless of the justice’s ideology 
 
iii. Interest Group Model:  “Affected Groups” Hypothesis 
At its core, the interest group model is essentially a public opinion based explanation for 
amicus influence.  The larger the number of cosigners on an amicus brief, the stronger the public 
support appears for the position advocated by the brief.  Much prior literature has shown that the 
justices of the USSC care about public opinion out of their concern for institutional legitimacy 
and policy enforcement (e.g., Collins 2004; Epstein and Knight 1998; Stimson, MacKuen and 
Erickson 1995; Flemming and Wood 1997; Mishler and Sheehan 1993).  This truth is concisely 
stated by Caldeira (1986, 1209): the USSC “must depend to an extraordinary extent on the 
confidence, or at least the acquiescence, of the public.”  To the extent that the USSC cares about 
its democratic legitimacy, it should recognize the value of including affected groups within the 
process and providing them an opportunity to influence the outcome (Simard 2007, 682). 
The interest group model is cogently described by Kearney and Merrill: 
Insofar as the Justices are assumed to try to resolve cases in accordance with the weight 
of public opinion, they should look to amicus briefs as a barometer of opinion on both 
sides of the issue. Moreover, the information that amicus briefs convey about organized 
opinion is such that it can largely be assimilated simply by looking at the cover of the 
brief. The Justices can scan the covers of the briefs to see which organizations care 
strongly about the issue on either side. The fact that the organization saw fit to file the 
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brief is the important datum, not the legal arguments or the background information set 
forth between the covers of the brief (2000, 785). 
 
Thus, the interest group model holds that amicus briefs are influential because they signal 
to the USSC which and how many groups and individuals will be affected by the decision 
(Collins 2004).  It is the mere presence of a large number of interests on one side relative to the 
other that is the mechanism of amici influence (Collins 2004, 814).   In short, the interest group 
model suggests that amici have utility not because of the legal arguments or information they 
provide, but simply because they are participating as brief filers or cosigners (Simard 2007, 281).  
The affected groups hypothesis flows from this model: “an advantage of amicus participants, 
relative to one’s opponent, will increase the likelihood of litigation success” (Collins 2004, 814-
15).   If the justices respond to the number of amicus cosigners on amicus briefs, then it would 
appear that public opinion matters to the USSC.  On the other hand, if, consistent with the 
information/legal persuasion hypothesis, the justices value the information content of the briefs, 
it is expected that an advantage of amicus briefs, relative to one’s opponent, will increase the 
likelihood of litigation success, irrespective of the number of cosigners on the briefs (Collins 
2008, 179). 
 
iv. Empirical Evidence  
To test whether the information/legal persuasion hypothesis or the affected groups 
hypothesis is a better explanation of amicus influence, Collins (2004) designed a study to see if 
the number of amicus briefs, or the number of amicus brief cosigners, has greater impact on 
USSC case outcomes.  If the information hypothesis is accurate, then a greater number of briefs 
will have more of an impact, while if the affected groups hypothesis is accurate, then greater 
numbers of cosigners will have more of an impact. While not necessarily providing more 
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substantive information to the USSC, having more amicus brief cosigners does provide the 
USSC with a means of assessing the number of groups which will be affected by the decision 
(and may serve as a crude barometer of public opinion).  Controlling for other known influences 
on USSC decision-making (e.g., SG participation; party resources; ideological congruence; 
lower court direction; lower court conflict), Collins’ (2004) results indicate that it is the number 
of amicus briefs, and not the number of cosigners of briefs, that have an impact.  Thus, the 
affected group hypothesis was not supported, but the informational hypothesis was moderately 
supported.   This indicates that the legal model better captures the reality of amicus impact than 
the interest group model. 
In a more rigorous and comprehensive study, Collins (2008) confirms his earlier findings 
failing to garner empirical support for the interest group model of amicus influence: “the justices 
do not respond to the number of cosigners on amicus briefs but do respond to the number of 
amicus briefs” (179-80).  Significantly, however, Collins does find that not only do amicus briefs 
influence the decision-making of USSC justices, but also that for the overwhelming majority of 
the USSC, ideology does not act as a mediating variable conditioning how the justices process 
the information contained in amicus briefs (pg. 172-73).  Regardless of ideology, a justice is 
more likely to vote conservatively the greater the number of conservative amicus briefs filed, and 
conversely, a justice is more likely to vote liberally the greater the number of liberal briefs filed.  
It is notable, however, that this amicus brief effect was attenuated in both the conservative and 
liberal ideological extremes of the USSC.   Further, the only justices found not to be influenced 
by attitudinally incongruent briefs were extremely conservative justices.  This is Collins’ only 
finding that supports the attitudinal explanation for amicus influence.   
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Taken as a whole, Collins (2008) shows that the decision-making of the vast majority of 
the USSC justices is more than simply a function of the justices attitudes and values (as the 
attitudinal model would predict).  Collins’ findings provide strong evidence that justices engage 
in “top-down cognition” – i.e., a justice responds to the persuasive arguments presented by amici 
that are attitudinally incongruent with the justice’s ideology because the justice aims to reach 
accurate legal answers.  Further, Collins (2008, 111) finds that the justices who sit at or near the 
ideological center of the USSC are especially susceptible to the persuasive legal arguments 
contained in amicus briefs.  Such evidence bolsters the utility of targeting the median (swing) 
vote through amicus briefs (Ennis 1984; Kolbert 1989).   
On the whole, Collins’ (2008) comprehensive study provides support for the legal 
persuasion model of judicial decision-making, as it shows that justices – even those not 
attitudinally predisposed to the amici’s arguments – respond to the information conveyed in 
amicus briefs.  Ultimately, Collins concludes that the law matters and that the legal persuasion 
model best explains the influence of amicus briefs on the USSC.  However, the research of Box-
Steffensmeier, Christenson, and Hitt (2013), discussed above, provides an important 
qualification to Collins’ general conclusion that the legal persuasion model best explains amicus 
influence.  Their findings suggest that whether the legal model or attitudinal model better 
explains amicus influence depends on both the power of the amici and the ideology of the 
justice.  Specifically, recall that Box-Steffensmeier et al. find that liberal and conservative 
justices respond differently to the presence of powerful interest groups of the opposing ideology. 
The more conservative justices tend to view the presence of a powerful liberal amicus group as a 
signal to vote against the party that group supports.  This particular finding undermines the legal 
persuasion model of decision-making and supports the attitudinal model.  At the same time, 
 63 
 
liberal justices are more likely to vote conservatively in cases involving a powerful conservative 
amicus.  This finding is supportive of the legal persuasion model.   Similarly, the research of 
Corley, Collins, and Hamner (2013), discussed above, and Unah and Hancock (2006), discussed 
below in Chapter 3, indicate that amici have less impact in salient cases, as justices are more 
likely to decide consistently with their attitudes in such cases. In short, which model of decision-
making best explains the impact of amicus curiae depends on the case context and the actors 
involved. 
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Chapter 2: The Roberts Court 
In order to provide context and frame the subsequent description and analysis of amicus 
participation and impact on the Roberts Court, it is appropriate to include a brief overview, along 
with descriptive statistics, of the Roberts Court era (2005 – 2012 terms of the USSC).  The 
Roberts Court has seen four new justices join its ranks since its inception.  Two justices were 
appointed by President Bush – Roberts and Alito – and two were appointed by President Obama 
– Sotomayor and Kagan.  Of the eleven justices who have served on the Roberts Court since its 
inception in 2005, seven have been appointed by Republican presidents (Stevens, Souter, Scalia, 
Thomas, Alito, Kennedy, and Roberts), while only four have been appointed by Democratic 
Presidents (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan).  The advantage of Republican appointees 
on the Roberts Court provides an indication of its conservative leaning.  There is general 
consensus amongst scholars and practitioners of the justices whom constitute the left and right of 
the Roberts Court.  Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts make-up the conservative wing 
of the Roberts Court, while current Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan (and 
formerly Souter and Stevens) occupy the liberal camp.   Justice Kennedy typically falls in the 
middle of these two camps – the metaphorical “swing” justice of the Roberts Court. 
 
A. Literature and Case Law Review 
One constant on the Roberts Court has been the reliability of Justice Kennedy as the 
pivotal “swing” vote.   In this vein, Time Magazine (2012) has labeled Justice Kennedy “The 
Decider.”  In fact, Kennedy has played the role of what Epstein & Jacobi (2008, 41) refer to as a 
“super-median”: a member of the Court “so powerful that they [are] able to exert significant 
control over the outcome and content of the Court’s decisions.”  SCOTUSblog (2013, 2012) 
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reports that Kennedy has been the justice most likely to be in the majority of a 5-4 decision each 
term of the Roberts Court.  Kennedy joined the majority coalition in 87 percent of the Roberts 
Court’s 5-4 decisions in 2012, 80 percent in 2011, 88 percent in 2010, 69 percent in 2009, 78 
percent in 2008, 67 percent in 2007, 100 percent in 2006, and 75 percent in 2005.  Justice 
Kennedy is also the justice at the Roberts Court most likely to appear in a majority opinion, 
regardless of vote tally:  91 percent of cases in the majority in 2012, 93 percent in 2011 and 
2010, 91 percent in 2009, 92 percent in 2008, and 86 percent in 2007.    
While Justice Kennedy is viewed as the median or “swing” justice on the Roberts Court, 
he generally aligns himself with the conservative wing of the USSC, siding almost twice as often 
with the conservatives as with the liberals. According to the Martin-Quinn judicial ideology 
scores,
27
 developed by judicial scholars Andrew Quinn and Kevin Martin, Justice Kennedy is 
very conservative by historical standards for the median justice of the USSC.   Thus, while 
Kennedy is typically viewed as the median of the Roberts Court, his is not necessarily viewed as 
a true moderate.  Perhaps the most accurate description of Justice Kennedy’s ideology is 
provided by Knowles (2009), who, in her book – The Tie Goes to Freedom: Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy on Liberty – characterizes Kennedy’s jurisprudence as “modestly libertarian.”  Knowles 
(2009, 5) goes on to qualify this label by asserting that Kennedy’s documented embrace of 
judicial activism (i.e., his willingness to strike down state and federal laws) is part and parcel of 
his modestly libertarian philosophy: “his requirement that governmental actions pass far more 
stringent tests when they impinge upon liberty in ways that demean the individual, negatively 
affect a person’s dignity, diminish personal responsibility, or treat in a particular way because of 
their race is entirely consistent with the tenets of libertarian thought.” 
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 The Martin-Quinn scores are discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 3, but suffice it here to say that these 
scores are based upon statistical Bayesian techniques that score justices on a conservative-liberal 
continuum. 
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 According to the Martin-Quinn judicial ideology scores, which go back to 1937, the 
Roberts Court is the most conservative of the modern USSC era.  Many USSC observers agree 
with this statistical conclusion.  The conservative orientation of the Roberts Court can be 
explained by the following factors: (1) the rightward shift of public opinion over time, which 
has, in turn, impacted the USSC; (2) the replacement of the more moderate Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor with the more conservative Justice Samuel Alito; and (3) the numerical advantage of 
Republican appointees on the USSC.  
In his statements before the Senate Judiciary Committee during his confirmation hearing 
during 2005, Chief Justice John Roberts pledged to respect the other branches of government as 
co-equals, to make a renewed push for consensus on the USSC, to reach narrow rulings designed 
to build broad coalitions, and to seek a jurisprudence characterized by modesty and humility 
(Winkler 2012).   He likened the role of USSC justices to umpires:  
Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them.  The role of an umpire and a judge is 
critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules.  But it is a limited role. Nobody 
ever went to a ballgame to see the umpire … I will remember that it’s my job to call balls 
and strikes and not to pitch or bat (Roberts 2005). 
 
Critics of the Roberts Court claim that Chief Justice Roberts has led a Court that has not 
lived up to his promises by frequently ignoring or changing precedent with which it disagrees 
(e.g., Coyle 2013; Winkler 2012; Toobin 2009; Nichol 2011; Greenhouse 2013).  Such critics 
point to controversial rulings of the Roberts Court striking down limits on corporate and union 
campaign spending, allowing for new restrictions on abortion, curtailing the reach of 
environmental protection regulations, striking down gun regulations, and rolling back civil rights 
protections in the area of race, particularly involving affirmative action and voting rights, as 
evidence of this claim.   
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Other scholars disagree with this characterization of the Roberts Court as activist and 
ultra-conservative (e.g., Adler 2010, Rhodes 2011).  For example, in an empirical and doctrinal 
analysis comparing the Roberts Court to its predecessor Courts, Rhodes (2011) concludes that 
the Roberts Court has a better record of adhering to constitutional precedent than any other Court 
over the past 50 years, and that it invalidates fewer state and local laws than any of these Courts 
as well.  Given his findings, Rhodes’ concludes that the decisions of the Roberts Court typically 
evidence the principle of judicial minimalism: the Roberts Court avoids constitutional questions 
when possible, respects the holdings of prior decisions, and relies on incremental and narrow 
approach to constitutional rule-making and statutory interpretation.   Seen in this context, it is 
understandable why the Roberts Court has shown a propensity to decide more civil procedure 
cases than its predecessors, placing a renewed emphasis on legal disputes involving questions of 
pleadings, class actions, joinder, choice of law, personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, 
and appellate review (Rhodes 2011; Wasserman 2012).  Even New York Times columnist Adam 
Liptak (2013b), a consistent critic of the Roberts Court as activist and too far right, 
acknowledges that the most recent term of the Roberts Court (2012) evidenced a form of judicial 
modesty:  the USSC “declined to do away with affirmative action, gave Congress another shot at 
salvaging the Voting Rights Act, and refused to find a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.”  
Liptak even goes on to describe Chief Justice Roberts’ leadership as “patient and methodical” 
and one which takes “the long view,” proceeding incrementally.  
Of course, the Roberts Court has issued its fair share of controversial, high-profile 
decisions, the most notable of which has been the 2012 decision involving the PPACA, discussed 
in the introduction.  In the area of campaign finance, the Roberts Court has left its mark by 
striking down or narrowing campaign finance laws in the name of the First Amendment’s 
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protection of political speech, most notably in Citizens United v. FEC (2009). 
28
  In the area of 
gun control, the Roberts Court has struck down laws that ban the possession of hand guns as 
violating the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms for purposes of self-defense in District of 
Columbia v. Heller (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010).   In Arizona v. United 
States (2011) the Roberts Court struck down most aspects of Arizona’s highly-publicized 
immigration law on the ground that they were preempted by existing federal law, while allowing 
the portion pertaining to immigrant status checks to remain.  In the cases of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
(2006) and Boumediene v. Bush (2006) the Roberts Court pushed back against broad war power 
claims of the Executive branch, stating that military tribunals for Guantanamo detainees violate 
military law and the Geneva Conventions, and striking down a portion of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 by ruling that Guantanamo terror detainees have a right to seek their 
release in federal courts via habeas corpus relief.  Lastly, in its most recent term the Roberts 
Court issued landmark decisions regarding same-sex marriage, invalidating that portion of the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act which denies federal benefits to married gay and lesbian 
couples in those states where same-sex marriage is legal on equal protection and due process 
grounds (United States v. Windsor (2013)); and holding that a federal district court ruling that 
struck down California’s Proposition 8 ban on same-sex marriage could not be challenged 
because the ban’s supporters lacked legal standing (Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013)). 
A review of the literature indicates that the Roberts Court has left an indelible mark in 
four particular areas of the law:  business, the First Amendment, criminal procedure, and 
federalism (e.g., Howard 2012).   The decisions of the Roberts Court involving business interests 
seemed to have attracted the most attention and commentary of USSC observers. The Roberts 
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 Also Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008), and Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).   
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Court is generally regarded as being business-friendly in comparison with previous Courts 
(Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013; Coyle 2013; Franklin 2009; Chemerinsky 2008; Rosen 2008; 
Liptak 2013a; Liptak 2010).  For example, USSC observer and New York Times Columnist 
Adam Liptak (2013a) claims that the Roberts Court is friendlier to business than any Court since 
World War II.   As evidence of this, Liptak (2013a) claims the following: “In the eight years 
since Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court, it has allowed corporations to spend freely in 
elections in the Citizens United case, has shielded them from class actions
29
 and human rights 
suits,
30
 and has made arbitration the favored way to resolve many disputes.
31”  More specifically, 
one observer has noted that the Roberts Court tends to be skeptical about attempts to regulate 
business via litigation, and that business defendants, not business parties in general, are the 
primary beneficiaries of the Roberts Court (Franklin 2009, at 1021).  
Epstein, Landes, and Posner (2013) provide confirmation of the pro-business orientation 
of the Roberts Court.  In what is perhaps the most comprehensive and methodologically 
sophisticated study to date regarding the influence of business on the USSC from 1946 to 2011, 
Epstein, Landes, and Posner find that the Roberts Court has been more friendly to business 
generally than prior Courts and that five of the ten justices who have been the most favorable to 
business over this time period are currently serving on the Roberts Court, including the top two 
justices – Samuel Alito and John Roberts. 
The Roberts Court also stands out in the realm of the First Amendment, particularly 
freedom of expression.  Former Solicitor General Ken Starr (2011) has declared that the Roberts 
Court is “the most free speech Court in American history,” and ACLU’s legal director Steve 
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 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011) 
 
30
 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co. (2012) 
   
31
 AT&T v. Concepcion (2011) 
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Shapiro has acknowledged the “expansive view of the First Amendment” (Howard 2012, 82) 
taken by the Roberts Court.   In addition to the controversial Citizens United ruling, protecting 
the spending rights of corporations and unions in campaigns, the Roberts Court has issued many 
other significant rulings fortifying protections of speech. For example, in United States v. Stevens 
(2010), the Roberts Court protected offensive and appalling speech involving videos depicting 
animal cruelty.  Similarly, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (2011), the USSC 
struck down a California law prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video games to minors 
based on the First Amendment.  In Snyder v. Phelps (2011), the USSC said that protests and 
picketing by the controversial Westboro Baptist Church at military funerals was protected speech 
despite the tendency of such actions to arouse contempt.  And in United States v. Alvarez (2011), 
the USSC struck down the Stolen Valor Act, which made it illegal to lie about military 
decorations.   
However, the picture is not entirely rosy at the Roberts Court for proponents of an 
absolute and all-encompassing protection of speech.  The Roberts Court has issued opinions 
curtailing student speech (Morse v. Frederick (2007)), government employee speech (Garcetti v. 
Ceballos (2006)), and prisoner speech (Beard v. Banks (2006)).  All in all, the Roberts Court has 
issued 30 opinions pertaining to freedom of expression during its first eight terms.  According to 
USSC observer Ronald Collins (2013), the Roberts Court affirmed a First Amendment free 
expression claim in 13 of these 30 opinions; it was unanimous in seven of the cases in which it 
denied such claims; it divided 5-4 in six of the 30 cases; and the Chief Justice along with Justices 
Kennedy and Scalia authored two-thirds of these opinions, with the Chief Justice in the lead, 
authoring 10 of the 30 opinions.  
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The Roberts Court’s criminal procedure decisions cannot be lumped together and 
characterized as generally conservative or generally liberal.  Instead, they evidence shifting 
coalitions that vary across the ideological spectrum.  Nevertheless, some distinctive trends in the 
criminal procedure jurisprudence of the Roberts Court are manifest.  Criminal defendants, the 
accused, and those in prison have achieved some substantial victories.  For examples, in Roper v. 
Simmons (2005), Graham v. Florida (2010), and Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Roberts Court 
curtailed states’ power to punish juvenile offenders.   In Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008), the Court 
barred the death penalty for child rape.  And in Brown v. Plata (2010), the Roberts Court ordered 
California prisons to reduce overcrowding to improve health conditions.  The Roberts Court has 
also afforded criminal defendants greater protections against out-of-court testimonial statements, 
denials of their choice of counsel, punishment enhancements without jury findings, and 
ineffective counsel (Rhodes 2011, 60).   
In search and seizure cases implicating the Fourth Amendment, the Roberts Court has 
struggled to find a unifying principle to guide its jurisprudence.  In this vein, law professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky (2012) claims the following regarding the Roberts Court approach to the Fourth 
Amendment:  “I have long thought that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions can 
be explained by a simple predictive principle: if the justices can imagine it happening to them, 
then it violates the Fourth Amendment.”   For example, the Court has struggled to coalesce 
around a rationale for how the Fourth Amendment applies in this new technological era. In 
United States v. Jones (2012), the USSC held that attaching a GPS tracking device to a vehicle 
and then using that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment, but split as to why.  Some of the justices viewed the government action as a 
form of trespass, others as a violation of a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  
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Four search and seizure cases from the most recent term of the Roberts Court provide 
further evidence of the highly context-dependent nature of these Fourth Amendment rulings.  In 
Florida v. Jardines (2013), a 5-4 Court ruled that bringing a trained police dog onto someone’s 
front porch for purposes of obtaining evidence with which to secure a warrant is a search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  However, the Roberts Court was unanimous in Florida v. 
Harris (2013), ruling that when the police provide evidence of a drug-sniffing dog’s satisfactory 
performance in a certification or training program, the dog’s alert can provide probable cause to 
search a vehicle in the absence of a warrant.  In Missouri v. McNeely (2013), the USSC ruled 5-4 
that nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws in drunk-driving cases violate a person’s right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.  On the other hand, in Maryland v. King (2013), 
the Roberts Court ruled 5-4 that taking and analyzing a cheek swab of an arrestee’s DNA is 
reasonable and is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, as it is akin fingerprinting and 
photographing.   In summary, in the same term, the Roberts Court ruled that dog searches are 
unconstitutional in absence of a warrant at someone’s front porch, but constitutional if involving 
the sniffing of a vehicle.  And the Court ruled that warrantless blood draws of suspected drunk 
drivers are unconstitutional, but that DNA swabs of arrestee’s are constitutional. 
In the context of inmates, the Roberts Court has been unwilling to embrace more 
expansive Fourth Amendment protections, tending to give deference to the decisions of law 
enforcement authorities in the field.  For example, in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders 
of Burlington County (2012), the Roberts Court held that jailhouse strip-searches do not require 
reasonable suspicion, even for minor offenses.  Regarding warrants and the exclusionary rule, the 
Roberts Court seems to be moving away from a categorical warrant requirement towards case-
by-case reasonableness determinations, and away from the conclusion that all errors by law 
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enforcement authorities should result in the suppression of evidence at trial (O’Neill 2009).   For 
example, in Hudson v. Michigan (2006), the Court held that evidence need not be suppressed 
simply because law enforcement authorities violated the knock-and-announce rule.  And in 
United States v. Herring (2009), the USSC limited the use of the exclusionary rule to reckless or 
intentional mistakes by police, saying that the exclusionary rule did not apply to mistakes made 
in “good-faith.” 
Lastly, in the area of federalism, the Roberts Court has departed in some noticeable ways 
from the Rehnquist Court.  With its rulings, the Rehnquist Court helped to bring about the “new 
federalism” – a renewed emphasis on the role of the states in our federal system of government 
and an attempt to put some teeth back into the Tenth Amendment, which some contend had 
become almost an afterthought.   The Rehnquist Court had a reliable bloc of five conservative 
pro-state justices who helped to bring about this “new federalism” era.  However, the Roberts 
Court has no such consistent alignment of justices.  At the Roberts Court, the conservative 
justices are often as likely to favor the federal government as the states (Shortell 2012).    
According to Shortell (2012), the Roberts Court has departed from its predecessor in 
three primary ways in the realm of federalism. First, the Roberts Court has focused its federalism 
decisions on the doctrine of preemption, instead of the Commerce Clause and sovereign 
immunity (as did the Rehnquist Court).  Second, the Roberts Court, unlike the Rehnquist Court, 
has chosen to focus on questions of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional 
interpretation.  Third, with the replacement of Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, the Roberts 
Court lacks an identifiable group of justices who are strong supporters of state authority, who 
have experience with state government, and who come from the western conservative tradition. 
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Many important federalism cases have been decided by the Roberts Court.  First, in 
Gonzalez v. Oregon (2006), the USSC ruled 6-3 that the U.S. Attorney General was not 
authorized to suspend the licenses of doctors prescribing a lethal dose of medication under 
Oregon’s physician-assisted suicide law.  While this was a victory for “state’s rights,” it did not 
fit neatly within typically ideological lines, as supporters of euthanasia are typically viewed as 
liberal. Likewise, in Wyeth v. Levine (2008), the liberal justices were joined by Kennedy and 
Thomas in holding that a Vermont medical liability law was not preempted by FDA requirement, 
with the effect of allowing failure-to-warn suits in state courts against drug-manufacturers 
despite federal regulation.  This result also blurred ideological lines, as it was another victory for 
state’s rights, but one that reached a conclusion embraced by more liberals than conservatives.   
On the other hand, in the following cases, the Roberts Court ruled in favor of federal 
preemption, with the conservative bloc of justices joining the majority in each.  In Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc. (2008), the USSC 8-1 barred state court lawsuits for FDA-approved medical 
devices, concluding that federal law preempted state tort law.  Likewise in PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing (2011), the USSC favored federal preemption, blocking state court lawsuits over 
warning labels for generic drug manufacturers in a 5-4 decision along traditional conservative-
liberal lines.  Once again, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (2011), the USSC divided along 
traditional conservative-liberal lines, ruling 5-4 that federal law preempted state class action 
lawsuits under arbitration agreements.  And in National Meat Association v. Harris (2012), the 
USSC unanimously struck down a California slaughterhouse regulation law on federal 
preemption grounds.  The federal government prevailed in these cases, in which the outcome was 
generally welcomed by conservatives, and frowned upon by many liberals. 
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Thus, the Roberts Court federalism cases do not fall neatly along traditional liberal-
conservative fault lines.  As further corroboration of this point, one need look no further than the 
highest profile cases of the last two terms of the Roberts Court.   The PPACA case, discussed in 
the introduction, resulted in the Roberts Court coming down on the side of federal Congressional 
taxing power (5-4) against the states on the main constitutional question regarding the individual 
mandate.  However, the USSC took the side of the states (6-3) in the Medicaid state coercion 
argument, narrowing the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion.  Likewise, the 2012 Arizona 
immigration law case found the liberal justices, joined by Justices Kennedy and Roberts, 
prevailing in striking down most provisions of Arizona’s immigration law on preemption 
grounds.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, emphasized the federal government’s “broad, 
undoubted power over immigration.”  These two cases were clear, although not complete, 
victories for federal power, and were widely cheered by liberals and resoundingly criticized by 
conservatives.  
Similarly, the major twin decisions of the 2012 term involving same-sex marriage, United 
States v. Windsor (2013) and Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013), were seen as big victories for state’s 
rights, but also as liberal victories (and conservative defeats) regarding social policy.  In 
Windsor, Justice Kennedy, writing the majority opinion for deeply divided 5-4 Court, held that 
the federal DOMA was unconstitutional, in part, on federalism rationale, as the regulation and 
definition of marriage is within the realm and authority of the separate states.  In Hollingsworth, 
the USSC also ruled 5-4 that private parties do not have standing to defend a state statute where 
state officials have chosen not to do so.  So once again, in a high profile case implicating 
federalism, the Roberts Court came down on the state’s rights side on the fence in a federalism 
case to reach a liberal decision.  Finally, in the other major case of the 2012 term – Shelby 
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County v. Holder (2013) – a fractured 5-4 Court dividing along expected lines, ruling that section 
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was unconstitutional on principles of federalism and equal 
state sovereignty, saying that the formula used to identify state and local governments that have 
to abide by federal preclearance requirements was out-of-date, resulting in unequal treatment.  
This was victory for proponents of state’s rights, and was a decision widely hailed by 
conservatives and decried by liberals.  
Thus, analyzing a sample of the most notable federalism cases decided by the Roberts 
Court leads one to the conclusion that these cases do always not fall along easily identifiable 
ideological fault lines.  Sometimes the liberal justices embrace a state’s rights position, and 
sometimes the opposite, and likewise with conservatives.  The Roberts Court has not settled on a 
consistent rationale or voting bloc in these cases, instead balancing the question of the proper 
division of federal and state powers as the context and legal arguments of the case dictate. 
In conclusion, the Roberts Court is still relatively young, entering only its ninth year.  It 
is still developing its identity and its jurisprudence.  As with every Court, it has its champions 
and its detractors.  Some view the Roberts Court as activist; some view it as minimalist and 
restrained.  Some view the Court as too far right; others view it as modestly conservative.  Some 
view the Roberts Court as one in which politicians masquerade as judges; while others view the 
Roberts Court as a body who is dedicated to following the law wherever it leads – akin to 
umpires simply calling balls and strikes with no interest in the outcome of the game.  It is most 
likely, of course, that the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes.  This truth is 
evidenced by the fact that both conservatives and liberals tend to complain about the Court – it is 
either not conservative enough or not liberal enough for each of these groups.   The variation in 
the Roberts Court’s opinions indicate that trying to predict judicial votes and case outcomes 
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based upon a purely ideological and simplistic conservative-liberal dichotomy is often 
inaccurate, as it fails to take into account the influence of case context, other branches of 
government, public opinion, and the nuanced and complex nature of legal controversies and 
arguments.  If this is true, then it opens the door to for amici to influence the justice’s decisions. 
 
B. Descriptive Statistics on the Roberts Court and Comparison To Past Courts 
The following tables and graphs provide a detailed picture of the behavior of the Roberts 
Court in comparison to past Courts.   In the following tables and graphs, I use the data contained 
in the Spaeth US Supreme Court Database (SCDB) 2013 Release 01 (accessed at 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php). The SCDB contains over two hundred pieces of information 
about each case decided by the USSC between the 1953 and 2012 terms.  Specifically, I use the 
case citation as the unit of analysis, unless otherwise noted, and consider all orally-argued cases
32
 
before the USSC during the 2005 – 2012 terms.  
 Figure 2.1 shows the total number of cases decided each term, and the total 
number of cases over the entire Roberts Court era.  During this eight year period, the Roberts 
Court decided 586 total cases, for an average of 73.25 cases per term.  In comparison, during the 
19 terms of the Rehnquist Court (1986-2004), the Court decided 1,878 cases, for an average of 
98.84 cases per term.  During the 17 terms of the Burger Court (1969-1985), the Court decided 
2,439 cases, for an average of 143.47 cases per term. And during the 16 terms of the Warren 
Court (1953-1968), the Court decided 1,816 cases, for an average of 113.5 per term.  Thus, the 
Roberts Court took on the lowest case volume of the most recent Courts, and the Burger Court 
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 These include opinions of the Court, judgments of the Court, per curiam decisions, and equally divided vote 
decisions. 
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Figure 2.1. Number of Orally-Argued Cases Decided Per Term at Roberts Court 
 
took on the highest case volume (practically doubling the Roberts Court in cases decided per 
term). 
Figure 2.2 shows the number of cases decided in a conservative and liberal direction each 
term and over the entire period of the Roberts Court.  Of the Roberts Court 586 cases, 317 (54.10 
percent) were conservative, 262 (44.71 percent were liberal), and 7 (1.19 percent) were 
unspecifiable.  In comparison, of the 1,878 cases decided during the Rehnquist Court, 1,007 
(53.62 percent) were conservative, 839 (44.68 percent) were liberal, and 32 (1.70 percent) were 
unspecifiable.  Of the 2,439 cases decided during the Burger Court, 1,319 (54.08 percent) were 
conservative, 1,093 (44.81 percent) were liberal, and 27 (1.11 percent) were unspecifiable. Thus, 
the Roberts, Rehnquist, and Burger Courts are virtually the same in terms of the split of cases 
decided conservatively versus the split of cases decided liberally.  This is a notable finding, as it 
would indicate that the ideological bent of the USSC (in terms of its decisional outcomes) has  
74 
71 
69 
77 
76 
78 
67 
74 
60 65 70 75 80
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Number of Cases Decided Per Term 
 
Term 
 79 
 
 
Figure 2.2.  Number of Liberal and Conservative Decisions Per Term at Roberts Court 
 
remained stable and slightly conservative for over the last 40 years.  In contrast, of its 1,816 
cases, the Warren Court decided 614 cases conservatively (33.81 percent), 1,182 cases liberally 
(65.09 percent), and 20 cases (1.10 percent) were unspecifiable. Clearly, the Warren Court was 
the most liberal of the USSC Courts over the last 60 years. 
Figure 2.3 depicts the percentage of cases in which the Roberts Court struck down laws 
as unconstitutional compared to prior Courts.   The Roberts Court struck down laws as 
unconstitutional in 22 of the 586 cases (or 3.75 percent of cases).  In comparison, the Rehnquist 
Court struck down laws as unconstitutional in 119 of the 1,878 cases (or 6.34 percent of cases).   
The Burger Court struck down laws as unconstitutional in 217 of its 2,439 cases (or 8.9 percent 
of cases).  The Warren Court struck down laws as unconstitutional in 127 of its 1,816 cases (or 
7.0 percent of cases).   Thus, the Rehnquist Court struck down laws at a higher rate than the 
Roberts Court, the Warren Court struck down laws at a higher rate than the Rehnquist Court, and  
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Figure 2.3.  Percentage of Cases Striking Down Laws as Unconstitutional at USSC 
 
the Burger Court struck down laws at a higher rate than the Warren Court.   If one measures 
judicial activism by the percentage of cases where laws are struck down, the Burger Court was 
the most activist, and the Roberts Court the least activist in the USSC’s last 60 years. 
This result contradicts the narrative that is advanced among some USSC observers that 
the Roberts Court is an activist one.  Further empirical contradiction of this narrative is provided 
by Epstein and Martin (2011).  In a study analyzing the 1969 – 2009 terms of the USSC, Epstein 
and Martin conclude that the Roberts Court does not differ significantly in its level of activism 
from its predecessors.  Epstein and Martin demonstrate that a clear pattern emerges from analysis 
of the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts: liberal justices exercise judicial restraint when 
confronted with liberal laws, but are much more likely to strike down conservative laws.  
Conversely, conservative justices exercise judicial restraint when confronted with conservative 
laws, but are much more likely to strike down liberal laws.  Yet Epstein and Martin do find that 
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liberal justices on the Roberts Court are less willing to strike down liberal laws than liberal 
justices on predecessor Courts, and similarly, conservative justices on the Roberts Court are less 
willing to strike down conservative laws than conservative justices on predecessor Courts.   This 
suggests an increasing ideological polarization on the USSC, but this suggestion comes with a 
caveat: liberal justices on the Roberts Court are also less likely to strike conservative laws than 
liberal justices on the Rehnquist Court.  Interestingly, Justice Kennedy, the “super median” 
justice on the Roberts Court, is more likely to strike down liberal laws than conservative laws.  
This finding would help to explain the Roberts Court modest conservative bent. 
Figure 2.4 shows the percentage of cases in which the Roberts Court ruled in favor of 
petitioner.  In 381 cases (65.02 percent), the Roberts Court ruled in favor of the petitioner.  In 
comparison, the Rehnquist Court ruled in favor of the petitioner in 1,118 cases (59.53 percent).  
The Burger Court ruled in favor of the petitioner in 1,560 cases (63.96 percent).   Lastly, the 
Warren Court ruled in favor of the petitioner in 1,180 cases (64.98 percent).  Thus, over the last 
60 years, the USSC rules in favor of the petitioner about 60-65 percent of the time on average.  It 
is clear then that petitioners have the upper hand at the USSC, and this advantage spans across 
various natural Courts. 
Figure 2.5 shows the percentage of cases in which the Roberts Court formally altered 
precedent.  In 575 of the cases (98.12 percent), the Roberts Court made no determinable 
alteration of precedent, compared to only 10 cases (1.71 percent) in which precedent was 
formally altered.  In comparison, the Rehnquist Court made no determinable alteration of 
precedent in 1,833 cases (97.60 percent), compared to only 45 cases (2.4 percent) in which 
precedent was formally altered.  The Burger Court made no determinable alteration of precedent 
in 2,392 cases (98.07 percent), compared to only 47 cases (1.93 percent) in which precedent was  
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Figure 2.4.  Percentage of Cases in Which USSC Ruled in Favor of Petitioner 
 
 
Figure 2.5.  Percentage of Cases in Which USSC Formally Altered Precedent 
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formally altered.  Lastly, the Warren Court made no determinable alteration of precedent in 
1,773 cases (97.63 percent), compared to only 43 cases (2.37 percent) in which precedent was 
formally altered.   Therefore, while each of these Courts is similar in terms of their percentage of 
altering precedents, the Rehnquist and Warren Courts were most willing to alter precedent, and 
the Roberts Court has been least willing to alter precedent.  This finding provides further 
confirmation that the Roberts Court is not activist compared to its predecessors; if anything, it is 
more restrained. 
Figure 2.6 details the percentage of five vote majority cases and unanimously decided 
cases occurring in the Roberts Court.  153 of the 586 cases (26.11 percent) were decided by only 
a five vote majority coalition, whereas 197 (33.62 percent) were decided by a unanimous vote of 
all nine justices.   Notably, 91 of the 153 five vote majority cases (59.5 percent) were decided 
conservatively, while 59 of the five vote majority cases (38.6 percent) were decided liberally.  Of 
the 197 unanimous nine vote decisions, 95 (or 48.2 percent) were conservative, while 99 (or 50.3 
percent) were liberal.   
In comparison, 417 of the 1,878 cases (22.2 percent) decided by the Rehnquist Court 
were only by a five vote majority, whereas 680 of the 1,878 (36.2 percent) were decided by a 
unanimous vote of all nine justices. Notably, 253 of the 417 five vote majority cases (60.7 
percent) were decided conservatively, while 162 of the five vote majority cases (38.8 percent) 
were decided liberally. Of the 680 unanimous nine vote decisions, 331 (or 48.7 percent) were 
conservative, while 339 (or 49.9 percent) were liberal.   
At the Burger Court, 515 of the 2,439 cases (21.12 percent) were decided by a five vote 
majority, while 595 (24.4 percent) were decided by a unanimous vote of all nine justices.  309 of 
the 515 five vote majority cases (60.0 percent) were decided conservatively, while 206 (40.0  
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Figure 2.6. Percentage of Five Vote Majority and Unanimous Cases at the USSC 
 
percent) of the five vote majority cases were decided liberally.  Of the 595 unanimous nine vote 
decisions, 266 (44.76 percent) were decided conservatively, and 323 (54.3 percent) were liberal. 
At the Warren Court, 326 of the 1,816 cases (17.95 percent) were decided by a five vote 
majority, while 453 (24.94 percent) were decided by a unanimous vote of all nine justices.  142 
of the 326 five vote majority cases (43.6 percent) were decided conservatively, while 182 (55.8 
percent) of the five vote majority cases were decided liberally.  Of the 453 unanimous nine vote 
decisions, 101 (22.3 percent) were decided conservatively, and 346 (76.4 percent) were liberal. 
Therefore, the Roberts, Rehnquist, and Burger Courts exhibited remarkable consistency 
in the percentage of five vote majority decisions that were decided conservatively – each at about 
60 percent.  In close cases, these Courts swung conservatively in six out of ten cases.  But each 
of these conservative Courts were also slightly more likely to have their unanimous decisions be 
liberal.  This observation is most noticeable at the Burger Court.  Not surprisingly given its 
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reputation, the Warren court was slightly more likely to issue liberal five vote majority decisions 
than the other Courts, and much more likely to issue unanimous liberal decisions.  Also worth 
highlighting is the fact that the percentage of five vote majority decisions continue to rise during 
each Court over the last sixty years.  The Roberts Court is the most likely of these Courts to issue 
a five vote majority opinion, which would seem to indicate increasing division and polarity on 
the USSC.    
However, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts were much more likely to issue unanimous 
nine vote decisions than the Burger or Warren Courts.   Instead of increasing polarity, this 
finding indicates increasing like-mindedness on the USSC over the last 60 years.  Perhaps the 
USSC’s decreasing caseload also plays a role here, as the Roberts Court may be more likely to 
take the more difficult cases as its caseload decreases, increasing the possibilities for division on 
the USSC.  If this is so, then the fact that the Roberts Court issues unanimous decisions in at 
least a third of its cases could be seen as quite an accomplishment in comparison to past Courts. 
Lastly, Figure 2.7 depicts the number of cases in separate issue areas considered by 
Roberts Court, along with the number of cases decided liberally or conservatively in each area.   
It is apparent that criminal procedure, economic activity, civil rights, and judicial power cases 
dominate the Roberts Court docket.   Further, the Roberts Court is more likely to decide criminal 
procedure (56 percent), economic activity (61 percent), judicial power (59 percent), first 
amendment (69 percent), and privacy (79 percent) cases in a conservative direction.
33
  On the 
other hand, the Roberts Court is more likely to decide federalism (70 percent), due process (79 
percent), and federal taxation (88 percent) cases in a liberal direction.   Decisions involving civil 
rights, unions, and attorneys are essentially ideologically balanced at the Roberts Court. 
                                                 
33
 Chapter 3 will discuss in greater detail how the SCDB codes decisions as liberal or conservative in various 
issue areas. 
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Figure 2.7.  Number of Cases Decided by Issue Area and Decision Direction at Roberts 
Court 
 
 
C. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this chapter has provided an overview of the Roberts Court and its 
significant decisions, along with supporting descriptive statistics.  It should be evident from the 
above discussion that, while some have referred to the current USSC as Justice Kennedy’s Court 
given his prominence as the “swing” vote, over its 9 years this manifestation of the USSC has 
truly become the “Roberts Court,” bearing his fingerprints and led by his influence.  The 
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foregoing descriptive statistics show that the Roberts Court’s behavior is more alike its 
predecessors than it is different.  The differences, while not insignificant, tend to lie at the 
margins.  Yet, it is often the margins where critical distinctions are made and where major 
decisions and legal developments hang in the balance. The Roberts Court will continue to remain 
front and center in the public spotlight, as it will continue to be called upon to decide some of the 
most controversial legal, and ultimately political, disputes we face as a society.  This being the 
case, the Roberts Court will remain squarely within amici cross-hairs, marked as a target for 
friendly fire. 
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Chapter 3:  Hypotheses and Research Design 
 
I seek to determine if prior findings of amici influence on the Supreme Court (e.g., 
Collins 2008; 2007; Kearney & Merrill 2000) hold true at the Roberts Court.  Collins’ findings 
(i.e., the presence of amicus briefs has a discernible impact on how individual justices vote on 
the merits of a case, even when controlling for judicial ideology:  the provision of more liberal 
briefs enhances the probability of a liberal vote, and the provision of more conservative briefs by 
enhances the probability of a conservative vote) support the legal persuasion model of judicial 
decision-making.  I expect to find similar results for amicus impact on the Roberts Court.  I 
expect that amicus briefs will influence the ideological direction of each of the justices’ votes, 
and that this effect will become stronger the more ideologically moderate the justice.  This 
expectation is consistent with the legal persuasion model of judicial decision-making, which 
suggests that a justice should respond to both those briefs which are in accord with his/her 
predispositions and attitudes and as well as those that do not align with his/her ideology.   
In addition, although Collins (2008; 2004) did not find that the number of amicus 
cosigners influences the justices of the USSC, consistent with the interest group model, I do 
expect to find such influence over justice votes.  Moreover, although also not modeled by Collins 
(2008), I expect that prestigious amicus participants will have a greater influence on justice votes 
than other amici.  Lastly, I will explore whether a case’s political salience mediates the influence 
of amicus briefs on justice votes.  Unlike run of the mill cases, I expect that a politically salient 
case will condition the justices’ response to amicus briefs by enhancing the likelihood of an 
attitudinal vote by the justices.   
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A. Hypotheses 
H1 and H2 [Information/Legal Persuasion Hypotheses]:  
 H1: As the number of liberal amicus curiae briefs increases relative to the number of 
conservative amicus briefs, so too will the likelihood of observing a liberal vote, 
regardless of the justice’s ideology. 
 H2: As the number of conservative amicus curiae briefs increases relative to the number 
of liberal amicus briefs, so too will the likelihood of observing a conservative vote, 
regardless of the justice’s ideology. 
As explained by Collins (2008), the rationale behind these hypotheses is that justices, 
consistent with their legal training, explore alternative perspectives to reach what they believe to 
be the correct legal decision.  Amicus briefs thus serve to convince the justices of the correctness 
of the amici’s position.  
In addition to the informational content provided by their briefs, amici also serve as 
barometers of public opinion via their involvement in a case. The USSC justices take public 
opinion into consideration when making decisions for strategic and reputational reasons (e.g., 
Kearney and Merrill 2000).  Amici can serve as proxies of public opinion and as indicators of the 
array of social forces at play in the litigation.  Because of this, the interest group model of amicus 
influence suggests that a justice should respond positively to the number of amicus brief 
cosigners in a case regardless of whether or not they align with that justice’s ideology.  Thus: 
H3 and H4 [Affected Group Hypotheses]:  
 H3: As the number of liberal amicus curiae cosigners increases relative to the number of 
conservative cosigners, so too will the likelihood of observing a liberal vote, regardless of 
the justice’s ideology. 
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 H4: As the number of conservative amicus curiae cosigners increases relative to the 
number of liberal cosigners, so too will the likelihood of observing a conservative vote, 
regardless of the justice’s ideology. 
Finally, consistent with both the legal persuasion and interest group models of judicial 
decision-making, I expect that justices who sit at or near the ideological center of the USSC will 
be particularly susceptible to amicus influence as their attitudes are not as rigid.  Thus: 
H5 and H6 [Median Justice Information/Legal Persuasion Hypotheses]:   
 H5:  The closer the justice is to the ideological center of the Court, the greater the 
likelihood that the justice casts a conservative vote as the number of conservative amicus 
briefs increases relative to the number of liberal amicus briefs. 
 H6:  The closer the justice is to the ideological center of the Court, the greater the 
likelihood that the justice casts a liberal vote as the number of liberal amicus briefs 
increases relative to the number of conservative amicus briefs. 
H7 and H8 [Median Justice Affected Groups Hypotheses]:   
 H7: The closer the justice is to the ideological center of the Court, the greater the 
likelihood that the justice casts a conservative vote as the number of conservative amicus 
cosigners increases relative to the number of liberal amicus cosigners. 
 H8:  The closer the justice is to the ideological center of the Court, the greater the 
likelihood that the justice casts a liberal vote as the number of liberal amicus cosigners 
increases relative to the number of conservative amicus cosigners. 
Prior research has shown that justices rely to a greater extent on their attitudes and 
ideological preferences in politically salient cases than in less salient ones (e.g., Segal 1986; 
Spaeth and Segal 1999, 309-11; Unah and Hancock 2006; McAtee and McGuire 2007). 
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Politically salient cases are those cases that are particularly important to the public (Collins and 
Cooper 2012, 397).   The issues raised in salient cases reference justices’ attitudes more directly 
by raising justices’ interest and attention (Spaeth and Segal 1999, 309, Unah and Hancock 2006, 
297) to a greater degree than those cases deemed less significant.  The issues presented in such 
cases are usually politically controversial and have larger policy ramifications than issues raised 
in more routine cases.  As a result, judges rely more upon their attitudes and preferences in 
deciding high salience cases (297).  That is, the ideological preferences of the justices are more 
likely to override outside attempts at influence on those issues of greatest concern to them 
(Songer and Sheehan 1993, 346).   The justices are also more likely to negotiate, make 
suggestions and threats in the opinion writing process, and author separate opinions in salient 
cases (Epstein and Knight 1998, 98; Spriggs, Maltzman, and Wahlbeck 1999).    
Unah and Hancock describe salient cases as “those that ‘stand out’ in the Supreme Court 
plenary agenda in the sense that they involve important issues of public policy and are therefore 
likely to receive a disproportionate amount of attention and involvement from justices 
throughout and from court-watchers, such as journalists” (297).  In salient cases, a justice’s 
position is relatively fixed and the chance is relatively low that new information will change that 
position (Unah and Hancock 2006).   Thus, fluidity is less likely in such salient cases (Hagle and 
Spaeth 1991).   
In salient cases involving civil rights before the Supreme Court, Unah and Hancock 
(2006) find that justices primarily vote their attitudes regardless of the information provided by 
the Solicitor General or by interest groups.  Unah and Hancock think their findings also apply to 
other areas such as the right to privacy, the First Amendment, and criminal procedure.  They 
conclude that the attitudinal model of judicial decision- making has more predictive and 
 92 
 
explanatory accuracy in high salience cases than in low salience ones (314-15).  The more salient 
the case, the more justices will draw upon their own ideological predispositions in reaching a 
decision.   This conclusion is buttressed by Corley, Collins, and Hamner (2013), who find that 
amicus briefs are not as likely to be cited in the majority opinion of the USSC in salient cases 
compared to non-salient cases.  
Therefore, the attitudinal model should be a better predictor of judicial behavior in 
politically salient cases than in non-salient cases.  According to the attitudinal model, justices 
will not be more likely to vote against their policy preferences simply because more briefs are 
filed supporting the position they are not inclined to agree with, as it is hypothesized that such 
briefs are simply ignored or discounted by the justices (Collins 2008, 97-98).  In politically 
salient cases (those in which attitudinal factors are likely to predominate), a net advantage of 
amicus briefs that are incongruent with a justice’s ideology should not meaningfully influence 
that justice to vote against his ideological preference.   
However, as mentioned above, the attitudinal model still allows for amicus influence in 
salient cases insofar as the amicus brief reinforces or bolsters judges’ pursuit of their policy 
preferences.  Collins’ (2008, 93) attitudinal congruence hypothesis flows from this 
understanding:  as the number of liberal (conservative) amicus curiae briefs increases, so too will 
the likelihood of observing a liberal (conservative) justice cast a liberal (conservative) vote” (93).   
However, as mentioned above, under the attitudinal congruence hypothesis, justices will not be 
more likely to vote against their policy preferences simply because more briefs are filed 
supporting the position that the judge is not inclined to agree with.  Thus: 
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H9, H10, H11, and H12 [Political Salience Attitudinal Hypotheses]: 
 H9:  In politically salient cases, as the number of liberal amicus briefs (and cosigners) 
increases relative to the number of conservative briefs (and cosigners), so too will the 
likelihood of observing a liberal justice casting a liberal vote. 
 H10: In politically salient cases, as the number of conservative amicus briefs (and 
cosigners) increases relative to the number of liberal briefs (cosigners), so too will the 
likelihood of observing a conservative justice casting a conservative vote. 
 H11: In politically salient cases, an advantage in the number of liberal amicus curiae 
briefs (cosigners) relative to conservative amicus briefs (cosigners) will have no 
meaningful effect on the likelihood of observing a conservative justice casting a liberal 
vote. 
 H12: In politically salient cases, an advantage in the number of conservative amicus 
curiae briefs (cosigners) relative to liberal briefs (cosigners) will have no meaningful 
effect on the likelihood of observing a liberal justice casting a conservative vote. 
Finally, none of the foregoing hypotheses takes into account differences in the prestige 
and experience of amici.  Each of these hypotheses assumes that amici, and the substantive 
information they impart, are equally valuable, regardless of the reputation of the amici.  
However, as discussed above, scholars have found support for the notion that the prestige and 
experience of the amicus participant may influence judicial behavior (e.g., McGuire 1994; 
Kearney and Merrill 2000; Lynch 2004; Collins 2004; Simard 2007; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 
2013; Chandler 2013).  While the influence of powerful groups has been found to be present 
when amicus participation is relatively ideologically balanced in a case (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 
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2013), I expect an ideological advantage of prestigious amici in a case to impact a justice’s vote, 
regardless of the relative ideological advantage of all amici in the case.   Thus:  
H13 and H14: [Prestigious Amicus Hypotheses]: 
 H13: As the number of prestigious liberal amici increases relative to prestigious 
conservative amici, so too will the likelihood of observing a liberal vote, regardless of the 
justice’s ideology.    
 H14: As the number of prestigious conservative amici increases relative to prestigious 
liberal amici, so too will the likelihood of observing a conservative vote, regardless of the 
justice’s ideology.  
 
B. Research Design: Data and Methods 
To test these hypotheses, I employ a methodology similar to Collins (2008) and estimate 
statistical models that calculate the influence of liberal and conservative amicus briefs and 
cosigners on the likelihood of observing a justice cast a liberal vote for all orally argued cases 
decided on the merits during the 2007 – 2011 terms of the USSC.  Although the Roberts Court 
began in 2005, I have decided to only examine orally argued cases from 2007 through 2011 
terms of the USSC, as the amicus data is more difficult to access prior to the 2007 term.  I 
compile this data from four sources. First, the American Bar Association’s Preview of United 
States Supreme Court cases website 
(http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home.html) lists the amicus briefs filed (with 
links to the actual brief itself) in all orally argued cases decided on the merits during the 2007-08 
through 2011-12 terms of the Court.  This site also lists on whose behalf (Petitioner, Respondent, 
Neither party, etc.) the amicus brief was filed.  Second, SCOTUSblog’s website 
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(http://www.scotusblog.com/) contains essentially the same information for the same time 
frame.
34
  Third, the LexisNexis U.S. Supreme Court Briefs database includes a listing of amicus 
curiae briefs filed for all cases since 1979, along with information on which party the amici 
supported, and a link to the actual brief itself.
35
   Fourth, the official website of the USSC 
(http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docket.aspx) allows one to search each case by docket 
number and lists all amicus briefs filed for each case during the relevant time period.  While this 
listing is exhaustive and the most reliable of the four sources, the U.S. Supreme Court site does 
not include information on which party the amicus brief supports, nor does it have a link to the 
actual brief, as do the other three sources.   Thus, I cross-check each of these four sources for 
each case to ensure the accuracy and comprehensiveness of my data collection.   
In constructing my dataset, I create variables using data from existing sources regarding 
judicial ideology, judicial moderation, and political salience.  I then use my own original data 
collection to create variables for each case regarding party resources, total amicus participation, 
liberal amicus participation, conservative amicus participation, liberal-conservative amicus 
participation difference,  prestigious liberal amicus participation, prestigious conservative amicus 
participation, prestigious liberal-conservative amicus participation difference,  Solicitor General 
liberal and conservative participation, State, Local, and Foreign governments liberal and 
conservative amicus participation, and Individuals liberal and conservative amicus participation 
to conduct my analysis.  Finally, I merge this amici and other data that I gather on the Roberts 
                                                 
34
 These two websites, SCOTUSblog and American Bar Preview, are user-friendly.   While neither is entirely 
exhaustive in their listing of amicus briefs in every case, the vast majority of briefs are listed on both of 
these sites.  Occasionally, one or both sites will overlook a brief that is listed on either the Supreme Court’s 
website or in the Lexis Nexis Supreme Court Briefs database.  Thus I cross-reference all four sources 
mentioned above for each case to ensure that I am including a comprehensive account of amicus 
participation. 
 
35
 The LexisNexis database gathers its amicus information from the U.S. Reporter. It allows you to search each 
case by docket number, providing a listing of all the briefs filed (with links to the actual brief itself) for the 
chosen docket number. 
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Court with the Spaeth US Supreme Court Database (SCDB) 2012 Release 01 (accessed at 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php).  The SCDB contains over two hundred pieces of information 
about each case decided by the Court between the 1953 and 2011 terms.   
Similar to Kearney and Merrill (2000) and Collins (2008), I examine amicus curiae briefs 
filed at the merits stage of each orally argued case.  To identify the cases to use in my analysis, I 
use the SCDB, which provides a decision-type variable. Included in my analysis are the 
overwhelming majority of cases, including DEC_TYPE=1 (formally decided full opinion cases 
with oral argument), DEC_TYPE=5 (equally divided vote), DEC_TYPE=6 (per curiam, orally 
argued), and DEC_TYPE=7 (judgments of the Court, orally argued). The only decision types 
excluded from my analysis are non-orally argued decisions
36
, memorandum cases
37
, decrees
38
, 
and orally-argued original jurisdiction cases, as these cases contain little, if any, amicus 
participation, are rather infrequent, and are of much less significance.
39
  After taking these steps, 
the assembled dataset contains 3,571 observations, each row corresponding to each individual 
                                                 
36
 Non-orally argued (per curiam) decisions (DEC_TYPE=2) are excluded in this analysis because they are 
infrequent, of lesser importance, are typically disposed of by the justices based solely on the lower court 
record, and because the amicus curiae data for these cases is more difficult to access. Only 50 such cases 
occurred during this five year period.  Further, non-orally argued cases tend to attract significantly less 
amicus participation and tend to be clearly settled by existing precedent (Kearney and Merrill 2000, 835; 
Collins and Solowiej 2007). 
 
37
 Memorandum cases (DEC_TYPE=3) have been removed from the SCDB for both substantive and technical 
reasons, and thus are not included in this analysis. 
 
38
 Decrees (coded DEC_TYPE=4) are not included because they are very infrequent, arrive under the USSC’s 
original jurisdiction, usually involve state boundary disputes, and typically are handled by a special 
master’s report, which becomes the basis of the Court’s decision.  In fact, no decrees were issued by the 
USSC in the five year period of my analysis.  Thus, I do not include decrees because there are none to 
include. 
 
39
 Only five such orally argued original jurisdiction cases were found during this five year period of analysis. 
They each involved disputes between states, and were each coded as decided in an Unspecifiable direction 
in the SCDB.  Thus, these five cases are excluded from analysis. 
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justice participating in each of the 397 cases that occurred over this five term period when using 
the docket number as the unit of analysis.
40
   
Typically, when analyzing USSC decision-making, researchers will use the case citation 
as the unit of analysis.  This is because the USSC routinely combines several cases with similar 
factual circumstances under one case citation that disposes of each case with a single opinion.  
Thus, one record exists for the case.  However, when using the docket number as the unit of 
analysis, records exist for each case that is consolidated under the same opinion (Collins 2008, 
191 fn. 152).  In this study, I choose to use the docket number as the unit of analysis, as opposed 
to the case citation, for both substantive and methodological reasons.  First, other prominent 
researchers studying amicus participation and influence use the docket number as their unit of 
analysis (e.g., Collins 2008; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Gibson 1997).  Second, using the 
docket number allows for a more complete accounting of amicus participation and influence.  
Commonly, when the USSC takes a consolidated case, amicus participants will file one brief that 
applies to each of the docket numbers being consolidated.  For example, a situation might arise 
in which the consolidated case includes the filing of six unique amicus briefs, but each of the six 
briefs is meant to apply to each of the docket numbers included in the consolidated case.
41
   In 
such a situation, I would record the filing of six briefs for each docket number.   Therefore, 
because I am using the docket number as the unit of analysis, instead of the case citation, the 
                                                 
40
 During the five terms of my data collection, the USSC decided 29 consolidated cases. These 29 consolidated 
cases included 61 separate docket numbers.   Thus, if using the case citation instead of the docket number 
as the unit of analysis, my dataset would only include 365 cases, instead of 397, corresponding to 288 less 
observations. 
 
41
 For example, the consolidated cases of Dorsey v. United States (2011) and Hill v. United States (2011) have 
the same case citation,  raise the same basic issue – i.e., whether the Fair Sentencing Act applies to all 
sentencings occurring after its effective date or only to crimes committed after the statute became effective 
– and were decided by the same opinion.   The same six amicus briefs were filed for each docket number.   
I recorded the filing of six briefs for each docket number.   Because I used the docket number as the unit of 
analysis, instead of the case citation, the total amicus count for the consolidated case is recorded as 12 
instead of 6, even though only six unique briefs were filed. 
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total amicus count for this consolidated case would be recorded as 12 instead of 6, even though 
only six unique briefs were filed.
42
    
However, on other occasions, amicus participants will file a brief in the lead case, or in 
one of the non-lead cases of the consolidated case, that is only meant to apply to the specific 
docket number and not to the other docket numbers in the consolidated case.  For example, 
consider a situation in which thirteen different amicus briefs are filed, but ten of these briefs are 
only filed in the first docket number and the other three briefs are only filed in the second docket 
number.  In this situation, each of the briefs is distinct and only meant to apply to its 
corresponding docket number.
43
   In such a situation, I record the filing of ten briefs for the first 
docket number and three briefs for the second docket number, totaling 13 briefs for the entire 
consolidated case.   
My base statistical model (which excludes the interaction term) and primary all-inclusive 
statistical model (which includes the interaction term) will estimate the influence of amicus 
briefs/cosigners on all justices in all cases during the 2007-2011 terms of the USSC.  In addition, 
I will provide multiple subsidiary models to investigate in a targeted manner whether the justices 
                                                 
42
 In such situations, it could be argued that amicus participation is being double-counted, thus inflating amici 
participation levels and potentially overstating their influence on the justices’ voting. However, I think this 
method of counting is more appropriate than the alternative for two primary reasons. First, it more closely 
captures the amicus curiae’s interest in the case because the amicus intends the brief to apply to each 
instance of litigation instead of just to one docket number.  Second, because such a counting better 
approximates the legal salience of the case in the sense that the justices are taking the consolidated case to 
resolve two or more cases raising the same basic issue that have worked their way through the justice 
system, indicating the broader impact of such a ruling. 
 
43
 For example, the consolidated cases of Republic of Iraq v. Beaty (2009) and Republic of Iraq v. Simon (2009) 
have the same case citation – 556 U.S. 848.  However, each of these cases has its own docket number, 07-
1090 and 08-539, respectively.  The basic issue in these two cases was the same – whether U.S. courts have 
jurisdiction over Iraq in claims involving alleged misdeeds that occurred during Saddam Hussein’s regime 
– so the USSC consolidated the cases and decided them together with a single opinion.  However, in the 
lead case, docket number 07-1090, only three amicus briefs were filed; whereas in docket number 08-539, 
10 briefs were filed.  So, 13 total briefs were filed in the consolidated case, but the amicus participation was 
different in each of the docket numbers.   
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on the Roberts Court are more or less prone to amicus influence in certain categories of cases.  
Therefore, after estimating my base and primary all-inclusive models, I will test each of the 
foregoing hypotheses using five separate models that include smaller samples representing the 
following categories of cases:  politically salient; criminal procedure; civil rights and liberties; 
economics; and judicial power and federalism.
44
  Out of the 397 orally argued cases decided by 
the Roberts Court, 66 are politically salient.
45
  The Criminal Procedure category represents 107 
cases; the Civil Rights and Liberties category represents 122 cases; Economics represents 94 
cases; and Judicial Power and Federalism represents 72 cases.   
In addition, I will estimate four additional subsidiary statistical models in order to assess 
whether conservative and liberal justices respond differently to the persuasive attempts of amici.  
The first of these models will only include conservative justices in all cases; the second will only 
include liberal justices in all cases; the third will only include conservative justices in salient 
cases; and the fourth will only include liberal justices in salient cases.  Altogether, I will estimate 
eleven separate statistical models to explore the impact of amici on the Roberts Court.  Further 
detail about the specification of each of these models is included below. 
 My models will contain the following variables: 
 Dependent Variable   
My dependent variable is whether the justice issued a Liberal Vote or Conservative Vote.  
I use the justice vote as the basic unit of analysis.  The dependent variable is based upon the 
Spaeth SCDB “DIR” variable which describes the direction of the decision with regards to the 
                                                 
44
 These four separate categories are derived from the Spaeth SCDB (2012) Release 01 issue areas variable. 
Civil Rights and Liberties category includes cases involving civil rights, the First Amendment, due process, 
privacy, and attorneys.  Economics category includes cases involving economic activity, unions, and 
federal taxation.  The Criminal Procedure and Judicial Power and Federalism categories include cases 
involving what their category name implies.  
 
45
 A discussion of how cases are categorized as politically salient is included later in this chapter. 
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primary issue it addresses.  The dependent variable captures the ideological direction of the 
individual justice’s voting behavior, scored 1 for a liberal decision and 0 for a conservative 
decision.
46
  The SCDB codes this variable according to contemporary definitions of liberalism 
and conservatism.  “Liberal” or “conservative” labels are designated according to whether the 
case outcome favors a particular category of party before the USSC.  For example, in civil 
liberties cases, liberal votes support the litigant claiming violation of its freedoms, (such as free 
expression, freedom of religion, and the right to privacy), while conservative votes are the 
opposite.  In criminal cases, liberal votes support the rights of the criminally accused, while 
conservative votes favor the government.  In the context of cases involving economic activity 
and unions, liberal votes are anti-business, anti-employer, pro-liability, pro-union, pro-debtor, 
pro-consumer, etc., while conservative votes are the opposite.  In federalism cases, liberal votes 
are pro-federal power, anti-states, and pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, 
while conservative votes are the opposite.  In cases involving judicial power, liberal votes are 
pro-exercise of judicial power and pro-judicial activism, while conservative votes are in favor of 
judicial restraint.   Importantly, judicial votes are coded according to the main issue area 
involved in the case, not secondary issue areas. 
While the approach employed by the Spaeth SCDB characterizing judicial votes as 
“liberal” or “conservative” is common and widely accepted in empirical judicial behavior 
                                                 
46
 I was unable to code the decision direction of the justices as liberal or conservative in 18 cases.   In such 
instances, I simply code the decision direction as unspecifiable.  These 18 cases were classified as 
unspecifiable for one of three reasons: (1) no specifiable decision direction was included by the SCDB for 
the justice vote; or (2) the lower court decision was in the same ideological direction as the USSC’ 
decision, but the Petitioner was listing as the winning party; or (3) the lower court decision direction was in 
a different ideological direction from the USSC’s decision, but the Petitioner was classified as the losing 
party.   For example, in the second instance, the lower court direction is listed as conservative, along with 
the USSC decision, but the SCDB classifies the Petitioner as winning the case.  Or, an example in third 
instance would be when the lower court direction is listed as conservative, while the USSC decision is 
listed as liberal, but the SCDB classifies the Petitioner as losing the case. In these three situations, it is not 
possible to make a principled determination as to whether the justice actually voted in a conservative or 
liberal direction because the party outcomes do not align with ideological coding of lower court and USSC 
decision directions.   
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scholarship, such an approach does have limitations.  First, the terms “liberal” and 
“conservative” admittedly conceal a range of heterogeneity that traditional binary ideological 
coding does not reflect.  In real life, case ideological outcomes vary markedly on the 
conservative-liberal spectrum, and this variance cannot be captured by a measure that only 
includes two discrete polls (Sag 2009).  Second, a judge may vote conservatively in some issue 
areas and liberally in others – what scholars term the “challenge of multidimensionality” 
(Fischman and Law 2009, 19).  In the Spaeth SCDB, this challenge is addressed by taking a 
more specific issue area approach to coding justice votes as liberal or conservative, as described 
above.  Nevertheless, this is still problematic, as the delineation of the primary issue area itself 
can be somewhat subjective, since cases that present multiple issues can defy easy categorization 
and assignment of priority (Fischman and Law, 26).  Complex cases do not always fit neatly into 
one category or issue area.  Despite these problems, the prevailing view in the literature is that a 
single left-right dimension underlies virtually all USSC cases in virtually all areas of law 
(Epstein, Martin, Quinn and Segal 2012, 716).  
Because ordinary least squares regression is inappropriate when the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, I estimate logit models.  These methods estimate the parameters of a model’s 
independent variables in terms of the contribution each makes to the probability that the 
dependent variable falls into one of the designated categories (e.g., a liberal or conservative vote) 
(Songer and Tabrizi 1999, 512).  A logit model is an appropriate choice because it does not 
assume the influence of amici is linear (Collins 2004, 817, fn. 16).  For each independent 
variable, a maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) is calculated along with its standard error (SE).  
Each MLE represents the change in the logistic function that results from a one unit change in 
the independent variable.   I will also calculate marginal effects of substantively interesting 
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changes in the values of each of the independent variables on the likelihood that a justice will 
cast a liberal vote.  I will then use the results of the logit models to graphical plot the influence of 
the amici on the likelihood of observing a liberal vote across varying levels of judicial 
moderation, as appropriate.
47
  Lastly, I will also include predicted probabilities tables to 
accompany my primary all-inclusive model and my salient cases model, which will depict the 
probability of justices of various moderation levels casting a liberal vote as the ideological 
amicus brief advantage increases and decreases in a case by substantively interesting amounts.  
 Independent Variables 
The first independent variable of interest represents the difference in the number of 
liberal and conservative amicus briefs filed in each case: Liberal - Conservative Amicus Briefs 
Difference.  To determine the ideological direction of the amicus brief, I use the direction of the 
lower court’s decision (as identified by the SCDB) along with the litigant the amici supported 
(Petitioner or Respondent).  This allows for the ideological direction of the amicus brief to be put 
on the same dimension as the ideological direction of the justice vote.  For example, if the lower 
court handed down a liberal decision and four amicus briefs were filed for the petitioner, these 
briefs are coded in support of the conservative position.
48
  A value of 0 on Liberal - Conservative 
Amicus Briefs Difference means that either no briefs were filed in support of either the liberal or 
conservative position, or that the same number of liberal and conservative briefs were filed in the 
                                                 
47
 Like Collins (2008, 100), I will calculate the marginal effects of the noninteractive variables by altering the 
variables of interest from 0 to 1 (or modal to non-modal category) for dichotomous variables and from the 
mean to one standard deviation above the mean for continuous variables, holding all other variables at their 
mean or modal values. The marginal effects for the interactive variables, and their constituent terms, will be 
calculated using the method described in Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006). 
 
48
 However, because 18 cases in my dataset had to be classified as unspecifiable for the reasons discussed 
above, each of the amicus briefs in the cases also had to be classified as ideologically unspecifiable.  
Basically, since the ideological direction of the justice vote did not align with the winning party and the 
lower court decision direction according to the SCDB, the amicus briefs were not able to be assigned an 
ideological direction.  Thus, in these 18 cases, it is not possible to determine whether amici influence exists 
given my research design.  
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case.  A positive value indicates that liberal briefs outnumber conservative briefs in the case, 
while a negative value indicates the opposite.  I expect this variable to be signed positively, 
indicating that a relative advantage of liberal briefs in a case increases the likelihood of a justice 
voting liberally.  This finding would support the legal persuasion model (information/legal 
persuasion hypotheses) of amicus influence. 
The second independent variable of interest represents the relative advantage of liberal 
amicus participants in a case: Liberal - Conservative Amicus Cosigners Difference.  This variable 
reflects not only the number of amicus brief filers, but also amicus co-signers in each case.  I use 
the same basic methodology as described in the Liberal - Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference 
variable description above. A positive value indicates that liberal amicus signers outnumber 
conservative amicus signers in a case, while a negative value indicates the opposite.   I expect 
this variable to be signed positively, indicating that a relative advantage of liberal signers in a 
case increases the likelihood of a justice voting liberally.  This finding would support the interest 
group theory (affected groups hypotheses) of amicus influence. 
The third independent variable of interest is judicial ideology: Ideology. As the Court’s 
ideology is a well-known predictor of judicial outcomes, I control for judicial ideology (policy 
preferences) by using the Segal and Cover (1989) ideology scores, which are based on 
newspaper editorial commentary involving the justices’ perceived ideologies made between their 
presidential nomination and Senate Confirmation.  The Segal-Cover ideology scale runs from 0 
to 1.0, with 0 being the most conservative and 1.0 being the most liberal.
49
  Table 3.1 lists the 
                                                 
49
 As described by Segal and Cover (1989, 559), their ideology scores are derived by content analyzing each 
paragraph in the relevant newspaper editorials for signs of political ideology as follows: “Paragraphs were 
coded as liberal, moderate, conservative , or not applicable. Liberal statements include (but are not limited 
to) those ascribing support for the rights of defendants in criminal cases, women and racial minorities in 
equality cases, and the individual against the government in privacy and First Amendment cases. 
Conservative statements are those with an opposite direction. Moderate statements include those that 
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Segal-Cover scores of each of the justices on the Roberts Court during the 2007-2011 terms from 
highest (most liberal) to lowest (most conservative). 
 
Table 3.1 Justice Segal-Cover Scores Ranked Most Liberal to Most Conservative, 2007-
2011 Terms of the USSC 
Ranking 
 
Justice Segal-Cover Score 
1 
 
Sonya Sotomayor 0.78 
2 
 
Elena Kagan 0.73 
3 
 
R.B. Ginsburg 0.68 
4 
 
Stephen Breyer 0.475 
5 
 
Anthony Kennedy 0.365 
6 
 
David Souter 0.325 
7 
 
J.P. Stevens 0.25 
8 
 
Clarence Thomas 0.16 
9 
 
John Roberts 0.12 
10 
 
Samuel Alito 0.1 
11 
 
Antonin Scalia 0 
 
                                                                                                                                           
explicitly ascribe moderation to the nominees or those that ascribe both liberal and conservative values” 
(559).  Segal and Cover then measure judicial ideology by subtracting the fraction of paragraphs coded 
conservative from the fraction of paragraphs coded liberal and dividing by the total number of paragraphs 
coded liberal, conservative, and moderate. The resulting scale of policy preferences ranges from 0 
(unanimously conservative) to .5 (moderate) to 1 (unanimously liberal).  
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Segal-Cover scores are widely accepted and are consistent with common perceptions of 
justice ideology (Martin, Quinn, and Epstein 2005).
50
  The most liberal justice in the Roberts 
Court dataset measures at .78 (S. Sotomayor), while the most conservative scores a 0 (A. Scalia). 
The overall mean justice ideology between 2007-2011 terms of the Roberts Court is .327 (which 
is closet to Justice D. Souter, whose score is .325, and second closest to Justice A. Kennedy, 
whose score is .365), with a standard deviation of .252.
51
 The expected sign of this variable is 
positive, indicating that liberal justices are more likely than the conservative justices to cast 
liberal votes. 
In using the Segal-Cover scores as my measure of judicial ideology, I deviate from 
Collins (2008), who uses the Martin and Quinn (2002) (MQ) judicial ideology scores.
52
  Many 
researchers prefer MQ scores over the Segal-Cover scores because MQ scores reflect 
                                                 
50
 Although J. Souter and J. Stevens are widely regarded as being much more liberal in their voting record than 
their Segal-Cover score would indicate. 
 
51
 It bears noting that the Court’s ideologically median justice is not necessarily the same thing as the Court’s 
most ideologically moderate justice.  According to Epstein and Jacobi (2008, 45), to be the Court’s median 
justice is to be “the Justice in the middle of a distribution of Justices, such that half of the justices are to the 
right of (more ‘conservative’ than) the median and half are to the left of (more ‘liberal’ than) the median.”  
That is, the median justice is the justice who sits in the exact middle of Court (see also Martin, Quinn, and 
Epstein 2005). To be a “moderate” is to have a decreased commitment to either the liberal or conservative 
points of view or to hold ideological views than run in the middle of the two ideological poles.  For 
example, using Segal-Cover scoring, a score of .5 would be the most ideologically moderate.  When using a 
score of .5 as the standard for moderation, Justice Stephen Breyer – with a Segal-Cover score of .475 – 
becomes the closest justice to a moderate ideology in the Roberts Court to date.   Yet, Justices Souter and 
Kennedy are closest to USSC’s median during the time frame under analysis.    
 
52
 If I were using the Martin-Quinn scores as my measure of judicial ideology, the most liberal justice in the 
Roberts Court dataset would measure at -1.406 (Justice J.P. Stevens during the 2007 term), while the most 
conservative would score 4.629 (Justice C. Thomas during the 2007 term). The overall mean ideology 
would be 1.407 (which is closet to Justice A. Kennedy’s score during the 2011 term, whose score is 1.403, 
second closest to Justice A. Kennedy’s score of 1.521 during the 2010 term, and third closet to Kennedy’s 
score of 1.236 during the 2009 term), with a standard deviation of 1.829.  After Justice Kennedy, the closet 
Justice to the MQ mean ideology score is Chief Justice J. Roberts during the 2007 term with a score of 
1.99.   Justice R.B. Ginsburg, with scores of .011 and -.011 in the 2010 and 2011 terms, respectively, is 
actually the closest justice to the historic mean of the USSC during the time frame under analysis using MQ 
scoring.  However, unlike the Segal-Cover scores, the MQ scores are not able to capture actual ideological 
“moderation” as well as they capture the median justice, because, as described above, the MQ ideal points 
are arrived at by analyzing voting coalitions and comparisons to justices one another over time, not by 
measuring ideology in reference to how any particular case outcome aligns with subjective assessments of 
where cases should fall on the conservative-liberal ideological spectrum.  
 106 
 
longitudinal changes in an individual justice’s ideology (Roberts 2009, 107).  Martin and Quinn 
have shown that using a static score for one justice throughout tenure does not as accurately 
capture ideology. Instead, justices evolve over time and the MQ scores reflect that change. Each 
justice has a score for every term calculated with a dynamic probability model with Bayesian 
inference.  MQ scores are based upon a justice’s actual voting record each term.  Specifically, 
Martin and Quinn make inferences from patterns of voting coalitions observed during cases to 
arrive at a justice’s ideal point.  Each justice’s ideal point represents the overall preferred 
position of that justice in the aggregate.  A positive score reflects a more conservative ideology, 
while a negative score reflects a liberal ideology.  A score of zero represents the historical mean 
of the USSC since 1937. These scores are theoretically unbounded, but currently range from -6 
(Justice W. Douglas, very liberal) to +4.6 (Justice C. Thomas, very conservative).   
It is crucial to note that the MQ ideology measures have been described as an “agnostic” 
method of coding (Fischman and Law 2008, 30-31) because they do not require the researcher to 
make a subjective assessment of the ideological direction of the case outcome or justice vote.  
Rather, MQ scores estimate the ideological direction of the outcome/vote from the actual voting 
alignment of the justices. That is, MQ scores makes inferences from the observed voting 
coalition patterns by considering all possible combinations of justice’s preferences that could 
explain these observed voting patterns (Epstein and Jacobi 2008, 47).  Basically, MQ scoring 
constructs a liberal-conservative scale that treats judges who represent the ends of the ideological 
spectrum as anchor points.  Thus, a liberal vote is “Brennan-like” and a conservative vote is 
“Rehnquist-like” (Fischman and Law 2008, 30-31).  As Fischman and Law (2008, 30) point out, 
the challenge of this type of agnostic coding is that the ideology of the justices must be inferred 
from their votes at the same time that the directionality of each case is inferred from the justice’s 
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positions.  This then is the main critique of the MQ scores: they are endogenous to justice votes, 
as they measure ideology by how often particular justices vote with each other, not necessarily 
by how often they support particular ideological outcomes.   
Admittedly, any attempt to measure judicial ideology presents challenges and trade-offs.  
MQ scores are often preferred by judicial researchers because they are more methodologically 
sophisticated and have been demonstrated to better predict a justice’s actual voting record than 
alternative measures such as Segal-Cover scores (Fischman and Law 2009).  I choose to use the 
Segal-Cover scores because they are exogenous measures of judicial ideology – i.e., they 
measure judicial attitudes independent of their votes, unlike the more fashionable MQ ideology 
scores.  As explained above, using MQ scores introduces the problem of endogeneity into the 
analysis:  i.e., the MQ scores, being based on a justice’s actual voting records, potential already 
capture the influence of amicus curiae briefs and other non-ideological factors.  Because MQ 
scores are derived from the justices’ votes, using these same scores to study the effect of 
ideology on votes amounts to using votes to predict votes (Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 
2012, 713).  As Segal and Cover (1989, 558) bluntly state: “One cannot demonstrate that 
attitudes effect votes when the attitudes are operationalized from those same votes.”  And as 
stated by Epstein et al. (2012, 708), “When the goal is to explain the effect of ideology on the 
judges’ votes, scholars typically prefer exogenous measures because explaining votes with 
measures derived (even in part) from those very same votes involves a degree of circularity.”  
Thus, by using the Segal-Cover scores, I avoid the problem of circularity in my causal findings.
53
   
                                                 
53
 The Segal-Cover scores are admittedly static – i.e., they do not change over the course of a justice’s career, 
even though research shows that most justices become more liberal or conservative during their tenure on 
the USSC (e.g., Epstein et al. 2007). This is one reason that many scholars prefer the MQ ideology 
measures, as they are dynamic and change over time.  Additionally, while Segal-Cover scores have been 
shown to have strong explanatory power in civil rights cases, the same is not true for cases involving 
unions, federalism, or taxation as the primary issue area (e.g., Epstein and Mershon 1996).  The MQ scores 
have been shown to have more predictive power in these areas. 
 108 
 
My fifth independent variable is Prestigious Liberal – Conservative Amicus Difference.  
This variable represents the relative advantage of prestigious liberal amicus participants in a case 
as compared to prestigious conservative amicus participants.  As discussed above, scholars have 
found some support for the notion that the prestige and experience of the amicus participant may 
influence judicial behavior (e.g., McGuire 1994; Kearney and Merrill 2000; Lynch 2004; Collins 
2004; Simard 2007; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2013).  In coding this variable, I have identified 10 
private interest groups that, based upon prior literature and their frequency of amicus 
participation, represent the most prestigious and experienced amici: ACLU, AFL-CIO, American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), NAACP and NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
54
 
Washington Legal Foundation (WLF), Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), American Bar Association (ABA), American Medical 
Association (AMA), and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (CofC).  These ten 
groups were chosen because each has been identified in the literature as either (1) having higher 
success rates than the average for amici, or (2) more frequently participating as amici, or (3) 
having a strong reputation among legal practitioners, judges, and scholars, or (4) a combination 
of the prior three.
55
   This group of 10 prestigious amici comprises seven groups that are 
commonly viewed as liberal in their ideological orientation – ACLU, AFL-CIO, AARP, 
NAACP, NACDL, ABA, and AMA, and three groups viewed as conservatively inclined – CofC, 
WLF, and PLF. 
                                                                                                                                           
 
54
 For purposes of this analysis, although technically separate organizations, I treat the NAACP and NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund as the same entity. 
 
55
 This list of ten prestigious groups is not meant to be exhaustive, but it is meant to be accurate and 
representative of the most prestigious, powerful, institutional amici to appear at the USSC: the 
quintessential “repeat players.”  There is no one accepted list or ranking of the most prestigious amicus 
groups.  My list is culled from various sources in the extant literature and is subject to judgment calls. 
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The ACLU is consistently identified in the literature as one of the most prestigious and 
experienced amici (e.g., Krislov 1963; Barker 1967; Puro 1972; Ivers and O’Conner 1987; 
Kearney and Merrill 2000; Lynch 2004; Dunworth, Fischman, and Ho 2009; Unah and Hancock 
2006; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2013).  Likewise, the AFL-CIO’s prominence is widely 
documented (e.g., Puro 1972; Kearney and Merrill 2000;  Lynch 2004; Dunworth, Fischman, and 
Ho 2009); the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) is widely regarded as one of the 
most powerful interest groups in Washington and as one of the most active amicus participants 
(e.g., Chandler 2013; Nownes 2013); the NAACP and NAACP Legal Defense Fund  have 
historically been among the most regarded, active, and influential interest groups in the judicial 
process (e.g., Vose 1957; Krislov 1963; Lynch 2004; Unah and Hancock 2006);  the Washington 
Legal Foundation (WLF) is acknowledged as a leading amicus participant and conservative 
voice (e.g., Lynch 2004; Dunworth, Fischman, and Ho 2009; Chandler 2013) ; likewise, the 
Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF)  is one of the most active and prestigious amicus participants 
with a conservative/libertarian bent (e.g., Dunworth, Fischman, and Ho 2009; Chandler 2013) ;  
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) is the most active amicus in 
the realm of criminal procedure and one of the most active amici generally (e.g., Dunworth, 
Fischman, and Ho 2009; Chandler 2013); the American Bar Association (ABA), along with the 
American Medical Association (AMA), are two of the most prestigious professional association 
amici (e.g., Lynch 2004); and lastly, the prevalence and influence of the Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States (CofC)  as amici in the judicial sphere has been widely documented (e.g., 
Lynch 2004; Franklin 2009; Chandler 2013).  I expect Prestigious Liberal – Conservative 
Amicus Difference to be signed positively, indicating that a relative advantage of prestigious 
liberal briefs in a case increases the likelihood of a justice voting liberally.    
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 Interaction Term   
In addition to the foregoing independent variables, I include an interaction term in my 
model
56
 – Judicial Moderation x Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference – in order to 
examine whether or not all justices respond uniformly to the persuasion attempts of amici, or if 
amici have greater effects on the more moderate justices, with this effect diminishing the more 
ideologically extreme the justice becomes.
57
  Mishler and Sheehan (1996, 197) show that 
moderate (“swing”) justices are most likely to be receptive to the influence of public opinion. 
Similarly, and akin to the findings of Collins (2008) discussed above, I expect that the influence 
of amicus briefs will be present for all justices, with this effect becoming more pronounced the 
more moderate the justice.   
As a component of the interaction term, I create a variable to capture the level of 
ideological moderation of each of the eleven justices who have served on the Roberts Court 
during the 2007-2011 terms: Judicial Moderation.  For purposes of this Judicial Moderation 
variable, I choose to use the Martin-Quinn (MQ) ideology scores, instead of the Segal-Cover 
scores.  I do so because, as discussed in more detail above, it is accepted that the MQ scores are 
more descriptively nuanced and accurate than any of the existing exogenous measures (e.g., 
Segal-Cover scores) (Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 2012, 714).
58
  Further, I am able to avoid 
the circularity problem associated with the MQ scores, as I am not asserting that judicial 
moderation is directly causally related to whether or not a justice votes liberally or 
                                                 
56
 This interaction term is not included in the base model reported in the Appendix in Table A.3. 
 
57
 As described by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006), the purpose of using interaction terms is to capture the 
conditional relationship between two or more variables.  In this work, the interaction term is included to 
determine whether or not all justices respond uniformly to amicus briefs or whether a justice’s response is 
conditioned by his/her judicial ideology.  
 
58
 The MQ scores are able to capture a justice’s ideological drift over time, while Segal-Cover scores are not.  
Additionally, MQ scores are more predictive of a justice’s votes across various issue areas than are Segal-
Cover scores. 
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conservatively.  Instead, for purposes of this interaction term, I am assuming that ideology has an 
effect on voting, and I am then asserting that a justice’s moderation level conditions his/her 
response to amicus briefs.  As explained by Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal (2012, 708), when 
researchers want to take the effect of ideology as a given and wish to describe how it works, 
endogenous approaches are preferable as they are more precise. 
Therefore, as my measure of Judicial Moderation, I create a score for each justice for 
each term that captures his/her level of ideological moderation.  My scale ranges from 0 to 4.02, 
with 0 representing the most ideologically extreme justice score, and 4.02 representing the most 
ideologically moderate justice score in the dataset.   To arrive at this measure, I begin with each 
justice’s MQ score for the relevant term.  I then subtract this MQ score from the MQ score for 
the median justice for that term, to show the distance of each justice from the median justice for 
the term. I then take the absolute value of this distance (as MQ scores can be either positive or 
negative, with 0 representing the historical mean of the USSC), resulting in a value of zero 
representing the median justice and higher values representing greater ideological extremism.  I 
then multiply this number by -1 to reverse the scores, making -4.02 the value of the most 
ideologically extreme justice, and making 0 the score of the mean justice for the term.  I then add 
4.02 to each value (representing the distance of the justice furthest from 0), thus making 0 the 
new score for the most ideologically extreme justice, and 4.02 the new score for the most 
ideologically moderate (mean) justice.  The formula described is as follows:  -1 * abs( 
MQMeanJustice -  MQIdeology) + 4.02.   The higher the justice’s Judicial Moderation score, the 
more pronounced positive effect I expect amicus briefs/signers difference to make.   Table 3.2 
lists the mean moderation score of each justice serving during the 2007-2011 terms, based upon 
the above-described transformation, from most to least moderate. 
 112 
 
Table 3.2.  Justice Moderation Scores, From Most to Least Moderate, 2007-2011 Terms of 
the USSC 
Rank Justice Name MQ Moderation Mean 
1 Anthony Kennedy 4.02 
2 John Roberts 2.89 
3 Elena Kagan 2.86 
4 Sonya Sotomayor 2.80 
5 Stephen Breyer 2.66 
6 Samuel Alito 2.61 
7 R.B. Ginsburg 2.51 
8 David Souter 2.15 
9 J.P. Stevens 1.99 
10 Antonin Scalia 1.69 
11 Clarence Thomas 0.65 
 
As described by Collins (2008, 101) and Ai and Norton (2003), in nonlinear models such 
as logit, it cannot be inferred from the sign, magnitude, or statistical significance of the 
coefficient of the interaction term whether the conditioning variable (Judicial Moderation) 
mediates the influence of amicus briefs, therefore it is necessary to calculate the marginal effects 
and confidence intervals for this interaction term, holding all other variables at their mean (for 
continuous variables) or modal (for dummy variables) values. To do this, I, like Collins (2008), 
use the technique developed by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006).  
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 Control Variables  
In addition to my independent variables, and my interaction term, I include four control 
variables to account for well-documented influences on the decision-making of the USSC 
justices.  My first two control variables – SG Liberal Amicus and SG Conservative Amicus –
control for the long-recognized impact of the most influential amicus participant – the Solicitor 
General (e.g., Deen et al. 2003; Kearney and Merrill 2000; Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997; Lynch 
2004; Segal 1988; McGuire 1994; O’Connor 1983).  They are scored 1 if the SG filed an amicus 
brief arguing the liberal or conservative position, respectively, and 0 if otherwise.  The expected 
sign of SG Liberal Amicus is positive, while the expected sign of SG Conservative Amicus 
variable is negative, indicating that a justice is more likely to vote liberally in cases where the SG 
advocates the liberal position, and that a justice is more likely to vote conservatively in cases 
where the SG supports the conservative position.  
Lower Court Direction controls for the Court’s well-known practice of accepting cases 
on appeal that it seeks to reverse (Caldeira and Wright 1988; Segal and Spaeth 1993). This 
variable is coded 1 if the decision of the lower court that the USSC is reviewing was liberal and 
0 if it was conservative.   The expected sign of this variable is negative, indicating that a justice 
is more likely to vote conservatively in a case in which the lower court handed down a liberal 
decision. 
Lastly, Liberal — Conservative Party Resources Difference controls for the impact of 
party resources on judicial decision-making, and is based on the status continuum of litigants 
adopted by Collins (2008) from Sheehan, Mishler, and Songer (1992).  Prior research on the field 
of judicial behavior indicates that the resources a litigant possesses influences judicial decision-
making – i.e., the judiciary favors the “haves” over the “have nots,” due in part to their ability to 
 114 
 
hire better lawyers, expert witnesses, etc.  (Galanter 1974; Wheeler, Cartwright, Kagan, and 
Friedman 1987; McGuire 1995; Songer, Kuersten, and Kaheny 2000; Collins 2004; Collins 
2007).
59
  As acknowledged by Black and Boyd (2012, 288), “resource-endowed litigants have 
expertise, bargaining credibility, flexibility in long-term strategy and litigation, continuity in 
legal services, and fewer cost and delay barriers,” and these characteristics often translate into a 
higher likelihood of victory for such litigants. 
  I classify the litigants’ resource levels in each case by first referring to the Spaeth SCDB 
(2012) Release 01 (accessed at http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php), which includes variables 
identifying the petitioner and respondent parties in each case.  Second, I decide which party is 
liberal or conservative by finding the ideological direction of both the USSC and lower court 
decisions in the case, and then coupling this finding with whether the petitioner won or lost the 
case according to the SCDB.
60
  
Following Collins (2008), litigants are ranked according to increasing resources, as 
follows: poor individuals = 1,
61
 minorities = 2,
62
 individuals = 3,
63
 unions/interest groups = 4,
64
 
                                                 
59
 But compare Sheehan, Mishler, and Songer (1992), who fail to find a party status/ resources effect on the 
chances of judicial success at the USSC.  This finding may be explained, in part, by McAtee and 
McGuire’s research (2007, 271), which shows that justice ideology at the USSC mediates the influence of 
litigant resources: “liberal justices favor the social and economic underdogs, while more conservative 
justices support the interests of wealthier, institutional litigants.” Thus, the liberal and conservative justices 
may often cancel each out, muting the discernible effect of party resources on justice votes. 
 
60
 In 18 of the 397 cases under review, I was not able to classify the resource levels of the parties as either 
liberal or conservative, as the ideological direction of the USSC’s decision in the case was unspecifiable.   
In such instances, I did not fill in values for the Liberal and Conservative Party Resources variable. 
 
61
 I code Poor Individuals as those who were proceeding via in forma pauperis petitions, as well as those who 
were coded as indigent defendants, persons convicted of crimes, welfare recipients, and prisoners in the 
SCDB (2012) Release 01. 
 
62
 I code Minorities as including those classified in the SCDB as minority employees or job applicants, other 
racial or ethnic minorities, lesbian, gay, or bisexual individuals, handicapped individuals, aliens, and 
Indians or Native American tribes.  
 
63
 I code Individuals as including those classified in the SCDB as private persons, voters, attorneys, physicians, 
defendants, children, females, employees, and any other individuals not included categories 1 or 2. 
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small businesses = 5, businesses = 6,  corporations = 7,
65
 local governments = 8,
66
 state 
governments = 9,
67
 and the federal government = 10.
68
 
69
  It is expected that the sign of  
Liberal—Conservative Party Resources Difference will be positive, indicating that the USSC is 
more likely to rule in the liberal direction when the liberal party has greater resources than the 
conservative party.  Conversely, it is expected that when the conservative party’s resource level 
exceeds that of the liberal party, the USSC is more likely to hand down a conservative decision. 
As mentioned previously, after estimating my base and primary all-inclusive logit 
models, I estimate multiple subsidiary logit models in order to provide a more contextualized 
analysis of amici impact.  Because the primary model relies on a measure of judicial moderation 
instead of a direct measure of judicial conservatism or liberalism, it is necessary to include two 
                                                                                                                                           
 
64
 Unions/Interest Groups include those classified as unions, professional organizations, political action 
committees, private colleges and universities, religious organizations and institutions, nonprofit groups, 
environmental organizations, public interest organizations, etc., in the SCDB. 
 
65
 I follow Sheehan et al. (1992, 470, fn. 1), and code Corporations as including very large business entities 
(e.g., airlines, railroads, banks, insurance companies, oil companies, telecommunications companies, etc.) 
and national corporations (e.g. Amazon, Microsoft, General Electric, etc). Small Businesses include those 
which are more likely to have an individual owner-proprietor, e.g., bookstores, realtors, restaurants, 
theaters, and so-called “mom and pop” establishments.  Lastly the Businesses category includes those 
businesses in between these other two categories or whose size is ambiguous. 
 
66
 I code Local Governments as both municipalities, counties, and their respective officials. 
 
67
 I code State Governments as including the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories, and 
their respective officials. I also include Foreign Governments in this category, as I expect their resource 
levels to be typically higher than local governments but lower than the U.S. federal government. 
 
68
 I code Federal Government as instances where the United States, or one of its bureaucratic departments or 
agencies, or top officials is a party.  The Solicitor General is always the legal representative before the 
USSC in such instances speaking on behalf of the federal government.   
 
69
 While the party resource continuum adopted in this study is admittedly subject to arbitrariness and 
overgeneralization at times, this is true of any parsimonious ranking of litigant resources. Nevertheless, 
such a continuum remains a “pragmatic solution” (Wheeler et al. 1987, 413).   Similar litigant resource 
continuums have been widely accepted in the literature (see e.g., Black and Boyd, 2012; Wheeler et al. 
1987; Sheehan et al. 1992; Collins 2004, 2007, 2008).  As noted by Black and Boyd (2012, 293), despite 
minor variations, scholars are in widespread agreement as to the general scaling of parties: individuals are 
the least powerful and have the lowest resource levels, while businesses have the next level of power 
because they are better organized and have a larger pool of resources to draw from.  Lastly, governments 
are placed at the top of the rankings because they are frequently involved in litigation and have a nearly 
limitless pool of resources. 
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separate logit models to assess whether or not conservative and liberal justices respond in the 
same way to amicus briefs.  The first of these models includes only liberal justices and the 
second includes only conservative justices for all cases at the Roberts Court.  This will allow for 
a comparison of liberal and conservative justices to see if they respond similarly or differently to 
amici.  Liberal justices are identified as those justices that have Martin-Quinn ideology scores of 
less than .4; conservative justices are those that have MQ scores of greater than .4.
70
  Table 3.3 
ranks each of the eleven justices that have served on the Roberts Court between the 2007-2011 
terms from most conservative to least conservative according to their mean MQ ideology score 
over that five term span. 
These two ideology models are specified the same as the primary all-inclusive model, 
except that they exclude the variable controlling for judicial ideology along with the interaction 
variable, as ideology in essence will already be controlled for since these models will only be 
focused on liberal justices, and conservative justices, respectively.  Thus, the influence of amici 
on these two categories of justices will be directly observable without need for the inclusion of 
an interaction term or a separate control variable for judicial ideology. 
Next, another subsidiary logit model is included that only focuses on politically salient 
cases.  This salience model includes the same variables and interaction term as the primary all-
inclusive model.  The inclusion of this model allows for an examination of how the salience of a 
case blunts or heightens the impact of the persuasion attempts of amici. I provide this model 
                                                 
70
 I chose .4 as the conservative/liberal break-point for a couple of reasons.  First, it was a natural break-point 
when looking at the alignment of justices when arrayed from highest MQ scores (most conservative) to 
lowest MQ scores (most liberal).  Second, it was the dividing line between the highest MQ score of the 
least liberal of those justices widely considered to be a part of the liberal bloc on the Roberts Court (Elena 
Kagan in 2011 term: .392 MQ score), and the lowest MQ score of the least conservative of the justices 
considered to be part of the conservative bloc of the Roberts Court (Anthony Kennedy in the 2007 term: 
.609).    
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Table 3.3. Ranking of Justices According to Their Martin-Quinn Mean Ideology Scores, 
2007-2011 Terms 
Rank Justice Name MQ Ideology Mean 
1 Clarence Thomas 4.53 
2 Antonin Scalia 3.49 
3 Samuel Alito 2.57 
4 John Roberts 2.29 
5 Anthony Kennedy 1.16 
6 Elena Kagan 0.31 
7 S. Sotomayor 0.17 
8 Stephen Breyer -0.2 
9 R.B. Ginsburg -0.35 
10 David Souter -1.06 
11 J.P. Stevens -1.08 
 
 
because I expect the influence of amicus briefs to be different in salient cases from others.  In 
salient cases, a justice’s ideology should play a more prominent role, reducing the likelihood of 
observing a judge casting an ideologically incongruent vote, and enhancing the likelihood of 
observing a judge cast an ideologically congruent vote.  Because of this, an ideologically 
advantage of amicus briefs/signers that is in the opposite direction of a justice’s ideology should 
not have as much sway over the justice in salient cases as in non-salient cases.  However, an 
ideologically advantage of amicus briefs/signers that is in the same direction of a justice’s 
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ideology should positively influence the justice in both salient and non-salient cases, as such 
briefs/signers simply reinforce the justice’s natural tendencies.  Therefore, amici influence can be 
expected in these salient cases, but only for those justices ideologically aligned with the amicus. 
Consequently, the level of amici influence should be less pronounced in the salience model than 
in the primary all-inclusive model.  In addition, I include two more subsidiary logit models 
focusing on salient cases – one for conservative justices, and one for liberal justices – to 
determine if the justices respond differently to amici in salient cases. 
To identify those cases which are politically salient, I use the list of top ten major cases 
compiled by CQ Press for each USSC term, which is published in its annual Supreme Court 
Yearbook.  The selection is based on such factors as the rulings' practical impact; its significance 
as legal precedent; the degree of division on the Court; and the level of attention among interest 
groups, experts, and news media (Jost 2012).
71
  In the model including only politically salient 
cases, I expect the results to show that a relative advantage of amicus briefs that are incongruent 
with a justice’s ideology will not meaningfully influence that justice to vote inconsistent with her 
                                                 
71   In using this Congressional Quarterly measure, I depart from Collins (2008, 124-125) and Epstein and Segal 
(2000) who determine political salience based upon whether the case appeared on the front page of the New 
York Times following the decision.  However, access to such New York Times data is only available through 
the 2009 term of the USSC, thus it is not appropriate for this study. The Congressional Quarterly salience 
measure has been used in prior literature and is one of the two measures (along with the New York Times), 
that is used in the Spaeth SCDB Salience Measures, located at http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php?s=5.  The CQ 
Press measure of issue salience indicates if the case appears on the list of landmark decisions in 
Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court (Savage 2010) (located at 
http://library.cqpress.com/supremecourtguide/).  A number of leading scholars in the field have used this 
CQ measure of case salience (e.g., Collins 2008; Brenner and Arrington 2002; Epstein and Knight 1998; 
Segal and Spaeth 1996; Brenner and Spaeth 1995). Epstein and Segal (2000) acknowledge the validity of 
the CQ Press salience measure, but level two primary criticisms against it: (1) it is biased towards cases 
involving civil rights and liberties; and (2) it is primarily a measure of retrospective case salience as 
determined by scholars, instead of a contemporaneous measure.  However, this second criticism does not 
apply with much force in this study, as I am only using the CQ press measure for recent terms of the USSC.  
Thus, my CQ Press salience measure is quite contemporaneous.  Moreover, as the last date of publication 
of CQ’s Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court was 2010 (which does not contain data on the 2010 and 2011 
terms of the USSC), I chose instead to use the list of major cases for the 2007 – 2011 terms of the USSC 
that is published by CQ Press in its annual Supreme Court Yearbook. 
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ideological preference, but that a relative advantage of amicus briefs that are congruent with a 
justice’s ideology will make it more likely for that justice to vote consistently with her ideology.   
Further, to investigate whether amici influence differs across issue areas, I include four 
other subsidiary logit models corresponding to the four main case issue areas confronting the 
justices: criminal procedure; civil rights and liberties; economics; and judicial power and 
federalism.  These issue area models will provide an assessment as to whether the impact of 
amici is uniform across various issue areas, or whether amici have a differential impact 
depending on the type of case confronting the justices.  These four issue area models will include 
the same variables and interaction term as the primary all-inclusive model. 
Lastly, in addition to the logit models described above, I provide tables detailing the 
Pearson’s correlation between the ideological direction of a justice’s vote and the amicus 
variables (Liberal–Conservative Amicus Brief Difference; Liberal–Conservative Amicus 
Cosigner Difference; Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference; SG Liberal Amicus; 
SG Conservative Amicus) for each of the eleven justices that served during the 2007-2011 terms. 
The purpose of these tables is to compare and contrast the influence of amici on each individual 
justice who has served at the Roberts Court.  These models, graphs, and tables will provide 
ample opportunity to assess the impact of amici on the Roberts Court in a variety of contexts. 
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Chapter 4: Amicus Participation at the Roberts Court 
This chapter provides a detailed description of amicus participation during the 2007-2011 
terms of the USSC.  By the conclusion of this chapter, I will demonstrate that amicus 
participation at the Roberts Court is prolific, and that this phenomenon is relatively consistent 
across individual terms, across various issue areas, and among differing categories of amicus 
participants.  Specifically, this chapter includes the following information regarding amici at the 
Roberts Court:  the number and percentage of cases with amicus participation across the 2007-
2011 terms, across individual terms, and across issue areas; the numbers, percentages, and 
averages of liberal, conservative, and total amicus briefs and cosigners across the 2007-2011 
terms, and across individual terms, issue areas, and amici categories; the percentage of amicus 
participation that each amicus category and subcategory represents; the number and percentage 
of cases involving various amicus categories; a ranking of the cases involving the most amicus 
briefs and amicus signers; a listing of the most frequent tracked amicus participants; the most 
frequent tracked conservative amici; the most frequent tracked liberal amici; and lastly, a ranking 
of those tracked amici who have the highest winning percentage at the Roberts Court. 
 
A. Amicus Participation by Issue Area 
 Table 4.1 presents information on the total amount of amicus briefs filed during the 2007-
2011 terms, as well as across four basic issue areas. The first row indicates the percentage of 
cases with at least one amicus brief for each issue area, and all areas combined.  Notably, amicus 
briefs were present in over 96 percent of all cases, and in at least 95 percent of cases in every 
issue area.  Not surprisingly, civil rights and liberties cases experienced the highest percentage of 
amicus participation (99.18 percent), but each of the other areas very closely followed.   
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Table 4.1.  Amicus Curiae Briefs by Issue Areas, 2007-2011 Terms 
 
Criminal 
Procedure 
Civil Rights 
and Liberties 
Economics 
Judicial Power 
and Federalism 
Totals* 
Percent of Cases 
with Amicus 
Briefs 
95.18% (98) 99.18% (121) 97.87% (92) 97.22% (70) 96.47% (383) 
Number of Briefs 
Filed 
637 1,209 955 815 3,639 
Number of 
Liberal Briefs 
Filed 
367 633 417 345 1,762 
Number of 
Conservative 
Briefs Filed 
255 493 402 386 1,535 
Number of 
Unspecifiable 
Briefs Filed 
15 86 132 83 339 
Mean Briefs Per 
Case 
5.95 9.91 10.15 11.31 9.17 
Mean Liberal 
Briefs Per Case 
3.43 5.19 4.44 4.79 4.44 
Mean 
Conservative 
Briefs Per Case 
2.38 4.04 4.27 5.36 3.86 
Mean 
Unspecifiable 
Briefs Per Case 
0.14 0.7 1.46 1.15 0.87 
Maximum 
Number of Briefs 
in a Case 
68 53 69 87 87.00 
Percent of Total 
Amicus Briefs 
17.50% 33.22% 26.24% 22.40% 100% 
Percent of Cases 
Decided 
26.95% (107) 30.73% (122) 23.68% (94) 18.14% (72) 100% (397) 
*The total column includes the two cases from this time frame that do not fit into the four issue 
areas listed here.  Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of observations.  
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 Rows 2 through 5 of Table 4.1 present the total number of amicus briefs filed in each 
issue area, as well as the total number of liberal, conservative, and unspecifiable briefs filed.  
3,639 amicus briefs were filed from 2007-2011 terms, with civil rights and liberties cases having 
the most briefs filed (1,209), followed, in order, by economics (955), judicial power and 
federalism (815), and criminal procedure (637) cases.  As one can see, almost twice as many 
briefs were filed in civil rights and liberties cases as in criminal procedure cases.    
As rows 3 and 4 show, the total number of conservative and liberal amicus briefs is 
relatively balanced at the Roberts Court (1,762 to 1,535), with liberal briefs having a modest 
advantage.  Rows 3 and 4 also demonstrate that liberal amicus briefs outnumber conservative 
briefs in all issue areas except judicial power and federalism cases.  This is understandable 
considering the fact that governments, which generally advocate the conservative position as 
amici, are particularly likely to be affected by this category of cases. 
Row 6 of Table 4.1 presents the mean number of total amicus briefs per case.  Notably, 
the Roberts Court averaged over 9 amicus briefs per case during the 2007-2011 terms.   Judicial 
power and federalism cases attracted the most mean amicus briefs per case (over 11), followed 
closely by economics (over 10) and civil rights and liberties cases (almost 10).   Criminal 
procedure cases attract the least number of briefs per cases (at almost 6).  Thus, in both absolute 
numbers and case averages, criminal procedure cases attract the least amount of amicus brief 
filings.  This finding could be explained by the fact that criminal defendants and prisoners tend 
to be low on the political resources, power, and sympathy scales.  Nevertheless, amicus brief 
filings are quite robust even in this category of cases.     
Rows 7 and 8 present the mean number of liberal briefs per case (4.44), and the mean 
number of conservative briefs per case (3.86), respectively.  For every conservative amicus brief 
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that was filed, 1.15 liberal briefs were filed at the Roberts Court.  Liberal amicus briefs 
comprised 48.42 percent of total amicus briefs, while conservative amicus briefs comprised 
42.18 percent of total briefs (with unspecifiable amicus briefs accounting for the remaining 9.32 
percent).  These findings confirm that liberal and conservative briefs are relatively balanced at 
the Roberts Court.  It appears, then, that counteractive lobbying is occurring among amici at the 
Roberts Court.  Liberal amicus briefs attract conservative responses, and vice versa.  These 
findings also provide evidence that amici do not simply file briefs in cases they are predisposed 
to winning.  If this were the case, we would expect to see more conservative amicus briefs filed 
than liberal ones at the conservative Roberts Court.  But the opposite is true.  Liberal amicus 
briefs maintain an over .5 brief advantage on average over their conservative counterparts in all 
cases.
72
  This finding is significant in that liberal amicus briefs still have a modest advantage in 
terms of participation on what is widely regarded as a conservative Court.  Liberal amici 
apparently do not feel that lobbying the modestly conservative Robert Court is a lost cause; on 
the contrary, they seem to relish the challenge. 
Comparing the issue areas, rows 7 and 8 show that liberal and conservative briefs are 
most closely balanced in economics cases (4.44 vs. 4.27); while civil rights and liberties cases 
have the greatest difference between liberal and conservative briefs per case (5.19 vs. 4.04).  
Judicial power and federalism is the only category of cases in which conservative brief 
outnumber liberal briefs on average (5.36 to 4.79). 
                                                 
72
 Judicial power and federalism is the only issue area that is not characterized by a liberal amicus brief 
advantage. 
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Row 10 of Table 4.1 shows the maximum number of briefs filed in a case for each issue 
area, and all areas combined.
73
  Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida (2011 
term) attracted the most amicus briefs of any case, with 87 briefs filed.   This particular case was 
a part of the broader consolidated health care law case involving the constitutionality of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which consolidated three docket numbers into one 
case:  Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida (11-398; 87 briefs); Florida vs. 
Department of Health and Human Services (11-400; 52 briefs); and National Federation of 
Independent Business vs. Sebelius (11-393; 29 briefs).  Altogether, this consolidated health care 
law case was accompanied by the filing of 168 amicus briefs, 136 of which were unique, and 32 
of which were the same brief filed in more than one of these three docket numbers.  This case set 
the all-time USSC record for number of amicus brief filings.  The criminal procedure case that 
attracted the most amicus participation (68 briefs) was District of Columbia v. Heller (2007 
term), involving the constitutionality of District of Columbia’s gun restrictions and whether the 
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to own a firearm for purposes of self-defense.   
The civil rights and liberties case with the most amicus briefs (53) was Citizens United v.  
Federal Election Commission (2009 term), regarding whether the First Amendment prohibits the 
government from restricting independent political expenditures by corporations, associations, 
and labor unions.  The economics case having the most amicus briefs (69) was Bilski v. Kappos 
(2009 term), involving a patent dispute over whether business methods could be patented.  
Table A.1, located in the Appendix, lists a ranking of all cases during the 2007-2011 
terms of the Roberts Court that were accompanied by at least 25 amicus briefs.  This table 
provides information regarding the case name, docket number, term, vote, ideological direction 
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 These maximum brief numbers are based on specific docket numbers.  For consolidated cases (those with 
multiple docket numbers), the actual number of briefs filed will often be higher. 
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of the decision, specific number of amicus briefs, net difference in the number of liberal and 
conservative briefs in the case, along with a brief description of the case holding.   
Row 12 demonstrates that the USSC decides more civil rights and liberties cases than any 
other category, followed by criminal procedure, economics, and judicial power and federalism 
cases, respectively.  This helps explain, in part, why civil rights and liberties cases attract more 
amicus briefs, in absolute numbers, than the other categories, as we know from Row 6 that 
economics and judicial power and federalism cases attract slightly more amicus briefs on 
average per case than do civil rights and liberties cases. 
Table 4.2 presents information on the total number of amicus brief cosigners during the 
2007-2011 terms, as well as across four basic issue areas.  Rows 1 and 2 of Table 4.2 present the 
total number of amicus cosigners in each issue area, along with the ratio of cosigners to briefs in 
each issue area.  24,476 amici signed briefs from 2007-2011 terms, with judicial power and 
federalism cases having the most cosigners (7,484), followed, in order, by criminal procedure 
(7,131), civil rights and liberties (6,132), and economics (3,632) cases.  Comparing the total 
number of amicus cosigners (24,476) to the total number of amicus briefs (3,639) at the Roberts 
Courts, we see that for every one amicus brief that is filed, an average of 6.7 amici cosign such 
briefs.  It should be obvious then, that one must look beyond simply amicus briefs, to amicus 
cosigners, when assessing amicus participation, otherwise one is left with an incomplete picture 
of the nature and extent of amicus participation and impact at the Roberts Court.  
When comparing Tables 4.1 and 4.2, one can see that amicus cosigner participation 
presents quite a different story to that of amicus brief participation across issue areas.  While 
judicial power and federalism cases ranked third in terms of numbers of briefs filed, they ranked 
first in the number of amicus cosigners of the four issue areas. And while criminal procedure  
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Table 4.2.  Amicus Curiae Cosigners by Issue Areas, 2007-2011 Terms 
 
Criminal 
Procedure 
Civil Rights 
and Liberties 
Economics 
Judicial Power 
and Federalism 
Totals 
Number of Amicus 
Cosigners 
7,131 6,132 3,632 7,484 24,476 
Ratio of Cosigners 
to Briefs 
11.2 to 1 5.1 to 1 3.8 to 1 9.2 to 1 6.7 to 1 
Number of Liberal 
Amicus Cosigners 
3,440 3,289 1,841 3,738 12,308 
Number of 
Conservative 
Amicus Cosigners 
3,655 2,405 1,376 3,355 10,791 
Number of 
Unspecifiable 
Amicus Cosigners 
36 438 415 391 1,377 
Mean Amicus 
Cosigners Per Case 
66.64 50.26 38.73 103.94 61.69 
Mean Liberal 
Cosigners Per Case 
32.15 26.96 19.63 51.92 31.02 
Mean Conservative 
Cosigners Per Case 
34.16 19.71 14.67 46.6 27.20 
Mean Unspecifiable 
Cosigners Per Case 
0.33 3.59 4.43 5.42 3.47 
Maximum Number 
of Amicus 
Cosigners in a Case 
1,622 249 178 1,928 1,928 
Percent of Total 
Amicus Cosigners 
29.13% 25.05% 14.84% 30.58% 100% 
Percent of Cases 
Decided 
26.95% (107) 30.73% (122) 23.68% (94) 18.14% (72) 100% (397) 
*The total column includes the two cases from this time frame that do not fit into the four issue 
areas listed here.  Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of observations. 
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cases had the lowest number of amicus briefs of any of the four issue areas, they had the second 
most amicus cosigners.  Also of note, while economics cases had the second most amicus briefs 
filed, they had the least number of amicus cosigners of any of the issue areas.   
In fact, criminal procedure amicus cosigners outnumbered economics cosigners by an 
almost 2:1 ratio; and judicial power and federalism amicus cosigners outnumbered economics 
cosigners by an over 2:1 ratio.  In economics cases amici are much less likely to collaborate 
together on briefs, whereas amici in judicial power and federalism and criminal procedure cases 
are much more likely to collaborate.  This finding could be explained, in part, by the fact that 
state and local government amici often collaborate together on briefs, and these amici are more 
likely to be directly affected by criminal procedure and judicial power and federalism cases, than 
the other two issue areas.  The lesser willingness of amici to collaborate in economics cases 
might be explained by the fact that amici in economics cases are typically business interests, 
which are likely to have more resources than many other amici, and thus feel less need to pool 
resources and collaborate on the filing of amicus briefs.  The ranking of amici collaboration from 
greatest to least across issue areas is as follows:  criminal procedure; judicial power and 
federalism; civil rights and liberties; and economics.   
Rows 3-5 of Table 4.2 show the number of liberal, conservative, and unspecifiable 
amicus cosigners in total, and across issue areas.  Consistent with the findings regarding amicus 
briefs, we see once again that total liberal cosigners outnumber total conservative cosigners, but 
that this liberal advantage is modest.  The ratio of liberal to conservative amicus cosigners is 1.14 
to 1, which is almost identical to the ratio of liberal to conservative amicus briefs (1.15 to 1).   
Criminal procedure is the only issue area in which conservative cosigners outnumber liberal 
ones.  This can be explained by the predominance of governmental amici in criminal procedure 
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cases.  By contrast, civil rights and liberties cases exhibit the greatest advantage of liberal 
cosigners of the issue areas.  This finding should not come as a surprise, as those amici most 
attracted to civil rights and liberties cases tend to be more liberal in their orientation, as they 
typically side with the interests of the pro civil rights and liberties claimant against the interests 
of governmental regulation.   
When comparing the collaboration levels of total liberal and conservative amici at the 
Roberts Court (as evidenced by their willingness to cosign briefs instead of filing separate 
briefs), one reaches a notable conclusion: the ratio of cosigners to briefs for both liberal and 
conservative amici is virtually identical: 6.99 liberal amici cosign together for every liberal brief 
that is filed, while 7.03 conservative amici cosign together for every conservative brief that is 
filed on average.  Thus, collaboration is the very common among both conservative and liberal 
amici, and this collaboration tends to be strikingly balanced.  This is one more finding bolstering 
the conclusion that amici are engaged in an ideological arms race, and that they engage in 
counteractive lobbying behavior.    
However, upon examination of the four issue areas, we see that differences do exist in the 
collaboration levels of liberal and conservative amici. The ratio of liberal to conservative 
cosigners for each amicus brief across issue areas is as follows: criminal procedure – 9.37 to 
14.33; civil rights and liberties – 5.20 to 4.87; economics – 4.41 to 3.42; and judicial power and 
federalism – 10.33 to 8.69.   The main conclusion regarding amicus collaboration drawn from 
these cosigner ratios is that liberal amici exhibit slightly higher collaboration levels than do 
conservative amici in every issue area except criminal procedure.  The criminal procedure 
anomaly is likely due to the fact that states typically cosign amicus briefs together rather than 
filing separately, and that states are predominant amici in criminal procedure cases, and that 
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states in criminal procedure cases usually represent the conservative position.   In short, while 
amicus briefs and cosigners are relatively ideologically balanced at the Roberts Court, liberal 
amici are slightly more likely to file briefs, and also slightly more likely to collaborate in most 
issue areas.  
Row 6 of Table 4.2 presents the mean number of total amicus cosigners per case.  
Notably, the Roberts Court averaged almost 62 cosigners per case during the 2007-2011 terms.   
Judicial power and federalism cases attracted the most mean amicus cosigners per case (almost 
104), followed by criminal procedure (over 66), civil rights and liberties cases (over 50), and 
lastly economics (almost 39).   Thus, in both absolute numbers and case averages, economics 
cases attract the least amount of amicus cosigners, despite having the second highest amicus 
brief filings in absolute numbers and mean briefs per case.  As stated above, this indicates that 
amici in economics cases are more likely to choose to file solo briefs, rather than to collaborate 
compared to amici in other issue areas.  As mentioned previously, this finding is likely due, in 
part, to the higher resource levels possessed by economic amici compared to others. 
Rows 7 and 8 of Table 4.2 present the mean number of liberal cosigners per case (31.0), 
and the mean number of conservative cosigners per case (27.2), respectively.  Therefore, a 3.8 
liberal amicus cosigner advantage over conservative cosigners exists on average for each case at 
the Roberts Court.  As stated previously, for every conservative amicus cosigner, 1.14 liberal 
cosigners are present on average at the Roberts Court.  Liberal amicus cosigners comprise 50.29 
percent of total amicus cosigners, while conservative amicus cosigners comprise 44.09 percent of 
total cosigners (with unspecifiable amicus cosigners accounting for the remaining 5.63 percent).  
These findings provide further confirmation of the relatively ideologically balanced nature of 
amicus participation at the Roberts Court, with a slight liberal advantage.   
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Similar to the findings regarding amicus briefs, these findings regarding amicus cosigners 
provide additional evidence that amici do not simply participate in cases they are predisposed to 
winning.  If this were the case, we would expect to see more conservative amicus cosigners than 
liberal ones at the conservative Roberts Court, but the opposite is true.  Once again, liberal amici 
are not reluctant to lobby at the Roberts Court, indicating that they do not think that such 
lobbying is a waste of time, money, or effort. 
Comparing the issue areas, Rows 7 and 8 show that liberal amici enjoy an approximately 
seven cosigner advantage over conservative amici on average in civil rights and liberties cases, 
and approximately a five cosigner advantage on average in economics and judicial power and 
federalism cases.  On the other hand, criminal procedure cases have two more conservative 
amicus cosigners than liberal ones on average.   
Row 11 of Table 4.2 shows the maximum number of cosigners filed in a case for each 
issue area, and all areas combined.
74
  Just as is with case with amicus briefs, Department of 
Health and Human Services v. Florida (11-398) (2011 term) attracted the most amicus cosigners 
(1,928) of any case during the 2007-2011 terms of the Roberts Court.  As stated previously, 
Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida was a part of the broader consolidated 
health care law case involving the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, which consolidated three docket numbers into one case:  Department of Health and Human 
Services v. Florida (11-398; 1,928 cosigners); Florida vs. Department of Health and Human 
Services (11-400; 1,413 cosigners); and National Federation of Independent Business vs. 
Sebelius (11-393; 450 cosigners).  Altogether, this consolidated health care law case was 
                                                 
74
 These maximum cosigner numbers are based on specific docket numbers.  For consolidated cases (those with 
multiple docket numbers), the actual number of cosigners will often be higher. 
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accompanied by 3,791 cosigners (some of which are duplicative, as some of the same briefs were 
filed in a couple of docket numbers).   
The criminal procedure case that attracted the most amici cosigners (1,622 cosigners), 
was McDonald v. City of Chicago (08-1521) (2010 term), involving the constitutionality of 
Chicago’s gun restrictions and whether the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms limits the 
ability of states and local governments to restrict guns.   The civil rights and liberties case with 
the most amicus cosigners (249) was Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (08-1371) (2009 term), 
regarding whether, consistent with the First Amendment, a public law school could bar 
recognition of student campus chapter of the Christian Legal Society because it required students 
to subscribe to a “statement of beliefs” and refrain from proscribed behavior, including 
homosexuality, in order to become a member.  The economics case having the most amicus 
cosigners (69) was Microsoft v. i4i Limited Partnership (10-249) (2010 term), involving whether 
the Patent Act requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence.  
Table A.2, located in the Appendix, ranks all of the cases during the 2007-2011 terms of 
the Roberts that possessed at least 125 amicus cosigners.  This table provides information 
regarding the case name, docket number, term, vote, ideological direction of the decision, 
specific number of amicus cosigners, and net difference in the number of liberal and 
conservative cosigners in the case, along with a brief description of the case holding.   
 
B. Amicus Participation by Term 
 Table 4.3 presents information regarding amicus brief filings by term of the Roberts 
Court.  The percentage of cases each term accompanied by at least one amicus brief was 
remarkably consistent, ranging from just over 95 percent of cases to just over 97 percent of cases 
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over the 5 terms.  The 2011 term had the highest percentage of cases with amicus participation, 
but each of the other terms closely followed.  Row 2 of Table 4.3 shows that the 2010 term of the 
Roberts Court had the most amicus briefs (834), followed by the 2011 term (754).  The 2008 
term had the fewest amicus briefs (659).  Rows 3-5 of Table 4.3 show the number of liberal, 
conservative, and unspecifiable briefs filed each term.  Liberal amicus briefs outnumbered 
conservative briefs in every term, with the liberal advantage being greatest in the 2007 term (111 
liberal brief advantage over conservative briefs).    
 Row 6 depicts the mean number of amicus briefs filed each case during each term.   The 
2010 and 2011 terms had the greatest mean number of amicus briefs per case – both at 9.8 briefs 
per case.  By contrast, the 2008 term had the fewest amicus brief filings per case (7.75).   Rows 
7-9 illustrate the mean number of liberal, conservative, and unspecifiable amicus briefs per case, 
respectively.  While more liberal amicus briefs were filed per case in every term, the liberal 
advantage was greatest during the 2007 term (1.52 brief advantage), and was smallest during the 
2009 term (.17 brief advantage).   
 Row 10 of Table 4.3 shows the maximum number of amicus briefs filed in a case each 
term.  2011 had the case with the most amicus briefs, Department of Health and Human Services 
v. Florida (11-398) (87 briefs). The case accompanied by the most amicus briefs in the 2009 
term was Bilski v. Kappos (08-294) (69 briefs).  The case in the 2007 term with the most amicus 
briefs was District of Columbia v. Heller (07-290) (68 briefs).   Microsoft v. i4i Limited 
Partnership (10-290) (48 briefs) had the most amicus briefs filed in the 2010 term.  Lastly, the 
case with the most amicus briefs from the 2008 term was Wyeth v. Levine (06-1249), in which 
the USSC decided to allow failure-to-warn suits in state court against drug makers despite 
federal regulation. 
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Table 4.3.  Amicus Curiae Briefs by Term 
 
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 Totals 
Percent of 
Cases with 
Amicus Briefs 
97.26% 
(71) 
96.47% 
(82) 
96.10% 
(74) 
95.29% 
(81) 
97.40% 
(75) 
96.47% 
(383) 
Number of 
Briefs Filed 
661 659 731 834 754 3,639 
Number of 
Liberal Briefs 
Filed 
359 298 328 413 364 1,762 
Number of 
Conservative 
Briefs Filed 
248 277 315 392 303 1,535 
Number of 
Unspecifiable 
Briefs Filed 
55 84 88 28 87 342 
Mean Briefs 
Per Case 
9.07 7.75 9.49 9.81 9.79 9.17 
Mean Liberal 
Briefs Per Case 
4.93 3.51 4.26 4.86 4.73 4.44 
Mean 
Conservative 
Briefs Per Case 
3.41 3.26 4.09 4.61 3.94 3.86 
Mean 
Unspecifiable 
Briefs Per Case 
0.76 0.99 1.14 0.33 1.17 0.87 
Maximum 
Number of 
Briefs in a Case 
68 30 69 48 87 87.00 
Percent of 
Total Amicus 
Briefs 
18.16% 18.11% 20.09% 22.92% 20.72% 100% 
Percent of 
Cases Decided 
18.39% 
(73) 
21.41% 
(85) 
19.40% 
(77) 
21.41% 
(85) 
21.41% 
(77) 
100%  
(397) 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of observations. 
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Row 11 of Table 4.3 demonstrates that each term was roughly equivalent in terms of its 
share of the total percentage of amicus briefs, ranging from a low of just over 18 percent in the 
2008 term, to a high of almost 23 percent in the 2010 term.   Likewise, Row 12 shows that each 
term was roughly equivalent in terms of its share of the total caseload, ranging from just over 18 
to just over 21 percent.  
In similar fashion, Table 4.4 presents information regarding amicus cosigners by term of 
the Roberts Court.  Row 1 of Table 4.4 shows that the 2011 term by far had the most amici 
participation in the form of brief cosigners (7,307), followed by the 2009 term (4,969).  Not only 
did the 2010 term have the fewest amicus briefs, it also had the fewest cosigners (3,744).  Rows 
2-4 of Table 4.4 show the number of liberal, conservative, and unspecifiable amicus cosigners 
each term.  Liberal amici outnumbered conservative amici cosigners in three (2007, 2008, 2011) 
of the five terms, with the liberal cosigner advantage being greatest in the 2007 term (1,415 
liberal cosigner advantage).   In fact, of the five terms, the 2007 term exhibited the greatest 
liberal amicus advantage both in terms of briefs and cosigners.  In both the 2009 and 2010 terms, 
the number of conservative amici cosigners outnumbered liberal cosigners, with this 
conservative amici advantage being greatest in the 2009 term (986 conservative cosigner 
advantage). 
Row 5 depicts the mean number of amicus brief cosigners for each case during each term. 
The 2011 term had the greatest mean number of amicus cosigners per case (94.9), due in large 
part to the impact of the consolidated health care law cases, which had a total of 3,791 cosigners 
and significantly elevated the means for the 2011 term.  The mean number of amicus cosigners 
per case in the 2011 term more than doubled the mean number of cosigners in the 2008 and 2010 
terms, with 45 and 44 cosigners per case, respectively.  Rows 6-8 illustrate the mean number of  
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Table 4.4.  Amicus Curiae Cosigners by Term 
 
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 Totals 
Number of 
Amicus Cosigners 
4,597 3,859 4,969 3,744 7,307 24,476 
Number of Liberal 
Amicus Cosigners 
2,908 1,858 1,812 1,790 3,940 12,308 
Number of 
Conservative 
Amicus Cosigners 
1,493 1,478 2,798 1,903 3,119 10,791 
Number of 
Unspecifiable 
Amicus Cosigners 
196 523 359 51 248 1,377 
Mean Amicus 
Cosigners Per 
Case 
63.16 45.4 64.53 44.05 94.9 61.69 
Mean Liberal 
Cosigners Per 
Case 
39.96 21.86 23.53 21.06 51.17 31.02 
Mean 
Conservative 
Cosigners Per 
Case 
20.51 17.39 36.33 22.39 40.51 27.2 
Mean 
Unspecifiable 
Cosigners Per 
Case 
2.69 6.15 4.67 0.6 3.22 3.47 
Maximum 
Number of 
Amicus Cosigners 
in a Case 
920 228 1,622 182 1,928 1,928 
Percent of Total 
Amicus Cosigners 
18.78% 15.77% 20.30% 15.30% 29.85% 100% 
Percent of Cases 
Decided 
18.39% 
(73) 
21.41% (85) 19.40% (77) 21.41% (85) 21.41% (77) 100% (397) 
Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of observations. 
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liberal, conservative, and unspecifiable amicus cosigners per case.  Liberal amicus cosigner 
advantage per case was most pronounced in the 2007 (19 liberal cosigner advantage) and 2011 
(almost 11 cosigner advantage) terms.  On the other side, conservative cosigner advantage per 
case was greatest during the 2009 term (almost 13 conservative cosigner advantage), and also 
present during the 2010 term (over 2 cosigner advantage).    
Row 9 of Table 4.4 shows the maximum number of amicus cosigners in a case each term.  
Just as with amicus briefs, the case with the most amicus cosigners in the 2011 term was 
Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida (11-398) (1,928 cosigners), a part of the 
larger consolidated health care law case.  The case accompanied by the most amicus cosigners in 
the 2009 term was McDonald v. City of Chicago (08-1521) (1,622 cosigners).  Just as with 
amicus briefs, the case in the 2007 term with the most amicus cosigners was District of 
Columbia v. Heller (07-290) (920 cosigners).   Republic of Iraq v. Simon (08-539) (228 
cosigners) had the most amicus cosigners in the 2008 term (along with its companion case 
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty (07-1090) (which had 217 cosigners, most of which were identical to 
those in Republic of Iraq v. Simon).  This case involved the question of whether the U.S. courts 
have jurisdiction over Iraq for claims involving alleged misdeeds that occurred during Saddam 
Hussein’s regime.  Lastly, the case with the most amicus cosigners from the 2010 term was 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (182 cosigners), in which the USSC struck down 
a California law banning the sale or rental of violent video games to minors based upon the First 
Amendment. 
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C. Amicus Participation by Amicus Category 
In this section, I investigate the nature of the amici who participate at the Roberts Court.  
I have categorized all amici as falling into one of three basic categories: (1) interest groups; (2) 
governments; or (3) individuals.  Governmental amici include the Solicitor General, state 
governments,
75
 local governments,
76
 and foreign governments.  Individuals include any person 
who signs their individual name on an amicus brief.  Common examples of amici individuals are 
academics, scientists, members of Congress, state legislators, governors, and other current and 
former government officials.   Interest groups are all amici who are not governments or 
individuals.  Interest groups take many forms, including corporations (AT&T, General Electric, 
Google, WalMart, Microsoft), public advocacy organizations (ACLU, Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving, NAACP, National Rifle Association, PETA, Sierra Club, National Organization for 
Women), public interest law firms (American Center for Law and Justice, Pacific Legal 
Foundation, Mental Health Law Project, Rutherford Institute), trade associations (American 
Sociological Association, American Bankers Association, American Bar Association), unions 
(United Mine Workers, American Federation of Teachers, National Education Association), and 
peak associations (Chamber of Commerce of the United States, AFL-CIO, National League of 
Cities).  Other examples of interest groups include churches and religious organizations, political 
parties, political action committees, charities, universities and colleges, think tanks, and ad hoc 
coalitions. 
Table 4.5 presents information on the levels of participation by each of the categories of 
amici during the 2007-2011 terms.  Column 2 reports the number and percentage of total amici 
that each amici category and subcategory represents.  Interestingly, individuals are the most 
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 I code state governments as including the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories. 
 
76
 Local governments include municipalities, counties, and any subdivisions thereof. 
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frequent amici category at the Roberts Court, comprising 47.3 percent of total amici.  This 
finding is noteworthy, as it differs sharply from prior findings regarding the prominence of 
individuals as amici at the USSC.   For example, Caldeira and Wright (1990) find that only six 
percent of amici during the 1982 term were individuals.  Collins and Solowiej (2007, 967) show 
that individuals accounted for only about 22 percent of amici in the 1995 term.  And in an 
analysis of the 1950, 1968, 1982, and 1995 terms of the USSC, Collins (2008, 61) finds that 
individuals accounted for only 12.1 percent of amicus participants.  Thus, the Roberts Court has 
seen a significant increase in the percentage of individuals who are participating as amici.  
Interest groups account for 35.75 percent of all amici at the Roberts Court.   This finding 
is noteworthy in that it also departs from Collins’ (2008, 61) findings, in which interest groups 
(excluding governments and individuals) constituted 56.8 percent of all amici during the 1950, 
1968, 1982, and 1995 terms of the USSC.  In addition, I find that governments constitute almost 
17 percent of amici at the Roberts Court.  This finding also departs from those of Collins (2008), 
who shows that governmental amici accounted for just over 31 percent of total amici.   Thus, the 
percentage of individuals participating as amici is significantly higher at the Roberts Court than 
in prior terms of the USSC, and the percentage of interest groups and governments is 
significantly lower.  Perhaps individuals are more aware today than in times past of the 
prominent role the USSC plays in shaping public policies, as well as more aware of the potential 
of amici to influence judicial outcomes at the USSC.   The increased presence of individual 
amici might also be a testament to the increased ability of individuals to share information and 
communicate efficiently in our technological age, thus making it easier to collaborate and pool 
resources for the purposes of filing amicus briefs.
77
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 Of course, this phenomenon would hold true for interest groups and governments as well, but perhaps the 
barriers to amicus collaboration previously faced by individuals have been reduced to a greater extent by this 
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Table 4.5.  Amicus Curiae Participation by Amicus Category, 2007-2011 Terms 
Amicus Category Number of Amici* Number of Cases** 
Interest Groups 8,750 (35.75%)  370 (93.20%) 
Liberal Interest Groups 4,582 (52.37%) 319 (80.35%) 
Conservative Interest Groups 3,545 (40.51%) 257 (64.74%) 
Unspecifiable Interest Groups 623 (7.12%) 
 
Governments 4,148 (16.95%) 251 (63.22%) 
Liberal Governments 997 (24.04%) 84 (21.16%) 
Conservative Governments 2,839 (68.44%) 157 (39.55%) 
Unspecifiable Governments 312 (7.52%) 25 (6.30%) 
Individuals 11,578 (47.30% ) 227 (57.18%) 
Liberal Individuals 6,682 (57.73%) 161 (40.55%) 
Conservative Individuals 4,459 (38.51%) 106 (26.70%) 
Unspecifiable Individuals 437 (1.79%) 29 (7.30%) 
Totals 24,476 (100%) 383 (96.47%) 
* Numbers in parentheses in the “Number of Amici” column reflect percentage of total amici 
each category or subcategory represents. 
**Numbers in parentheses in the “Number of Cases” column reflect percentage of total cases in 
which each category or subcategory participated. 
 
Looking once again at Column 2 of Table 4.5, one can see the percentages of each 
amicus category that are liberal, conservative, or unspecifiable in terms of the ideological 
positions advanced by the amici.  A total of 4,582 interest group amici (52.37 percent) advocated 
a liberal position, compared to 3,545 interest group amici (40.51 percent) who advocated a 
conservative position.  The ratio of liberal interest group amici to conservative ones is 1.29 to 1.  
Liberal amici individuals also possess an advantage over their conservative counterparts.  6,682 
                                                                                                                                           
phenomenon than for governments and interest groups, who have long had networks and resources that aid 
collaborative efforts. 
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individual amici (57.73 percent) advocated a liberal position, compared to 4,459 individual amici 
(38.51 percent), who advocated a conservative position.  The ratio of liberal individual amici to 
conservative ones is 1.50 to 1.   These numbers indicated that liberal interest groups and liberal 
individuals more often participate as amici at the Roberts Court than do conservative ones.     
However, governmental amici participation tells a different story.  Conservative 
governmental amici account for over 68 percent of governmental amici, while only 24 percent of 
governments advocate a liberal position.  The ratio of conservative governmental amici to liberal 
ones is 2.85 to 1.  Obviously, government amici are much more likely to advance a conservative 
position than a liberal one.  This finding can be explained, in part, by the fact that the SCDB 
typically characterizes a pro-government decision as a conservative outcome. 
Column 3 of Table 4.5 indicates the number of cases in which at least one member of the 
amicus category appeared on an amicus brief.  This information shows how often each amicus 
category (or subcategory) participates in cases before the Roberts Court.  Take note that the 
numbers in parentheses do not total 100 percent because different types of amici often appear in 
the same case.  Examining Column 3, one observes that interest groups participate in a higher 
percentage of cases (93 percent) than either individuals (57 percent) or governments (63 
percent).  Therefore, while individual amici appear more often in total numbers at the Roberts 
Court than the other amici categories, they appear in the fewest cases.  This finding indicates that 
individual amici concentrate their participation in fewer cases than governments or interest 
groups, and that they are more likely to collaborate together on amicus briefs than governments 
or interest groups.  In fact, in those 227 cases in which at least one individual amici appears, an 
average of 51 individuals appear per case.  By comparison, in the 370 cases in which at least one 
interest group appears, an average of 23.65 interest groups appear per case.  And, in the 251 
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cases in which at least one government amici participates, an average of 16.53 governments 
participate per case.   
Looking at the participation of the amicus subcategories in cases as reflected in Column 3 
of Table 4.5, one finds that liberal interest groups participate in a higher percentage of cases as 
amici (80.35 percent) than do conservative interest groups (64.74 percent).  But one also finds 
that, in the cases in which they participate, both liberal and conservative interest groups average 
about 14 amici per case.   These findings provide further confirmation that liberal interest groups 
are more frequent participants at the Roberts Court than conservative groups.  On the other hand, 
for government amici, those that advocate a conservative position appear in a higher percentage 
of cases (39.6 percent) than do those that advance a liberal position (21.2 percent).   In the cases 
in which they participate, liberal government amici average almost 12 amici per case.  In 
contrast, in cases in which at least one conservative government amici participates, an average of 
just over 18 conservative government amici appear.  Lastly, liberal individual amici appear in a 
higher percentage of cases (40.6 percent) than do conservative individual amici (26.7 percent).  
However, both liberal and conservative individual amici average about the same amount of 
participants per case (42) in which they appear.   In short, these findings demonstrate that liberal 
interest group amici and liberal individual amici have an advantage over their ideological 
counterparts at the Roberts Court, but that conservative government amici have the advantage 
over liberal ones.  
Table 4.6 provides a more in-depth examination of amicus curiae participation by 
governments at the Roberts Court.  Column 2 reports the number and percentage of total amici 
that each government amici category and subcategory represents.  As is plain, state governments  
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Table 4.6.  Amicus Curiae Participation by Governments, 2007-2011 Terms 
 
Number of Amici  Number of Cases 
Solicitor General 163 (3.93%) 163 (41.06%) 
Liberal Solicitor General 69 (42.33%) 69 (17.38%) 
Conservative Solicitor General 77 (47.24%) 77 (19.40%) 
Unspecifiable Solicitor General 17 (10.43%) 17 (4.28%) 
State Governments 3,746 (90.31%) 176 (44.33%) 
Liberal State Governments 798 (21.30%) 56 (14.11%) 
Conservative State Governments 2,707 (72.26%) 120 (30.23%) 
Unspecifiable State Governments 241 (6.43%) 14 (3.53%) 
Local Governments 202 (4.87%) 39 (9.82%) 
Liberal Local Governments 142 (70.30%) 19 (4.79%) 
Conservative Local Governments 51 (25.25%) 19 (4.79%) 
Unspecifiable Local Governments 9 (4.46%) 1 (0.25%) 
Foreign Governments 38 (0.92%) 5 (1.26%) 
Liberal Foreign Governments 34 (89.47%) 3 (0.76%) 
Conservative Foreign Governments 4 (10.53%) 2 (0.50%) 
Unspecifiable Foreign Governments 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Totals 4,148 (100%) 251 (63.22%) 
* Numbers in parentheses in the “Number of Amici” column reflect percentage of total amici 
each category or subcategory represents. 
**Numbers in parentheses in the “Number of Cases” column reflect percentage of total cases in 
which each category or subcategory participated. 
 
are the most frequent government amici (3,746 times) at the Roberts Court by a wide margin, 
constituting over 90 percent of all government amici, followed by local governments (202 times 
– almost 5 percent), the Solicitor General (SG) (163 times – almost 4 percent), and foreign 
governments (38 times – almost 1 percent).   
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Looking once again at Column 2 of Table 4.6, one can see the percentages of each 
government amicus category that are liberal, conservative, or unspecifiable.  In all, 798 state 
government amici (21.3 percent) advocated a liberal position, compared to 2,707 state 
government amici (72.26 percent) which advocated a conservative position.  The ratio of 
conservative state government amici to liberal ones is 3.39 to 1.   Conservative state government 
amici clearly predominate over liberal state government amici.   However, the reverse is true 
when it comes to local governments.  Liberal local government amici possess a sizeable 
advantage over their conservative counterparts.  A total of 142 liberal government amici (70.3 
percent) advocated a liberal position, compared to 51 local government amici (25.25 percent) 
who advocated a conservative position.  The ratio of liberal local governments to conservative 
ones is 2.78 to 1.   Lastly, in the 2007-2011 terms, the SG participated as amicus 163 times: 69 
times the SG supported the liberal position (42.33 percent), 77 times the SG supported the 
conservative position (47.24 percent), and 17 times the SG’s position was ideologically 
unspecifiable (10.43 percent).   Therefore, the SG was much more ideologically balanced that 
other government amici, and slightly favored the conservative position.  This finding is 
interesting, because in at least four of the five terms of the Roberts Court, the SG represented the 
interests of the Obama administration, which is viewed as liberal in orientation.  However, the 
modest conservative slant of the SG’s amicus activity can likely be explained, in part, by the 
nature of the SCDB’s ideological coding, in which the pro-government position is more often 
than not deemed the conservative one, particularly in civil rights and liberties, criminal 
procedure, and judicial power cases.
78
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 However, this is not true in all areas.  For example, in federal taxation cases, the pro-United States position is 
liberal; and in federalism cases, the pro-federal power position is liberal, as is the pro-executive power position. 
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Column 3 of Table 4.6 indicates the number of cases in which at least one member of the 
government amicus category appeared on an amicus brief.   Once again, note that the numbers in 
parentheses do not total 100 percent because different types of amici often appear in the same 
case.  The states participate in the highest percentage of cases (44.33 percent) of any government 
amicus category, appearing in a total of 176 cases.  The SG closely follows, appearing in just 
over 41 percent of cases.  Local governments only appear in approximately 10 percent of cases 
as amici, while foreign government amici only appear in just over 1 percent of cases. Even 
though the states and the SG appear in a similar percentage of cases, the SG rarely collaborates 
with other amici on briefs, while states (and to a lesser extent local governments) frequently do.   
This is understandable, as the SG does not have the need to collaborate with others, given its 
resource advantages and inherent prestige.  Further, while local government amici appear more 
often in total numbers at the Roberts Court than the SG, they appear in far fewer cases.  This 
finding indicates that local government amici concentrate their participation in fewer cases than 
the SG, and are more likely to collaborate together.  In those 176 cases in which at least one state 
amici appears, an average of 21.28 states appear per case.  By comparison, in the 39 cases in 
which at least one local government appears, an average of 5.17 local governments appear per 
case.   
Looking at the participation of the government amicus subcategories in cases as reflected 
in Column 3 of Table 4.6, one finds that the SG participates in a higher percentage of cases as a 
conservative amicus than as a liberal amicus, but the difference is only about two percent.  
Conservative state government amici participate in a higher percentage of cases (30.23 percent) 
than liberal ones (14.11 percent).   In the cases in which they participate, liberal government 
amici average over 14 amici per case.  In contrast, in cases in which conservative government 
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amici participate, they average 22.6 amici per case.  Interestingly, liberal local government amici 
appear in the same percentage of cases (4.79 percent) as do conservative local government amici, 
even though liberal local government amici significantly outnumber their conservative 
counterparts (142 to 51).   In the cases in which they participate, liberal local governments 
average 7.47 amici per case, while conservative local governments only average 2.68 amici per 
case.   Finally, foreign government amici appeared in only five cases in the 2007-2011 terms.
79
 
Liberal foreign governments appeared in three cases, and conservative foreign government amici 
in two cases.   However, in the three cases in which they participated, liberal foreign 
governments averaged over 11 amici per case, while conservative foreign governments averaged 
only two amici per case.  
In brief, these findings demonstrate that conservative government amici are more 
prevalent than liberal government amici because of the predominance of conservative state amici 
at the Roberts Court.  Local government and foreign government amici exhibit a liberal bent, 
while the SG is relatively ideologically balanced.    
It is worth noting here that the SG often participates in a case before the USSC not as an 
amicus, but as a party representing the interests of the federal government.  In fact, the SG was a 
party in 124 cases between 2007-2011 terms. The SG was a liberal party in 23 cases (18.5 
percent), a conservative party in 98 cases (79.03 percent), and an unspecifiable party in 3 cases 
(2.42 percent).  Collins (2008, 105) reports that during the 1946-2001 terms of the USSC, the SG 
served as a party in more than 41 percent of all cases argued before the USSC.  This compares to 
31 percent of cases in which the SG appeared as a party during the 2007-2011 terms of the 
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 The five cases in which foreign government amici appeared are as follows:  (1) Medellin v. Texas (06-984) 
(2007 term – 15 liberal amici); (2) Ali Samantar v. Yousef (08-1555) (2009 term – 1 conservative amicus); 
(3) Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. (08-1191) (2009 term – 3 conservative amici); (4) Minneci v. 
Pollard (10-1104) (2011 term – 1 liberal amicus); (5) Arizona v. United States (11-182) (2011 term – 18 
liberal amici; 1 unspecifiable amicus). 
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USSC.   Therefore, when the SG is a party, the SG is much more likely to advocate a 
conservative position (almost 80 percent of the time) than when the SG is an amicus (about 47 
percent of the time) at the Roberts Court.  Regardless, in either capacity, the SG is more likely to 
assume a conservative stance, which is notable, as the SG has predominantly represented the 
interests of the liberal Obama administration during the 2007-2011 terms of the Roberts Court. 
 
D. Frequency of Participation and Winning Percentage of Prestigious Amici 
 Table 4.7 ranks the most frequent amicus participants on the Roberts Court of the ten 
prestigious interest groups that I chose to track for purposes of this study.  As stated in Chapter3, 
these ten interest groups are representative of the most prestigious, experienced, and prominent 
amici, based upon the literature.   Table 4.7 ranks these ten groups based upon their total amicus 
participation during the 2007-2011 terms of the Roberts Court.   In addition, this table provides 
information on the number of conservative, liberal, and unspecifiable amicus briefs that each 
group submitted.   The NACDL is the most active amicus participant at the Roberts Court, 
submitting 100 total briefs, 90 of which were liberal.  The Chamber of Commerce is the second 
leading amicus participant, submitting 79 amicus briefs, 61 percent of which were conservative.  
The ACLU ranks third, filing 75 amicus briefs, 84 percent of which were liberal.  Rounding out 
the top five are the AARP, and the Washington Legal Foundation, submitting 60 and 51 briefs, 
respectively.  In all, 70 percent of the AARP’s briefs were liberal, while 70.5 percent of WLF’s 
briefs were conservative.  Looking at rankings six through ten, 67 percent of the Pacific Legal 
Foundation’s briefs were conservative; 75 percent of the NAACP’s briefs were liberal; 82 
percent of the ABA’s briefs were liberal; 76 percent of the AFL-CIO’s briefs were liberal; and 
64 percent of the AMA’s briefs were conservative. 
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Table 4.7.  Most Frequent Tracked Amicus Interest Groups, 2007-2011 Terms 
Rank Amicus Name 
Liberal 
Amicus 
Conservative 
Amicus 
Unspecifiable 
Amicus 
Total 
Amicus 
1 
National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers 
90 5 5 100 
2 Chamber of Commerce 24 48 7 79 
3 American Civil Liberties Union 63 8 4 75 
4 
American Association of Retired 
Persons 
42 9 9 60 
5 Washington Legal Foundation 13 36 2 51 
6 Pacific Legal Foundation 8 29 6 43 
7 
NAACP / NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund 
30 4 6 40 
8 American Bar Association 28 3 3 34 
9 AFL-CIO 13 4 0 17 
10 American Medical Association 2 9 3 14 
 
  
 Comparing Table 4.7 to the Table 1.1, which lists the top 15 amicus participants between 
1976-2006, as compiled by Dunworth, Fischman, and Ho (2009), one sees many similarities. The 
ACLU and the NACDL were ranked first and second, respectively, in Table 1.1   WLF was 
ranked seventh; the Chamber of Commerce ninth; ALF-CIO eleventh; NAACP thirteenth; and 
the PLF fifteenth.   So there is continuity in terms of prestigious amicus participation at the 
Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts.   
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 A few other observations regarding these tables are in order.  First, the AARP and CofC 
have become even more active amicus participants than in prior years.  Second, the conservative 
leaning interest groups – CofC, WLF, and PLF – do seem to have increased their amicus 
participation at the Roberts Court compared to past Courts, accounting for three of the top five 
groups.  But this phenomenon holds true for most interest groups across the ideological 
spectrum. And third, the NACDL’s prominent role can be explained by the fact that the group 
rarely misses an opportunity to represent a criminal defendant or prisoner when criminal 
procedure cases come before the USSC, and many times it is the only amicus to advance the 
interests of these parties. 
 Table 4.8 simply ranks the same ten tracked interest groups by the number of 
conservative amicus briefs filed.  As is plain, the CofC, WLF, and PLF are the predominant 
conservative interest group amici at the Roberts Court.   Likewise, Table 4.9 ranks the groups by 
the number of liberal amicus briefs filed.   The NACDL, ACLU, AARP, NAACP, and ABA are 
the most prominent and frequent liberal amici groups.  Altogether, these ten groups filed a total 
of 313 liberal amicus briefs, 155 conservative amicus briefs, and 45 unspecifiable amicus briefs.  
Thus, the ten prestigious interest groups that I chose to track clearly had a liberal slant, with 
liberal briefs outnumbering conservative briefs by an over 2 to 1 margin.
80
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 I did not purposely choose for my ten groups to have a liberal slant.  But I also did not want to select my ten 
prestigious groups by cherry-picking the five conservative and five liberal groups that I thought to be most 
prestigious, as I was concerned this method might skew the data, as it might not be emblematic of the most 
prestigious groups.  Put differently, my purpose was not to evenly weight conservative and liberal 
prestigious interest groups, but to select, based upon the literature, ten groups that I decided were 
representative of the most prestigious interest groups.  
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Table 4.8.  Most Frequent Tracked Conservative Amicus Interest Groups, 2007-2011 
Terms 
Rank Amicus Name Conservative Amicus 
1 Chamber of Commerce 48 
2 Washington Legal Foundation 36 
3 Pacific Legal Foundation 29 
4 American Association of Retired Persons 9 
5 American Medical Association 9 
6 American Civil Liberties Union 8 
7 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 5 
8 NAACP / NAACP Legal Defense Fund 4 
9 AFL-CIO 4 
10 American Bar Association 3 
 
 
Table 4.9.  Most Frequent Tracked Liberal Amicus Interest Groups, 2007-2011 Terms 
Rank Amicus Name Liberal Amicus 
1 National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 90 
2 American Civil Liberties Union 63 
3 American Association of Retired Persons 42 
4 NAACP / NAACP Legal Defense Fund 30 
5 American Bar Association 28 
6 Chamber of Commerce 24 
7 Washington Legal Foundation 13 
8 AFL-CIO 13 
9 Pacific Legal Foundation 8 
10 American Medical Association 2 
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Table 4.10.  Winning Percentage of Tracked Prestigious Amici, 2007-2011 Terms 
Rank Amicus Name 
Winning 
Side 
Losing 
Side 
Winning  
Percentage 
1 Solicitor General 108 42 72.00% 
2 Pacific Legal Foundation 28 11 71.79% 
3 American Bar Association 23 10 69.70% 
4 State Governments 2,323 1414 62.16% 
5 Washington Legal Foundation 31 20 60.78% 
6 Chamber of Commerce 45 31 59.21% 
7 Local Governments 97 67 59.15% 
8 Foreign Governments 21 17 55.26% 
9 
National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers 
49 49 50.00% 
10 American Association of Retired Persons 29 31 48.33% 
11 American Medical Association 5 7 41.67% 
12 AFL-CIO 7 10 41.18% 
13 American Civil Liberties Union 30 43 41.10% 
14 NAACP / NAACP Legal Defense Fund 13 23 36.11% 
 
 
Lastly, Table 4.10 presents the winning percentage of the prestigious amicus interest 
groups and governments that I tracked for purposes of this study.  As discussed in Chapter 1, 
these winning percentages, by themselves, are not proof of amicus influence.  However, these 
percentages provide prima facie evidence and indications of amicus influence.  All things being 
equal, it is likely that the groups that exhibit the highest winning percentages at the Roberts 
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Court are likely to be more influential.  This is particularly likely, as the evidence does not 
support the conclusion that amici are cherry-picking cases in which to file briefs based upon a 
belief that they are likely to prevail. 
The SG is clearly the most successful prestigious amicus participant in terms of winning 
percentage at the Robert Court between the 2007-2011 terms.  The SG supported the winning 
side in 108 cases; supported the losing side in 42 cases; and either supported neither side or 
supported an unspecifiable position in 13 cases, for a total winning percentage of 72 percent as 
an amicus before the Roberts Court.  This compares to a winning percentage of 85 percent at the 
Warren Court and 73 percent at the Rehnquist Court (Deen, Ignani, and Meernik 2003).   This 
finding reaffirms what prior studies have shown – the SG is consistently the most influential and 
effective amicus at the USSC – and is consistent with the historic success rate of the SG at the 
USSC.
81
   The SG is not only the “king of the citation frequency hill” (Kearney and Merrill 
2000), but also sits on the throne as the king of the amici.  
Of course, the SG’s influence extends beyond its amicus activity.  Between 1946-2001, 
the SG prevailed 61 percent of the time when appearing as a party at the USSC.   During the 
2007-2011 terms, by comparison, the SG prevailed 14 out of 23 times as when appearing as a 
liberal party (60.87 percent of the time); and the SG prevailed 49 out of 98 times when appearing 
as a conservative party (50.00 percent of the time).  Combined, the SG’s win percentage as a 
party between the 2007-2011 terms is 52.07 percent.  Therefore, the SG appears to be more 
influential as an amicus participant than as a party, both at the Roberts Court, and in past Courts.  
Further, compared to prior eras, the SG as a party is appearing in a smaller percentage of cases 
with the Roberts Court, and has a lower winning percentage with the Roberts Court than with 
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 Segal (1988) shows that the SG had a winning percentage of 75 percent during the 1952-1982 terms of the 
USSC.  Sakolar (1992) reaches a similar conclusion based upon an analysis of the 1959-1986 terms: 72 
percent winning percentage for the SG. 
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prior Courts.   It appears that the influence of the SG as a party is diminishing slightly in 
comparison to past Courts.   
In total, the SG participated in 287 out of 397 cases (or 72.29 percent) as either a party or 
an amicus between 2007-2011.  In those cases in which the SG appeared either as a party or an 
amicus, the SG supported the winning side in 63.10 percent of cases.  By winning over 6 out of 
10 cases in which it appears, the SG’s influence on the Roberts Court is apparent and strong. 
Continuing with the examination of Table 4.10, one notices the winning percentage of the 
conservative-libertarian leaning Pacific Legal Foundation rivals that of the SG at 72 percent.  
Using this measure, PLF is the most successful prestigious interest group of those tracked at the 
Roberts Court.   This should not come as a total surprise, as the PLF is one of the most 
prestigious conservative amici and is self-described as the “oldest and most successful public 
interest legal organization that fights for limited government, property rights, individual rights, 
and a balanced approach to environmental protection.”82  As such, one would expect the 
modestly conservative Roberts Court to be receptive to their arguments.   
Also notable is the finding that the American Bar Association, a left-leaning professional 
organization, has the third highest winning percentage at the Roberts Court, winning almost 70 
percent of its cases.   This is particularly striking, as over 80 percent of its amicus briefs advocate 
the liberal position.  Perhaps it should not be that much of a surprise, however, that the nation’s 
leading association of attorneys would produce high-quality, influential amicus briefs.  Ranking 
fourth in winning percentage are state government amici, whose amicus briefs support the 
winning position over 62 percent of the time.  This is expected, as the states have been long 
known for their influence and high quality briefs (Kearney and Merrill 2000; Lynch 2004), and 
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as the conservative leaning Roberts Court is likely to be receptive to the arguments advanced by 
the conservative leaning states.  
Table 4.10 shows that conservative amici WLF and the Chamber of Commerce rank fifth 
and sixth in winning percentage, at about 60 percent each.   Thus, of the top six amici according 
to their winning percentage at the Roberts Court, four are conservatively oriented (PLF; states; 
WLF; CofC), one is liberally inclined (ABA), and one is relatively ideologically balanced (SG).  
Local and foreign government amici are ranked seventh and eighth, with winning percentages of 
59 percent and 55 percent, respectively.  Therefore, it can be safely concluded that government 
amici in general experience success at the Roberts Court:  the SG wins 72 percent of the time; 
the states 62 percent of the time; localities 59 percent of the time; and even foreign governments 
support the winning side over half the time (although the sample size is admittedly small).  If one 
were the betting sort, one would be well advised to put money on the side of the table where the 
majority of governmental amici gather at the Roberts Court. 
Ranking ninth in winning percentage at the Roberts Court is the NACDL, prevailing in 
exactly half of the cases in which they participate and in which a winner can be discerned.   It 
might seem that this means the success of the NACDL is simply akin to a coin flip.  However, 
when one views the NACDL’s winning percentage in light of the fact that they typically advance 
the liberal position, and that they typically support those parties who are low in resources and 
public sympathy, a 50 percent winning percentage becomes more impressive.  The prominence 
of the AFL-CIO, ranking twelfth, seems to be diminishing, as it filed only 17 briefs and won 
only 41 percent of the time.  This finding is probably linked to the broader decline of political 
power and influence of unions and organized labor in our political process.   
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Lastly, those amici ranked tenth through fourteenth in Table 4.10 each have winning 
percentages of less than 50 percent, with the ACLU (41 percent success rate) and NAACP (36 
percent success rate) assuming the bottom two positions.  This finding is a bit surprising, even 
given the liberal character of these two organizations, since these two groups have historically 
been seen as among the most prestigious amici, and have been at the vanguard of interest group 
litigation and amicus participation in American legal history, particularly in the realm of civil 
rights and liberties.  Perhaps the declining influence of these groups is related to a sense that the 
major civil rights battles of the past are behind us as a society and that it is now time to move on 
to a differing vision of legal equality, particularly in the realms of gender and race.   Or perhaps 
the lower success rate of these groups owes to the fact that they typically represent minority 
and/or politically unpopular voices in our society.  The lower success rate of these two prominent 
groups in particular should provide a caveat to assuming that winning percentage before the 
USSC is equivalent to influence, as it is hard to detect how the parties these amici groups support 
would have fared in the absence of these amici.  
 
E. Conclusion 
Amicus participation at the Roberts Court is robust and at all-time high levels. 
Governments, individuals, and interest groups submit briefs regularly.  On average, over 96 
percent of the cases at the Roberts Court have amicus participation, over 9 amicus briefs are filed 
per case, and over 61 amici are present each case.  While levels of amicus participation vary by 
case issue area, all areas attract significant amicus activity.  In total, over 3,600 amicus briefs, 
and over 24,400 cosigners appeared in just five terms of the Roberts Court.  Saying that amicus 
participation is the norm at the Roberts Court is not adequate to describe its intensity.  The terms 
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“counteractive lobbying” or “arms race” are more apt monikers for describing amicus activity at 
the Roberts Court, particularly since the ideological persuasion of amici are relatively balanced, 
though leaning slightly liberal.  The Roberts Court is a firing range in which organized interests 
set their aim and target the justices to hit their legal goals and to leave their mark on public 
policy.  In this sense, the “friends” of the Roberts Court are truly engaging in “friendly fire.”   
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Chapter 5: Amici Impact on Justice Votes 
 As a means of showing whether or not, and to what extent, amici impact the way justices 
vote at the Roberts Court, this chapter presents the results and interpretation of the various 
statistical logit models that were described in Chapter 3.   Along with this presentation and 
interpretation, this chapter will also discuss how the results support, or fail to support, the 
hypotheses listed in Chapter 3.   Lastly, I will conclude this chapter by highlighting some 
implications of my findings. 
 
A. Results and Interpretation of Logit Models 
The results of my primary all-inclusive logit model (Model 1) are reported in Table 5.1.  
Model 1 estimates the influence of the net difference of liberal-conservative amicus briefs, the 
net difference of liberal-conservative amicus cosigners, and the net difference of prestigious 
liberal-conservative amici in a case on the ideological direction of the justices’ votes, controlling 
for other known influences on justice decision-making.  Included are the constituent variables 
and their MLE coefficients.  The chi square test for the model is statistically significant, which 
means that all the variables considered together in the model are significantly different than zero.  
The model correctly predicts 64.99 percent of the outcomes on the dependent variable (liberal 
vote), which is a 27.15 percent reduction in error in the absence of the model (liberal votes 
actually occurred 48.06 percent of the time).   
It is essential to recognize that, as emphasized by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) and 
Ai and Norton (2003), it cannot be inferred from the sign, magnitude of the coefficient, and 
significance of the interaction term whether the conditioning variable mediates the influence of 
the conditioned variable.  Therefore, I have no expectations as to the direction or significance of  
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Table 5.1. Primary Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice 
Votes at the Roberts Court with Interaction Term, 2007 – 2011 Terms 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio Marginal Effect 
Amicus Brief Difference 0.015 (.024) 1.015 1.7% 
Moderation -0.050 (045) 0.951 -1.1% 
Moderation x Amicus Brief Difference 0.015 (.009) 1.015 See Figure 5.1 
Ideology 1.987 (0.166)**** 7.295 11.8% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference -0.001(0.000) 0.999 -1.2% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief 0.620 (0.108)**** 1.860 15.3% 
SG Con Amicus Brief -0.760 (0.105)**** 0.468 -16.1% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference 0.063 (0.034)* 1.066 1.9% 
Lower Court Direction -0.750 (0.076)**** 0.472 -18.5% 
Resource Difference 0.057 (0.009)**** 1.059 6.5% 
Constant -0.033 (0.128) 
  
N 3,264 
  
Prob > chi2 0 
  
Percent Correctly Predicted 64.99 
  
Percent Reduction in Error 27.15 
  
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative). Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors.  *p< .07, **p<.05, ***p<.01, 
****p<.001 (one-tailed). 
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the interaction term.  Instead, the magnitude of the interaction effect depends on the values of all 
the covariates in the model.   Accordingly, I employ the method developed by Brambor, Clark, 
and Golder (2006) to evaluate interaction terms.  I calculate marginal effects and confidence 
intervals for all non-interactive terms in Model I by altering the variables of interest from 0 to 1 
for dichotomous variables and from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for 
continuous and count variables, while holding all other variables at their mean or modal values, 
as appropriate.
83
   
Further, I graphically illustrate the marginal effect of amicus brief advantage on the 
ideological direction of the vote across the observed range of judicial moderation, as depicted in 
Figure 5.1.  I employ this same interpretive approach for the other five interaction models that 
follow.  As an alternative interpretation to marginal effects, I report odds ratios for each of the 
constituent variables in my models.   The odds ratio simply reflects the proportionate change in 
the dependent variable (ideological direction of justice vote) that coincides with a single unit 
difference on the independent variable (a change for 0 to 1 for dummy variables).  Stated another 
way, the odds ratio tells how the presence of each independent variable increasing by one unit 
increases or decreases the odds of observing the presence of the dependent variable (i.e., a liberal 
justice vote).  If the odds ratio is less than 1, then the odds of a liberal justice vote decrease with 
a one unit increase in the independent variable.  If the odds ratio is greater than 1, then the odds 
of a liberal justice vote increase with a one unit increase in the independent variable.  
 
 
                                                 
83
 Also, for purposes of interpreting the marginal effect of the non-interactive terms in Model I, I hold the 
interactive term (Judicial Moderation x Liberal-Conservative Amicus Brief Difference) constant at the 
product of the mean value of its constituent terms: 1.36.  I follow this same approach for interpreting the 
marginal effects in the other five interactive models as well. 
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While the MLE coefficient for Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference does not 
rise to the level of statistical significance in Model 1, it is shown to be statistically significant and 
in the expected direction when I estimate this same model without the judicial moderation 
variable and without the interaction term (Judicial Moderation x Liberal-Conservative Amicus 
Briefs Difference) – what I term the “Base Model.”   The results of this Base Model are reported 
in the Appendix in Table A.3.  The remainder of the results of the Base Model are consistent 
with those of the Model 1, and have a similar interpretation, thus it is not necessary to include 
further discussion of the Base Model here.  Because the MLE coefficient for Liberal-
Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference is significant and in the expected direction in the Base 
Model, the inclusion of the interaction term in Model 1 is justified, enabling me to determine the 
effect of an amicus brief advantage across a range of judicial moderation scores.   
In Model 1, the MLE coefficient on Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference 
(.015) indicates the influence of amicus briefs when the interaction term (Moderation x Liberal-
Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference) is held at the product of the means of its constituent 
variables.  The odds ratio of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference is 1.015, indicating 
that the odds of liberal justice vote increase in Model 1 by 1.015 times when there is a one unit 
increase in a liberal brief advantage. The marginal effects of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs 
Difference reveals that a justice whose moderation score is at 2.44 (i.e., the mean moderate 
justice – closet to Justice Ginsburg’s mean moderation score of 2.51) is 1.7 percent more likely 
to cast a liberal vote as the Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference in the case increases 
from .57 (the mean) to just over 5 (approximately one standard deviation above the mean). Yet, 
as none of the observations actually involve a Judicial Moderation score at the mean, and as the 
sign or significance of the interaction term cannot be interpreted from its MLE coefficient 
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(Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006), it is necessary to graphically illustrate the marginal effects of 
Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference on the ideological direction of the vote across the 
observed range of Judicial Moderation (as shown in Figure 5.1.) to properly assess whether the 
effects of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference on justice votes rise to the level of 
statistical significance as they vary across a range of Judicial Moderation. 
As noted by Collins (2008, 101-102) when interpreting an interaction term, one must pay 
close attention to not only the slope of the effect but also the confidence intervals surrounding 
the slope which indicate significance levels.  The marginal effects are significant whenever the 
upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals are both above (or below) the zero line.   
 
 
Figure 5.1 Marginal Effect of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Brief Difference on Ideological 
Direction of Justice Vote Across Varying Levels of Judicial Moderation 
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The solid line in the figure indicates how the marginal effects of Liberal-Conservative Amicus 
Brief Difference vary across a range of justice moderation scores.  The 95 percent confidence 
intervals drawn around this solid line indicate significance levels.  Figure 5.1 reveals that a 
justice’s moderation level does indeed mediate the influence of amicus briefs, and that this effect 
is in the expected direction and statistically significant for all justices with a Judicial Moderation 
score greater than 1 – which is every justice except Clarence Thomas (who has a mean 
moderation score of .65).  As justices become more moderate, they are more influenced by a 
liberal-conservative amicus brief difference.  So, every justice on the Roberts Court except 
Thomas is more likely to vote in a liberal direction when there is an advantage of liberal amicus 
briefs in a case, holding all else equal.  The marginal effects graph shows that there is an 
approximately 4 percent increase in the likelihood of a liberal vote for justice with a moderation 
score of 1.69 (Scalia), and a 7.5 percent increase in the likelihood of a liberal vote for a justice 
with a moderation score of 4.02 (Kennedy) when there is an advantage of liberal briefs.   
These results demonstrate that amicus briefs influence almost all of the justices on the 
Roberts Court (except for Justice Thomas), and that this influence becomes more pronounced as 
the justices become more moderate in their ideologies.  These results are consistent with the 
findings of Collins (2008) regarding amicus influence on the USSC justices between 1946-2001. 
These findings support my information/legal persuasion hypotheses and my median justice 
hypotheses regarding amicus brief influence.   
Although there is clearly a statistically significant influence of amicus brief advantage for 
all but one of the justices, the above information is limited in that it does not adequately depict 
how the impact of amicus briefs in a case changes as both the numerical advantage of amicus 
briefs increases or decreases and as judicial moderation scores vary in other meaningful ways.   
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Thus, Table A.4, located in the Appendix, provides predicted probabilities of observing a liberal 
justice vote at varying levels of amicus brief advantage and judicial moderation, holding all other 
variables at their mean or modal values. For purposes of Table A.4, the mean moderate justice is 
classified as having a judicial moderation score at the mean (2.43), the less moderate justice is 
classified as having a judicial moderation score at the 25th percentile (2.0), the more moderate 
justice is classified as having a moderation score at the 75th percentile (2.84), the least moderate 
justice has a moderation score of 0, and the most moderate justice has a moderation score of 
4.02.     
Table A.4 conveys two significant pieces of information regarding amicus brief influence 
that bolster the findings of the marginal effects graph and the primary all-inclusive logit model. 
First, as expected, Table A.4 shows that when the justices encounter an increasing ideological 
advantage of briefs, the influence of those briefs increases, as the justices become more likely to 
vote in the direction of amicus brief advantage as the advantage becomes more pronounced.  
This effect holds true for justices across varying moderation levels. Second, Table A.4 shows 
that as the justices become more moderate, they are more susceptible to amicus impact, as they 
typically become even more likely to vote in the direction of the amicus brief advantage as their 
moderation levels increase.   
For example, compared to a case in which there is an 1 brief conservative advantage, in a 
case in which there is an 1 brief liberal advantage, the least moderate justice is 1 percent more 
likely to vote liberally, the less moderate justice is 2 percent more likely to vote liberally, the 
mean moderate justice is 2.4 percent more likely to vote liberally, the more moderate justice is 3 
percent more likely to vote liberally, and the most moderate justice is 3.4 percent more likely to 
vote liberally.  Compared with a case in which there is a 3 brief conservative advantage, in a case 
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in which there is a 3 brief liberal advantage, the least moderate justice is 2 percent more likely to 
vote liberally, the less moderate justice is 6 percent more likely to vote liberally, the mean 
moderate justice is 6 percent more likely to vote liberally, the more moderate justice is 7 percent 
more likely to vote liberally, and the most moderate justice is 10 percent more likely to vote 
liberally. Also, compared with a case in which there is a 10 brief conservative advantage, in a 
case in which there is a 10 brief liberal advantage, the least moderate justice is 7 percent more 
likely to vote liberally, the less moderate justice is 21 percent more likely to vote liberally, the 
mean moderate justice is 24 percent more likely to vote liberally, the more moderate justice is 26 
percent more likely to vote liberally, and the most moderate justice is 33 percent more likely to 
vote liberally.  And compared to a case in which there is a 15 brief conservative advantage, in a 
case in which there is a 15 brief liberal advantage, the least moderate justice is 11 percent more 
likely to vote liberally, the less moderate justice is 30.7 percent more likely to vote liberally, the 
mean moderate justice is 34.7 percent more likely to vote liberally, the more moderate justice is 
39 percent more likely to vote liberally, and the most moderate justice is almost 48 percent more 
likely to vote liberally.  
In short, Table A.4 shows that the greater the amicus brief advantage in a case, the more 
pronounced the impact of the amicus advantage.  Further, the greater the moderation of the 
justice, the greater the influence of amicus brief advantage becomes.  These results corroborate 
the findings of Model 1 and Figure 5.1. The degree of amicus brief impact in a case is related to 
both the numerical ideological disparity of briefs and the moderation levels of the justices. 
These results provide strong support for my information/legal persuasion hypotheses and my 
median justice hypotheses, and support the legal persuasion model of amicus influence.      
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On the other hand, the results of Model 1 show that amicus cosigner disparity does not 
rise to the level of statistical significance, and is signed in an unexpected direction.
84
  This result 
confirms Collins (2004, 2008) prior findings that it is the number of amicus briefs, not amicus 
cosigners, which influence justice votes.  This is a consequential finding, as it fails to provide 
support for the interest group model of amicus influence.  An ideological advantage of amicus 
cosigners does not seem to impact the justices in the same way that an ideological advantage of 
amicus briefs does.  Therefore, my affected group hypotheses are not confirmed.  The impact of 
amici must come from the substantive information they impart, as opposed to merely a simple 
tally of which side has a numerical advantage of affected groups.  As the MLE coefficient for 
Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner Difference is not statistically significant, it is not 
necessary to provide an interpretation of its odds ratio or marginal effect. 
However, Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference is statistically significant 
and signed in the expected direction. The odds ratio of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus 
Difference is 1.066, indicating that the odds of liberal justice vote increase in Model 1 by 1.066 
times when there is a one unit increase in a prestigious liberal amicus advantage. The marginal 
effects of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference reveals that a justice is 1.9 
percent more likely to cast a liberal vote as the Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus 
Difference in the case increases from .39 (the mean) to 1.62 (one standard deviation above the 
mean), and 13.4 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote as the Prestigious Liberal-Conservative 
Amicus Difference in the case increases from the least liberal advantage (-5) to the greatest 
liberal advantage (4).  This result supports my prestigious amicus hypotheses, indicating that, 
                                                 
84
 I even estimated an alternative model that included an additional interaction term (Lib-Con Amicus Cosigner 
Difference x Moderation) to determine if amicus cosigner influence could be demonstrated at statistically 
significant levels across a range of judicial moderation.  However, these results and marginal effects graph 
of the interaction term demonstrated that an amicus cosigner ideological advantage does not impact the 
justices on the Roberts Court, regardless of their level of moderation.   
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although the effect is relatively small, the justices respond favorably to an advantage of 
prestigious amicus briefs, even when controlling for an ideological advantage of total briefs and 
cosigners in a case. 
Further, all of the control variables are signed in the expected direction and statistically 
significant in Model 1.  First, Model 1 confirms the strong and statistically significant role of 
Ideology in predicting how a justice will vote. The odds ratio of Ideology is 7.295, indicating that 
the odds of liberal justice vote increase in Model 1 by 7.295 times when there is a one unit 
increase in judicial ideology. The marginal effect of Ideology is 11.8 percent, indicating that a 
justice whose Segal-Cover score is at .579 (one standard deviation above the mean – closest to 
Justice Ginsburg at .68, and second closest to Justice Breyer at .475) is 11.8 percent more likely 
to cast a liberal vote than a justice whose Segal-Cover score is at the mean (.327) (closet to 
Justice Souter’s score of .325, and second closest to Justice Kennedy’s at .365).   Further, the 
marginal effects reveal that, compared with the most conservative justice – Justice Scalia (Segal-
Cover score of 0) – the most liberal justice – Justice Sotomayor (Segal-Cover score of .78) – is 
36.24 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote. These findings are expected and are consistent 
with the attitudinal model of judicial decision making.  Ideology is among the strongest, if not 
the strongest, predictor of how a justice will vote. 
Second, the importance of the Solicitor General as both a conservative and liberal amicus 
in confirmed.  The odds ratio of SG Liberal Amicus is 1.860, indicating that the odds of a liberal 
justice vote is 1.860 times higher when the SG is a liberal amicus than when the SG is not.  
Further, the marginal effects reveal that the when the SG argues the liberal position, a justice is 
15.3 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote than when the SG does not advance the liberal 
position as an amicus.  Conversely, the odds ratio of SG Conservative Amicus is .468, indicating 
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that the odds of a liberal justice vote decrease by 2.14 times when the SG advocates the 
conservative position as amicus than when the SG does not.  Likewise, the marginal effects 
reveal that when the SG argues the conservative position, a justice is 16.1 percent less likely to 
cast a liberal vote, than when the SG does not advocate the conservative position as an amicus. 
Third, the Lower Court Direction variable is statistically significant and, as expected, 
negatively signed.  This odds ratio of .472 indicates that when the Roberts Court is reviewing a 
liberal decision, a justice is 2.12 times less likely to issue a liberal vote than when the Roberts 
Court is reviewing a conservative decision.  Similarly, the marginal effects reveal that when the 
Roberts Court reviews a liberal decision, a justice is 18.5 percent less likely to issue a liberal 
vote.  This result confirms the known propensity of justices to vote to overturn cases that they 
review. 
Fourth and finally, the Liberal – Conservative Resource Difference variable is 
statistically significant and signed in the expected direction.  The odds ratio of Liberal – 
Conservative Resource Difference is 1.059, indicating that a justice is 1.059 times more likely to 
issue a liberal ruling in Model 1 when there is a one unit increase in  Liberal – Conservative 
Resource Difference.  The marginal effect of Liberal – Conservative Resource Difference is 6.5 
percent, indicating that in a case in which the liberal party’s resource advantage is .97 (one 
standard deviation above the mean), a justice is 6.5 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote than 
in a case where the liberal party’s resource advantage is -3.78 (the mean).  Further, the marginal 
effects reveal that a justice is 24.82 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote in a case where 
liberal party resource advantage is at its highest value (9), than in a case where liberal resource 
advantage is at its lowest value (-9).  
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In sum, the results and interpretation of Model 1 (my primary, all-inclusive model) show 
that, when considering all cases, an ideological advantage of amicus briefs does influence the 
direction of all the justice votes except Justice Thomas at the Roberts Court.  The marginal 
effects are statistically significant, varying from about 4 percent to 7.5 percent as the justice 
becomes more moderate.  However, these effects become much larger as conservative or liberal 
amicus brief advantage increases in a case, as shown by Table A.4.   Similar findings regarding 
the impact of a prestigious amici advantage are also present.  An ideological advantage of amicus 
cosigners, however, does not have a statistically significant impact on the votes of the justices.  
Thus, justices seem to be influenced by who is filing amicus briefs, as well as how many briefs 
are filed.  These findings support my information/legal persuasion hypotheses, my median justice 
hypotheses, and my prestigious amicus hypotheses.  My findings do not support my affected 
groups hypotheses.  Therefore, Model 1 indicates that the legal model is a better explanation for 
amicus impact on the Roberts Court than the interest group model.  While attitudes are very 
strong predictors of justice votes, justices across the ideological spectrum do respond to the 
arguments put forward by amici in their briefs, and this impact generally becomes more evident 
at the justices become more moderate, and as the ideological advantage of amicus briefs 
increases. 
The results of my logit model considering only criminal procedure cases at the Roberts 
Court (Model 2) are reported in table 5.2.  Model 2 was estimated using the same variables and 
methodology as Model 1, and will be interpreted in the same manner as Model 1.  The chi square 
test for the model is statistically significant, which means that all the variables considered 
together in the model are significantly different than zero.  The model correctly predicts 64.72 
percent of the outcomes on the dependent variable (liberal vote), which is an 11.28 percent 
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Table 5.2. Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice Votes at 
the Roberts Court, 2007 – 2011 Terms: Criminal Procedure Cases 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio Marginal Effect 
Amicus Brief Difference -0.031 (.044) 0.970 -3.8% 
Moderation -0.055 (.085) 0.947 -1.2% 
Moderation x Amicus Brief Difference 0.038 (.017)* 1.039 See Figure 5.2 
Ideology 2.421 (.314)*** 11.253 14.77% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference -0.001 (.001) 0.999 -3.9% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief -0.048 (.428) 0.953 -1.2% 
SG Con Amicus Brief -0.173 (.180) 0.841 -4.3% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference -0.001 (.083) 0.999 0% 
Lower Court Direction -0.755 (.165)*** 0.470 -18.31% 
Resource Difference 0.051 (.031) 1.053 1.2% 
Constant -0.233(.327) 0.327 
 
N 927 
  
Prob > chi2 0 
  
Percent Correctly Predicted 64.72 
  
Percent Reduction in Error 11.28 
  
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative).  Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-
tailed). 
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reduction in error in the absence of the model (liberal votes actually occurred 48.12 percent of 
the time).   
As with Model 1, while the MLE coefficient for Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs 
Difference does not rise to the level of statistical significance in Model 2, it was shown to be 
statistically significant and in the expected direction when I estimated this same model without 
the interaction term.  This result justified the inclusion of the interaction term in Model 2 so that 
I could determine the effects of an amicus brief advantage across a range of judicial moderation 
scores.  In Model 2, the MLE coefficient on Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference (-
.031) indicates the influence of amicus briefs when the interaction term (Moderation x Liberal-
Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference) is held at the product of the means of its constituent 
variables.  The odds ratio of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference is .970, indicating 
that the odds of a liberal justice vote decrease in Model 2 by 1.03 times when there is a one unit 
increase in a liberal brief advantage.  The marginal effects of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs 
Difference reveals that a justice whose moderation score is at 2.42 (i.e., the mean moderate 
justice – closet to Justice Ginsburg’s mean moderation score of 2.51) is 3.8 percent less likely to 
cast a liberal vote as the Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference in the case increases 
from 1 brief (the mean) to 6 briefs (approximately one standard deviation above the mean). Yet, 
as none of the observations actually involve a Judicial Moderation score at the mean, and as the 
sign or significance of the interaction term cannot be interpreted from its MLE coefficient, it is 
useful to graphically illustrate the marginal effects of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs 
Difference on the ideological direction of the vote across the observed range of Judicial 
Moderation (as shown in Figure 5.2.) in order to properly assess whether the effects of Liberal-
Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference on justice votes rise to the level of statistical significance 
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Figure 5.2. Marginal Effect of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Brief Difference on Ideological 
Direction of Justice Vote Across Varying Levels of Judicial Moderation in Criminal 
Procedure Cases 
 
as they vary across a range of Judicial Moderation in criminal procedure cases at the Roberts 
Court. 
As with Figure 5.1, in Figure 5.2 the solid line indicates how the marginal effects of 
Liberal-Conservative Amicus Brief Difference vary across a range of justice moderation scores in 
criminal procedure cases.  The 95 percent confidence intervals drawn around these lines indicate 
significance levels.  Figure 5.2 reveals that a justice’s moderation level does indeed mediate the 
influence of amicus briefs in the expected direction, but this effect is only statistically significant 
for those justices with Judicial Moderation scores above 2 (which is every justice except for 
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Justices Scalia, and Thomas, and Justice Stevens in 2008).  Thus, the influence of amicus briefs 
on justice votes in criminal procedure cases exists for 9 out of the 11 justices who have served on 
the Roberts Court.  As justices become more moderate, they are more susceptible to the 
influence of an ideological advantage of amicus briefs in criminal procedure cases.  The 
marginal effects graph shows that there is an approximately 4 percent increase in the likelihood 
of a liberal vote for justice with a moderation score of 2.1 (Stevens and Souter in 2007 term), and 
a 12 percent increase in the likelihood of a liberal vote for a justice with a moderation score of 
4.02 (Kennedy) when there is an advantage of liberal briefs.   
Together, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 demonstrate that amicus briefs influence the vast 
majority of the justices on the Roberts Court in criminal procedure cases and that this influence 
becomes more pronounced as the justices become more moderate in their ideologies.  These 
findings support my information/legal persuasion hypotheses and my median justice hypotheses 
regarding amicus brief influence.   
On the other hand, the results of Model 2 show that the number of amicus cosigners does 
not rise to the level of statistical significance, and is signed in an unexpected direction.  This 
result is consistent with the results of Model 1 and confirms that it is the number of amicus 
briefs, not amicus cosigners, which influence the justice’s votes in criminal procedure case.  This 
finding fails to provide support for my affected groups hypotheses and the interest group model 
of amicus influence. This provides further evidence that the impact of amici spring from the 
substantive information they impart, as opposed to simple numerical advantage of amicus groups 
and individuals.  As the MLE coefficient for Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner Difference 
is not statistically significant, it is not necessary to provide an interpretation of its odds ratio or 
marginal effect. 
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Neither is Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference statistically significant 
nor signed in the expected direction.  Therefore, it is not necessary to provide an interpretation of 
its odds ratio or marginal effect.  While an ideological advantage of amicus briefs matters, an 
ideological advantage of prestigious amici do not seem to have an impact in criminal procedure 
cases.   
Interestingly, only two of the control variables are statistically significant in Model 2 – 
Ideology and Lower Court Direction.  First, Model 2 confirms the strong and statistically 
significant role of Ideology in predicting how a justice will vote in criminal procedure cases. The 
odds ratio of Ideology is 11.253, indicating that the odds of liberal justice vote increase in Model 
2 by 11.253 times when there is a one unit increase in judicial ideology.  The marginal effect of 
Ideology is 14.77 percent, indicating that a justice whose Segal-Cover score is at .568 (one 
standard deviation above the mean – located between Justice Ginsburg at .68 and to Justice 
Breyer at .475) is 14.77 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote than a justice whose Segal-
Cover score is at the mean (.321) (closet to Justice Souter’s score of .325, and second closest to 
Justice Kennedy’s at .365).   Further, the marginal effects reveal that, compared with the most 
conservative justice (Justice Scalia, Segal-Cover score of 0)), the most liberal justice (Justice 
Sotomayor (Segal-Cover score of .78)) is 43.35 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote.  These 
findings are expected and are consistent with the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making.  
Ideology is a very strong predictor of how a justice will vote in criminal procedure cases. 
Second, the Lower Court Direction variable is statistically significant and, as expected, 
negatively signed.  This odds ratio of .470 indicates that when the Roberts Court is reviewing a 
liberal decision in criminal procedure cases, a justice is 2.13 times less likely to issue a liberal 
vote than when the Roberts Court is reviewing a conservative decision.  Similarly, the marginal 
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effects reveal that when the Roberts Court reviews a liberal decision, a justice is 18.31 percent 
less likely to issue a liberal vote.  This result again confirms the known propensity of justices to 
vote to overturn cases that they review. 
Notably, the SG Liberal Amicus and SG Conservative Amicus variables, along with the 
Liberal – Conservative Resource Difference variable, are not statistically significant, and the SG 
Liberal Amicus variable is signed in the unexpected direction. These are surprising findings, as 
the SG does not seem to impact the criminal procedure votes of the justices on the Roberts Court.  
Further, party resources do not seem to play much of a role either.  Typically, in criminal 
procedure cases, the party that is the accused (or the prisoner) is much lower on the resource 
continuum than the government.  Taken together, these findings indicate that the Roberts Court 
does not give as much deference either to the federal government as a party, or to the SG 
representing the federal government, or to the state governments, in criminal procedure cases, as 
one might expect.  This finding should provide some comfort for those who are concerned about 
the ability of criminal defendants to receive a fair and just outcome at the Roberts Court.   
Instead, when predicting justice votes in criminal procedure cases, one should primarily look to 
the justice’s ideology, the direction of the lower court decision, and which side has an advantage 
of amicus briefs, and this should give you a fairly accurate indication of how the case will be 
decided.   In short, while attitudes are very strong predictors of justice votes in criminal 
procedure cases, most of the justices (except Scalia and Thomas, and Justice Stevens during the 
2008 term) do respond to the persuasive arguments put forward by amici in their briefs, and this 
impact generally becomes more evident as the justices become more moderate.   
The results of my logit model considering only civil rights and liberties cases at the 
Roberts Court (Model 3) are reported in table 5.3.  Model 3 was estimated using the same  
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Table 5.3.  Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice Votes at 
the Roberts Court, 2007 – 2011 Terms: Civil Rights and Liberties Cases 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio Marginal Effect 
Amicus Brief Difference -0.007 (.056) 0.993 -0.7% 
Moderation 0.067 (.094) 1.069 1.2% 
Moderation x Amicus Brief Difference 0.006 (.020) 1.006 See Figure 5.3 
Ideology 2.793(.329)*** 16.333 14.5% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference 0.010 (.003)*** 1.010 6.9% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief 0.562 (.203)** 1.755 12.8% 
SG Con Amicus Brief -0.934 (.237)*** 0.393 -15.2% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference 0.242 (.063)*** 1.274 6.9% 
Lower Court Direction -1.644 (.153)*** 0.193 -38.9% 
Resource Difference 0.064(.020)*** 1.066 5.9% 
Constant -0.234 (.398) 
  
N 1025 
  
Prob > chi2 0 
  
Percent Correctly Predicted 73.76 
  
Percent Reduction in Error 44.98 
  
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative).  Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-
tailed). 
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variables and methodology as the prior models, and will be interpreted in the same manner.  The 
chi square test for the model is statistically significant, which means that all the variables 
considered together in the model are significantly different than zero.  The model correctly 
predicts 73.76 percent of the outcomes on the dependent variable (liberal vote), which is a 44.98 
percent reduction in error in the absence of the model (liberal votes actually occurred 47.70 
percent of the time).   
As with the prior logit models, the MLE coefficient for Liberal-Conservative Amicus 
Briefs Difference does not rise to the level of statistical significance in Model 3.  However, 
unlike the prior logit models, Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference was not statistically 
significant when I estimated this same civil rights and liberties model without the interaction 
term.  Therefore, an ideological advantage of amicus briefs does not appear to influence the 
direction of justice votes in civil rights and liberties cases at the Roberts Court.  This is a 
significant finding, as it shows that the level of amicus brief impact on the justices varies by 
issue area.   
To confirm this conclusion, I included the same interaction term in Model 3 as in the 
prior models.  However, when I produced a graph of the marginal effects of Liberal-
Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference on the ideological direction of the vote across the 
observed range of Judicial Moderation, the marginal effects graph confirmed that at no level of 
judicial moderation was the impact of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference 
statistically significant.  Thus, I can conclude that an ideological advantage of amicus briefs does 
not impact the way the justices vote in civil rights and liberties cases.  This finding fails to 
provide support for my information/legal persuasion hypotheses in the context of civil rights and 
liberties cases.  As Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference is not statistically significant, 
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it is not necessary to interpret the odds ratios or marginal effects.  Consequently, unlike the other 
models, I do not include a marginal effects graph for the interaction term of Judicial Moderation 
x Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs.   
 Yet importantly, also unlike the prior logit models, Model 3 demonstrates that the MLE 
coefficient on Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner Difference (.010) is statistically significant 
and signed in the expected direction.  The odds ratio of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigners  
Difference is 1.010, indicating that the odds of liberal justice vote increase in Model 3 by 1.010 
times when there is a one unit increase in a liberal cosigner advantage.  The marginal effects of 
Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner Difference reveals that a justice whose moderation score 
is at 2.44 (the mean moderate justice) is 6.9 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote as the 
Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigners Difference in the case increases from 7 cosigners (the 
mean) to 39 cosigners (approximately one standard deviation above the mean).  As I am 
interested in how judicial moderation levels affect the impact of amicus cosigners on justice 
votes, I estimated an alternative logit model that was the same in all respects to Model 3, except 
that it substituted a new interaction term (Judicial Moderation x Liberal-Conservative Amicus 
Cosigners Difference) for the amicus brief interaction term.  I ran this alternative model so that I 
could graphically illustrate the marginal effects of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner 
Difference in civil rights and liberties cases on the ideological direction of the vote across the 
observed range of Judicial Moderation (shown in Figure 5.3.)  
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Figure 5.3. Marginal Effect of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner Difference on 
Ideological Direction of Justice Vote Across Varying Levels of Judicial Moderation in Civil 
Rights and Liberties Cases 
 
Figure 5.3 reveals that a justice’s moderation level mediates the influence of amicus 
cosigners in civil rights and liberties cases, and that this effect is in the expected direction and 
statistically significant for all justices with a Judicial Moderation score greater than 1.6 – which 
is every justice except Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia in 2007.  The marginal effects graph 
shows that as justices become more moderate, they are more influenced by a liberal-conservative 
amicus cosigner difference.  So, each justice on the Roberts Court except Thomas and Scalia 
during 2007 is more likely to vote in a liberal direction when there is an advantage of liberal 
amicus cosigners in a case, holding all else equal.  The marginal effects graph shows that there is 
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an approximately .75 percent increase in the likelihood of a liberal vote for justice with a 
moderation score of 1.6 (Scalia), and a 1.75 percent increase in the likelihood of a liberal vote for 
a justice with a moderation score of 4.02 (Kennedy) when there is an advantage of liberal 
cosigners.  While this effect is admittedly small, it is statistically significant.   
These results demonstrate that amicus cosigners do have a small influence on almost all 
of the justices on the Roberts Court in civil rights and liberties cases, and that this influence 
becomes more pronounced as the justices become more moderate in their ideologies.  These 
findings support my affected groups hypotheses and my median justice hypotheses regarding 
amicus cosigner influence.  Taken together with the fact that amicus briefs do not seem to impact 
the justices votes, these findings suggest that amicus influence in civil rights and liberties cases 
does not come from the informational content they impart, but from their sheer numerical 
advantage.   This further implies that the justices approach civil rights and liberties cases in a 
different manner than other cases, seemingly being more sensitive to the array of affected groups 
with an interest in the outcome of the litigation. At a minimum, this finding suggests the justices 
are more attuned to public opinion in civil rights and liberties cases than in others.  
However, the results of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference provide an 
important caveat to the conclusion that amicus briefs do not matter in civil rights and liberties 
cases. Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference is statistically significant and signed 
in the expected direction in Model 3.  The odds ratio of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus 
Difference is 1.274, indicating that the odds of a liberal justice vote increase in Model 3 by 1.274 
times when there is a one unit increase in a prestigious liberal brief advantage.  The marginal 
effects of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference reveals that a justice is 6.9 
percent more likely to cast a liberal vote as the Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus 
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Difference in the case increases from .38 (the mean) to 1.73 (one standard deviation above the 
mean), and 33.6 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote as the Prestigious Liberal-Conservative 
Amicus Difference in the case increases from the least liberal advantage (-5) to the greatest 
liberal advantage (3).  This result supports my prestigious amicus hypotheses, indicating that the 
justices respond favorably to an advantage of prestigious amicus briefs, even when controlling 
for an ideological advantage of total briefs and cosigners in a case.  This result implies that the 
justices respond to the presence of prestigious amici and that they are influenced by the 
informational content of prestigious amicus briefs.  Thus, in civil rights and liberties cases, the 
justices seem to care more about who is filing briefs than the simple quantity of briefs, but they 
also respond in a limited way to a numerical advantage of amicus cosigners in a case.  Taken 
together, the results suggest that the justices do approach civil rights and liberties cases more like 
a popularity contest than other cases, responding to the arguments of powerful amici over run-of-
the mill amici, yet also susceptible to influence by the side with the net amici advantage. 
Further, all of the control variables are signed in the expected direction and statistically 
significant in civil rights and liberties cases.  First, Model 3 confirms the strong and statistically 
significant role of Ideology in predicting how a justice will vote.  The odds ratio of Ideology is 
16.33, indicating that the odds of liberal justice vote increase in Model 3 by 16.33 times when 
there is a one unit increase in judicial ideology.  The marginal effect of Ideology is 14.5 percent, 
indicating that a justice whose Segal-Cover score is at .584 (one standard deviation above the 
mean) is 14.5 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote than a justice whose Segal-Cover score is 
at the mean (.33).  Further, the marginal effects reveal that, compared with the most conservative 
justice (Justice Scalia), the most liberal justice (Justice Sotomayor) – is 45.15 percent more likely 
to cast a liberal vote. These findings are expected and are consistent with the attitudinal model of 
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judicial decision making.  Ideology is the strongest predictor of how a justice will vote in civil 
rights and liberties cases.  This is consistent with much prior literature confirming the impact of 
judicial attitudes in this category of cases (e.g., Unah and Hancock 2006).  
Second, the impact of the Solicitor General as both a conservative and liberal amicus in 
civil rights and liberties is confirmed by Model 3.  The odds ratio of SG Liberal Amicus is 1.755, 
indicating that the odds of a liberal justice vote is 1.755 times higher when a SG is a liberal 
amicus than when the SG is not.  Further, the marginal effects reveal that the when the SG argues 
the liberal position, a justice is 12.8 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote than when the SG 
does not advance the liberal position as an amicus.  Conversely, the odds ratio of SG 
Conservative Amicus is .393, indicating that the odds of a liberal justice vote decrease by 2.54 
times when the SG advocates the conservative position as amicus than when the SG does not.  
Likewise, the marginal effects reveal that when the SG argues the conservative position, a justice 
is 15.2 percent less likely to cast a liberal vote, than when the SG does not advocate the 
conservative position as an amicus. 
Third, the Lower Court Direction variable is statistically significant and, as expected, 
negatively signed.  The odds ratio of .193 indicates that when the Roberts Court is reviewing a 
liberal decision, a justice is 5.18 times less likely to issue a liberal vote than when the Roberts 
Court is reviewing a conservative decision.  Similarly, the marginal effects reveal that when the 
Roberts Court reviews a liberal decision, a justice is 38.9 percent less likely to issue a liberal 
vote.  This result again confirms the known propensity of justices to vote to overturn cases that 
they review. 
Fourth and finally, the Liberal – Conservative Resource Difference variable is 
statistically significant and signed in the expected direction.  The odds ratio of Liberal – 
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Conservative Resource Difference is 1.066, indicating that a justice is 1.066 times more likely to 
issue a liberal ruling in Model 3 when there is a one unit increase in  Liberal – Conservative 
Resource Difference.  The marginal effect of Liberal – Conservative Resource Difference is 5.9 
percent, indicating that in a case in which the liberal party’s resource advantage is .26 (one 
standard deviation above the mean), a justice is 5.9 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote than 
in a case where the liberal party’s resource advantage is -4.15 (the mean).  Further, the marginal 
effects reveal that a justice is 23.99 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote in a case where 
liberal party resource advantage is at its highest value (8), than in a case where liberal resource 
advantage is at its lowest value (-9).   
The results of my logit model considering only economics cases at the Roberts Court 
(Model 4) are reported in Table 5.4.  Model 4 was estimated using the same variables and 
methodology as the prior models, and will be interpreted in the same manner.  The chi square 
test for the model is statistically significant, which means that all the variables considered 
together in the model are significantly different than zero.  The model correctly predicts 69.45 
percent of the outcomes on the dependent variable (liberal vote), which is a 38.67 percent 
reduction in error in the absence of the model (liberal votes actually occurred 49.82 percent of 
the time).   
As with Models 1 through 3, the MLE coefficient for Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs 
Difference does not rise to the level of statistical significance in Model 4, even though it is 
signed in the expected direction.   Further, Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference is also 
not statistically significant when I estimate this same economics model but without the 
interaction term.  Therefore, an ideological advantage of amicus briefs does not appear to 
influence the direction of justice votes in economics cases at the Roberts Court.   
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Table 5.4. Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice Votes at 
the Roberts Court, 2007 – 2011 Terms: Economics Cases 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio Marginal Effect 
Amicus Brief Difference 0.06 (.07) 1.061 6.0% 
Moderation -0.19 (.10)* 0.827 -4.2% 
Moderation x Amicus Brief Difference 0.00 (.02) 0.995 See Figure 5.4 
Ideology 1.94 (.36)*** 6.976 11.9% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference 0.00 (.00) 1.000 0.1% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief 0.67 (.19)*** 1.961 15.5% 
SG Con Amicus Brief -1.52 (.26)*** 0.219 -33.9% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference 0.41 (.10)*** 1.507 9.7% 
Lower Court Direction 0.23 (.18) 1.256 5.7% 
Resource Difference 0.06 (.07)*** 1.129 10.9% 
Constant .04 (.90) 
  
N 743 
  
Prob > chi2 0 
  
Percent Correctly Predicted 69.45 
  
Percent Reduction in Error 38.67 
  
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative).  Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors.  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-
tailed). 
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To confirm this conclusion, I produced a graph of the marginal effects of Liberal-
Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference on the ideological direction of the vote across the 
observed range of Judicial Moderation for economics cases (see Figure 5.4). The marginal 
effects graph confirms that at no level of judicial moderation is the impact of Liberal-
Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference statistically significant (as the dotted lines representing 
the 95 percent confidence intervals are never both above or below zero).  As a result, just as with 
civil rights and liberties cases, I conclude that an ideological advantage of amicus briefs does not 
impact the way the justices vote in economics cases at the Roberts Court.  This finding fails to 
support my information/legal persuasion hypotheses or my median justice hypotheses in the 
context of economics cases.  As Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference is not 
statistically significant, it is not necessary to interpret the odds ratios or marginal effects.  This 
result is notable, as it provides further evidence that the level of amicus brief impact on the 
justices varies by issue area. 
  In addition, Model 4 demonstrates that Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner 
Difference is not statistically significant, even though it is signed in the expected direction.  
Thus, my affected groups hypotheses are not supported.  As Liberal-Conservative Amicus 
Cosigner Difference is not statistically significant, it is not necessary to interpret the odds ratios 
or marginal effects.   
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Figure 5.4. Marginal Effect of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Brief Difference on Ideological 
Direction of Justice Vote Across Levels of Judicial Moderation in Economics Cases 
 
However, the results of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference tell a 
different story than Liberal-Conservative Amicus Brief Difference or Liberal-Conservative 
Amicus Cosigner Difference in Model 4.  Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference is 
statistically significant and signed in the expected direction in economics cases.  The odds ratio 
of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference is 1.507, indicating that the odds of a 
liberal justice vote increase in Model 4 by 1.507 times when there is a one unit increase in a 
prestigious liberal brief advantage.  The marginal effects of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative 
Amicus Difference reveals that a justice is 9.7 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote as the 
Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference in the case increases from -.27 (the mean) 
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to .66 (one standard deviation above the mean), and 53.73 percent more likely to cast a liberal 
vote as the Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference in the case increases from the 
least liberal advantage (-3) to the greatest liberal advantage (3).  This result supports my 
prestigious amicus hypotheses, indicating that the justices respond favorably to an advantage of 
prestigious amici, even when controlling for an ideological advantage of total briefs and 
cosigners in a case.  Thus, in economics cases, the justices are more persuaded by who is filing 
amicus briefs than the simple quantity of briefs or cosigners in a case.  In economics cases, the 
question of “who files?” is more important than a simple count of “how many file?” or “how 
many sign?”  The main lesson is that an ideological advantage of prestigious amici matter in 
economics cases, and the justices seem to resist the persuasion attempts of amici otherwise.  
These findings provide qualified support for both the legal and interest group models of amicus 
influence, but only insofar as they pertain to powerful groups.   
Further, all of the control variables are signed in the expected direction and statistically 
significant in economics cases, except Lower Court Direction.  First, Model 4 continues to 
confirm the strong and statistically significant role of Ideology in predicting how a justice will 
vote.  The odds ratio of Ideology is 6.976, indicating that the odds of liberal justice vote increase 
in Model 4 by 6.976 times when there is a one unit increase in judicial ideology.  The marginal 
effect of Ideology is 11.9 percent, indicating that a justice whose Segal-Cover score is at .579 
(one standard deviation above the mean) is 11.9 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote than a 
justice whose Segal-Cover score is at the mean (.33).  Further, the marginal effects reveal that, 
compared with the most conservative justice (Justice Scalia), the most liberal justice (Justice 
Sotomayor) is 35.27 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote. These findings are expected and 
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are consistent with the attitudinal model of judicial decision making.  As with the other issue 
areas, Ideology is the strongest predictor of how a justice will vote in economics cases.  
Second, the powerful impact of the Solicitor General as both a conservative and liberal 
amicus in economics cases is confirmed by Table 5.4.  The odds ratio of SG Liberal Amicus is 
1.961, indicating that the odds of a liberal justice vote is 1.961 times higher when the SG 
participates as a liberal amicus than when the SG does not.  Further, the marginal effects reveal 
that the when the SG argues the liberal position, a justice is 15.5 percent more likely to cast a 
liberal vote than when the SG does not advance the liberal position as an amicus. Conversely, the 
odds ratio of SG Conservative Amicus is .219, indicating that the odds of a liberal justice vote 
decrease by 4.57 times when the SG advocates the conservative position as amicus than when the 
SG does not.  Likewise, the marginal effects reveal that when the SG argues the conservative 
position, a justice is 33.9 percent less likely to cast a liberal vote, than when the SG does not 
advocate the conservative position as an amicus. 
Third, and interestingly, the Lower Court Direction variable is not statistically significant 
and is not signed as expected.  This result goes against the typical findings that the USSC 
considers cases that they have a tendency to reverse.  It would appear that the justices on the 
Roberts Court are not more likely to take cases they tend to reverse in economics cases to any 
statistically significant degree. 
Fourth and lastly, the Liberal – Conservative Resource Difference variable is statistically 
significant and signed in the expected direction.  The odds ratio of Liberal – Conservative 
Resource Difference is 1.129, indicating that a justice is 1.129 times more likely to issue a liberal 
ruling in Model 4 when there is a one unit increase in  Liberal – Conservative Resource 
Difference.  The marginal effect of Liberal – Conservative Resource Difference is 10.9 percent, 
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indicating that in a case in which the liberal party’s resource advantage is 2.71 (one standard 
deviation above the mean), a justice is 10.9 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote than in a 
case where the liberal party’s resource advantage is -.84 (the mean).  Further, the marginal 
effects reveal that a justice is 44.87 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote in a case where 
liberal party resource advantage is at its highest value (7), than in a case where liberal resource 
advantage is at its lowest value (-9).   
To conclude, when it comes to economics cases before the Roberts Court, judicial 
ideology matters a great deal, as does the presence of the SG as either a liberal or conservative 
amicus.  Party resources also matter to a lesser extent.   An advantage of amicus briefs or 
cosigners do not seem to make a difference, but an advantage of prestigious liberal amici does 
make a significant impact in the ideological direction of the justice vote.  In short, in economics 
cases, prestigious amici persuade the justices, others do not. 
The results of my logit model considering judicial power and federalism cases at the 
Roberts Court (Model 5) are reported in table 5.5.  Model 5 was estimated using the same 
variables and methodology as the prior models, and will be interpreted in the same manner.  The 
chi square test for the model is statistically significant, which means that all the variables 
considered together in the model are significantly different than zero.  The model correctly 
predicts 68.54 percent of the outcomes on the dependent variable (liberal vote), which is a 36.25 
percent reduction in error in the absence of the model (liberal votes actually occurred 49.36 
percent of the time).   
As with Models 1 through 4, the MLE coefficient for Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs 
Difference does not rise to the level of statistical significance in Model 5, even though it is 
signed in the expected direction.   Moreover, Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference is 
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Table 5.5. Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice Votes at 
the Roberts Court, 2007 – 2011 Terms: Judicial Power and Federalism Cases 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio Marginal Effect 
Amicus Brief Difference 0.069 (.060) 1.071 8.9% 
Moderation -0.060 (.111) 0.942 -1.3% 
Moderation x Amicus Brief Difference -0.013 (.022) 0.987 See Figure 5.5 
Ideology 0.849 (.388)* 2.338 5.4% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference 0.000 (.001) 1.000 -0.2% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief 1.021 (.287)*** 2.776 24.0% 
SG Con Amicus Brief -1.278 (.247)*** 0.279 -27.4% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference -0.278 (.084)*** 0.757 -8.1% 
Lower Court Direction -0.374 (.163)* 0.688 -9.3% 
Resource Difference 0.013 (.020) 1.013 1.6% 
Constant 0.259 (.296) 0.296 
 
N 569 
  
Prob > chi2 0 
  
Percent Correctly Predicted 68.54 
  
Percent Reduction in Error 36.25 
  
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative).  Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors.  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-
tailed). 
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also not statistically significant when I estimate this same judicial power and federalism model 
but without the interaction term.  Therefore, an ideological advantage of amicus briefs does not 
influence the direction of justice votes in judicial power and federalism cases at the Roberts 
Court.   
To confirm this conclusion, I produce a graph of the marginal effects of Liberal-
Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference on the ideological direction of the vote across the 
observed range of Judicial Moderation for judicial power and federalism cases (see Figure 5.5). 
The marginal effects graph confirms that at no level of judicial moderation is the impact of 
Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference statistically significant (as the dotted lines 
representing the 95 percent confidence intervals are never both above or both below zero).  As a 
result, just as with civil rights and liberties and economics cases, I conclude that an ideological 
advantage of amicus briefs does not impact in a significant manner the way the justices vote in 
judicial power and federalism cases at the Roberts Court.  This finding fails to support my 
information/legal persuasion hypotheses or my median justice hypotheses in the context of 
judicial power and federalism cases.  As Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference is not 
statistically significant, it is not necessary to interpret the odds ratios or marginal effects.  
  In addition, Model 5 demonstrates that Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner 
Difference is not statistically significant in judicial power and federalism cases.  Thus, my 
affected groups hypotheses are not supported either.  As Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner 
Difference is not statistically significant, it is not necessary to interpret the odds ratios or 
marginal effects.   
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Figure 5.5. Marginal Effect of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Brief Difference on Ideological 
Direction of Justice Vote Across Varying Levels of Judicial Moderation in Judicial Power 
and Federalism Cases 
 
Perplexingly, the results of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference are 
significant in judicial power and federalism cases, but the effects are not in the expected 
direction.  The odds ratio of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference is .757, 
indicating that the odds of a liberal justice vote decrease in Model 5 by 1.32 times when there is 
a one unit increase in a prestigious liberal amici advantage.  The marginal effects of Prestigious 
Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference reveals that a justice is 8.1 percent less likely to cast a 
liberal vote as the Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference in the case increases from 
.20 (the mean) to 1.1 (one standard deviation above the mean), and 33.20 percent less likely to 
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cast a liberal vote as the Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference in the case 
increases from the least liberal advantage (-2) to the greatest liberal advantage (3).  This result 
contradicts my prestigious amicus hypotheses, indicating that the justices respond with some 
hostility to an advantage of prestigious amici.  In judicial power and federalism cases, the 
justices seem more persuaded to vote against the preferences of the net prestigious advantaged 
amici’s side.  Perhaps this result can be explained by attitudinal model of judicial decision 
making.  In fact, it may be the case, as suggested by Box-Steffensmeir et al. (2013, 12), that the 
justices in judicial power and federalism cases use the presence of those prestigious amici of the 
opposing ideological orientation as heuristic for identifying the policy position they disagree 
with, and vote accordingly.  Put more simply, perhaps the justices take the presence of amici that 
they are inclined to disagree with as a signal to vote against the ideological position they 
advance.  If this is so, further research should explore why the justices would respond this way in 
judicial power and federalism cases to the presence of prestigious amici, but not in other issue 
areas.  The main take-away here is that an ideological advantage of prestigious amici do matter 
in judicial power and federalism cases, but not necessarily in the way one would expect.  This 
particular finding provides support for the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making.  
Finally, all of the control variables are signed in the expected direction and statistically 
significant in judicial power and federalism cases, except Liberal-Conservative Resource 
Difference.  Model 5 provides further support for the statistically significant role of Ideology in 
predicting how a justice will vote.  The odds ratio of Ideology is 2.34, indicating that the odds of 
liberal justice vote increase in Model 5 by 2.34 times when there is a one unit increase in judicial 
ideology.  The marginal effect of Ideology is 5.4 percent, indicating that a justice whose Segal-
Cover score is at .59 (one standard deviation above the mean) is 5.4 percent more likely to cast a 
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liberal vote than a justice whose Segal-Cover score is at the mean (.33).  Further, the marginal 
effects reveal that, compared with the most conservative justice (Justice Scalia), the most liberal 
justice (Justice Sotomayor) is 16.4 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote. These findings are 
expected and are consistent with the attitudinal model of judicial decision making, although not 
as strong as in the three other issue areas.    
Second, Table 5.5 confirms the powerful impact of the Solicitor General as both a 
conservative and liberal amicus in judicial power and federalism cases.  The odds ratio of SG 
Liberal Amicus is 2.776, indicating that the odds of a liberal justice vote is 2.776 times higher 
when the SG participates as a liberal amicus than when the SG does not.  Further, the marginal 
effects reveal that the when the SG argues the liberal position, a justice is 24.0 percent more 
likely to cast a liberal vote than when the SG does not advance the liberal position as an amicus. 
Conversely, the odds ratio of SG Conservative Amicus is .279,  indicating that the odds of a 
liberal justice vote decrease by 3.58 times when the SG advocates the conservative position as 
amicus than when the SG does not.  Likewise, the marginal effects reveal that when the SG 
argues the conservative position, a justice is 27.4 percent less likely to cast a liberal vote, than 
when the SG does not advocate the conservative position as an amicus. 
Third, the Lower Court Direction variable is statistically significant and signed as 
expected.  The odds ratio of .688 indicates that when the Roberts Court is reviewing a liberal 
decision, a justice is 1.45 times less likely to issue a liberal vote than when the Roberts Court is 
reviewing a conservative decision.  Similarly, the marginal effects reveal that when the Roberts 
Court reviews a liberal decision, a justice is 9.3 percent less likely to issue a liberal vote. This 
result indicates that in judicial power and federalism cases, the justices are more likely to vote 
against the ideological direction of the lower court decision.  Lastly, as Liberal – Conservative 
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Resource Difference is not statistically significant, it is not necessary to provide an interpretation 
of its odds ratio or marginal effects.  A party resource advantage simply does not matter in most 
judicial power and federalism cases.  
 To conclude, when it comes to judicial power and federalism cases before the Roberts 
Court, judicial ideology matters, as does the direction of the lower court decision.  Further, the 
presence of the SG as either a liberal or conservative amicus is a significant predictor of how the 
justices will vote.   However, an advantage of amicus briefs or cosigners does not make a 
statistically significant impact on how the justices vote, and an advantage of prestigious liberal 
amici actually makes it less likely for justices to respond positively to the arguments advanced 
by the prestigious amici.  In short, it appears that amici matter less in judicial power and 
federalism cases than in every other issue area. 
The results of my logit model considering salient cases at the Roberts Court (Model 6) 
are reported in table 5.6.  Model 6 was estimated using the same variables and methodology as 
the prior models, and will be interpreted in the same manner.  The chi square test for the model is 
statistically significant, which means that all the variables considered together in the model are 
significantly different than zero.  The model correctly predicts 72.44 percent of the outcomes on 
the dependent variable (liberal vote), which is a 40.40 percent reduction in error in the absence of 
the model (liberal votes actually occurred 53.76 percent of the time).   
The MLE coefficient for Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference does not rise to 
the level of statistical significance in Model 6, and is negatively signed.   However, Liberal-
Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference is statistically significant and signed in the positive 
(expected) direction when I estimate this same salience model but without the interaction term.  
Therefore, an ideological advantage of amicus briefs does appear to influence the direction of  
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Table 5.6. Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice Votes at 
the Roberts Court, 2007 – 2011 Terms: Salient Cases 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio Marginal Effect 
Amicus Brief Difference -0.009 (.033) 0.991 -2.0% 
Moderation -0.046 (.120) 0.955 -0.9 
Moderation x Amicus Brief Difference 0.020 (.012) 1.020 See Figure 5.6 
Ideology 4.782 (.521)*** 119.396 28.9% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference -0.001 (.001) 0.999 -5.1% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief -0.673 (.386) 0.510 -16.7% 
SG Con Amicus Brief -0.845 (.265)*** 0.429 -20.8% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference 0.207 (.068)** 1.230 8.6% 
Lower Court Direction -0.171 (.182) 0.843 -4.1% 
Resource Difference 0.010 (.024) 1.011 1.4% 
Constant -1.018 (.335) 
  
N 508 
  
Prob > chi2 0 
  
Percent Correctly Predicted 72.44 
  
Percent Reduction in Error 40.40 
  
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative).  Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors.  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-
tailed). 
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justice votes in salient cases at the Roberts Court, but it is necessary to produce a marginal 
effects chart to depict the influence of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference across a 
range of Judicial Moderation values (see Figure 5.6).  In Figure 5.6 the solid line indicates how 
the marginal effects of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Brief Difference vary across a range of 
justice moderation scores in salient cases.  The 95 percent confidence intervals drawn around 
these lines indicate significance levels.   
 
 
Figure 5.6. Marginal Effect of Liberal-Conservative Amicus Brief Difference on Ideological 
Direction of Justice Vote Across Varying Levels of Judicial Moderation in Salient Cases 
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Similar to the findings in criminal procedure cases at the Roberts Court, Figure 5.6 
reveals that a justice’s moderation level does indeed mediate the influence of amicus briefs in the 
expected direction for those justices with Judicial Moderation scores above 2 (which is every 
justice except for Justices Scalia and Thomas, and Justice Stevens in 2008).  Thus, the influence 
of amicus briefs on justice votes in salient cases exists for 9 out of the 11 justices who have 
served on the Roberts Court.  As justices become more moderate, they are more susceptible to 
the influence of an ideological advantage of amicus briefs in salient cases.   
The marginal effects graph shows that there is an approximately 3 percent increase in the 
likelihood of a liberal vote for justice with a moderation score of 2.1 (Stevens and Souter in 2007 
term), and a 7 percent increase in the likelihood of a liberal vote for a justice with a moderation 
score of 4.02 (Kennedy) when there is an advantage of liberal briefs.   
Figure 5.6 demonstrates that an ideological advantage of amicus briefs influences the vast 
majority of the justices in salient cases before the Roberts Court and that this influence becomes 
more pronounced as the justices become more moderate in their ideologies.  While these findings 
do support my information/legal persuasion hypotheses and my median justice hypotheses 
regarding amicus brief influence, I did not expect this in result in salient cases.  Figure 5.6 fails 
to support my political salience attitudinal hypotheses H11 and H12.  This is because H11 and 
H12 stated that amicus influence would be less in salient cases, as only justices that were on the 
same ideological side as the amicus brief advantage would succumb to amicus influence.  Yet 
this does not appear to be the case, as conservative justices Roberts, Alito, and Kennedy each 
have judicial moderation scores above 2.1, and Figure 5.6 evidences liberal amicus brief 
influence over these conservative justices. Further, each of the liberal justices score above 2.1 on 
the judicial moderation scale, and each of these justices evidences conservative amicus brief 
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influence.   Thus, contrary to my expectations, an ideological advantage of amicus briefs in 
salient cases does make all of the justices (except Justices Thomas and Scalia) more likely to 
vote in the direction supported by the most amicus briefs, and this effect crosses ideological 
lines, becoming more pronounced as the justices become more moderate.  This is a very 
important finding, as it indicates that amicus briefs impact the way the justices vote in the cases 
that matter the most at the Roberts Court.  The vast majority of the justices do not simply vote 
their ideological preferences in salient cases, but are open to the persuasive attempts of amicus 
briefs.  Therefore, the legal persuasion model does describe amicus brief influence in salient 
cases. 
Although Table 5.6 and Figure 5.6 show there is a statistically significant influence of 
amicus brief advantage for all justices with moderation scores above 2.0 (all but two the justices) 
in salient cases, the above information is limited in that it does not adequately depict how the 
impact of amicus briefs in a salient case changes as both the numerical advantage of amicus 
briefs increases or decreases across a range of values and as judicial moderation scores vary.   
Therefore, Table A.5, located in the Appendix, provides predicted probabilities of observing a 
liberal justice vote in salient cases at varying levels of amicus brief advantage and judicial 
moderation, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values. As with Table A.4, for 
purposes of Table A.5, the mean moderate justice is classified as having a judicial moderation 
score at the mean (2.43), the less moderate justice is classified as having a judicial moderation 
score at the 25th percentile (2.0), the more moderate justice is classified as having a moderation 
score at the 75th percentile (2.84), the least moderate justice has a moderation score of 0, and the 
most moderate justice has a moderation score of 4.02.     
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Table A.5 demonstrates the same two basic but significant pieces of information 
regarding amicus brief influence that Table A.4 also demonstrated.  First, Table A.5 shows that 
when the justices encounter an increasing ideological advantage of briefs in salient cases, the 
influence of those briefs increases, as the justices become more likely to vote in the direction of 
amicus brief advantage as the advantage becomes more pronounced, regardless of judicial 
ideology.  This effect holds true for justices across varying moderation levels, except for the least 
moderate justice – Justice Thomas.85  Second, Table A.5 shows that as the justices become more 
moderate, they are more susceptible to amicus impact in salient cases, as they typically become 
even more likely to vote in the direction of the amicus brief advantage as their moderation levels 
increase.   
For example, compared to a case in which there is an 1 brief conservative advantage, in a 
case in which there is an 1 brief liberal advantage, the less moderate justice is 1.5 percent more 
likely to vote liberally, the mean moderate justice is 2 percent more likely to vote liberally, the 
more moderate justice is 3.3 percent more likely to vote liberally, and the most moderate justice 
(Kennedy) is 3.5 percent more likely to vote liberally in salient cases.  Compared with a case in 
which there is a 3 brief conservative advantage, in a case in which there is a 3 brief liberal 
advantage, the less moderate justice is 4.5 percent more likely to vote liberally, the mean 
moderate justice is about 6 percent more likely to vote liberally, the more moderate justice is 7 
percent more likely to vote liberally, and the most moderate justice is over 10 percent more 
likely to vote liberally. Also, compared with a case in which there is a 10 brief conservative 
advantage, in a case in which there is a 10 brief liberal advantage, the less moderate justice is 15 
                                                 
85
 Unlike the other justices, Justice Thomas actually becomes less likely to vote liberally in salient cases as 
conservative amicus brief advantage decreases and as liberal amicus brief advantage increases.  This 
indicates that Justice Thomas either ignores the persuasive attempts of amicus briefs in salient cases or 
filters them attitudinally, i.e., as a signal to vote against the side they support.   
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percent more likely to vote liberally, the mean moderate justice is 19 percent more likely to vote 
liberally, the more moderate justice is 22 percent more likely to vote liberally, and the most 
moderate justice is 33.5 percent more likely to vote liberally. And lastly, compared to a case in 
which there is a 15 brief conservative advantage, in a case in which there is a 15 brief liberal 
advantage, the less moderate justice is 22 percent more likely to vote liberally, the mean 
moderate justice is 28.3 percent more likely to vote liberally, the more moderate justice is 33.6 
percent more likely to vote liberally, and the most moderate justice is almost 48 percent more 
likely to vote liberally.  
Thus, Table A.5 shows that the impact of amicus briefs on justice votes in salient cases is 
very similar to the impact of amicus briefs when considering all cases together.  The percentage 
change in the predicted probability of a liberal vote as amicus brief advantage and judicial 
moderation levels vary in salient cases closely mirrors the changes seen in the predicted 
probabilities of a liberal vote in all cases.  In sum, as with Table A.4, and apart from the least 
moderate justice (Thomas), Table A.5 shows that the greater the amicus brief advantage in a 
salient case, the more pronounced the impact of the amicus advantage, regardless of judicial 
ideology.  I did not expect this effect to be as pronounced as it is, given my hypothesis that 
attitudinal factors would predominate in salient cases, thus limiting the influence of amicus 
curiae in salient cases for those justices not predisposed to agree with the side with the amicus 
brief advantage.  Further, the greater the moderation of the justice, the greater the influence of 
amicus brief advantage becomes in salient cases.  These results corroborate the findings of 
Model 6 and Figure 5.6.   Therefore, as with all cases considered together, the degree of amicus 
brief impact in a salient case is related to both the level of numerical ideological advantage of 
briefs and the moderation level of the justice.  These results provide additional compelling 
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support for my information/legal persuasion hypotheses and my median justice hypotheses, as 
well as support for the legal persuasion model of amicus influence.  Amicus influence in salient 
cases appears to follow the same pattern as amicus influence in all cases.  The information that 
amicus briefs provide matter in both routine and salient cases, and the overwhelming majority of 
justices are responsive to this information. 
  However, Model 6 demonstrates that Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner Difference 
is not statistically significant, and is negatively signed.  This result fails to support my affected 
groups hypotheses, but this result was partially expected, as I thought attitudinal factors would 
predominate over public opinion influence in salient cases. As Liberal-Conservative Amicus 
Cosigner Difference is not statistically significant, it is not necessary to interpret the odds ratios 
or marginal effects.  It appears then, that in salient cases, the justices of the Roberts Court 
respond to the persuasive arguments and information contained in amicus briefs, but not to the 
simple numerical majority of amici in a case.  These findings should be encouraging to 
proponents of the legal model, who expect justices to attempt to reach the most accurate legal 
rulings, putting aside as much as possible extra-legal influences.   
Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference is statistically significant and signed 
in the expected direction. The odds ratio of Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference 
is 1.230, indicating that the odds of liberal justice vote increase in Model 6 by 1.230 times when 
there is a one unit increase in a prestigious liberal brief advantage. The marginal effects of 
Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference reveals that a justice is 8.6 percent more 
likely to cast a liberal vote as the Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference in the case 
increases from .32 (the mean) to 2.0 (one standard deviation above the mean), and 39.14 percent 
more likely to cast a liberal vote as the Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference in 
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the case increases from the least liberal advantage (-5) to the greatest liberal advantage (3).  This 
result supports my prestigious amicus hypotheses, indicating that the justices respond favorably 
to an advantage of those amici that matter most in those cases that matter most.  This is a 
noteworthy finding, and taken together with the findings regarding amicus brief influence, 
demonstrate that amicus briefs filed by powerful amici make a significant impact in salient cases.   
While the justices are more likely to reference their attitudes in deciding salient cases than other 
cases, they are also responsive to the persuasive arguments included in amicus briefs.  Therefore, 
both attitudinal and legal factors influence judicial decision-making at the Roberts Court in 
salient cases. 
Turning to an examination of the control variables in salient cases in Table 5.6, some 
notable results stand out.  First, as I expected, Ideology matters in salient cases, and it matters a 
great deal.  The odds ratio of Ideology is 119.396, indicating that the odds of liberal justice vote 
increase in Model 6 by 119.396 times when there is a one unit increase in judicial ideology.  The 
marginal effect of Ideology is 28.9 percent, indicating that a justice whose Segal-Cover score is 
at .59 (one standard deviation above the mean) is 28.9 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote 
than a justice whose Segal-Cover score is at the mean (.33).  Further, the marginal effects reveal 
that, compared with the most conservative justice (Justice Scalia), the most liberal justice 
(Justice Sotomayor) is 69.90 percent more likely to cast a liberal vote.  Comparing these results 
with the prior logit models shows conclusively that Ideology matters more in salient cases than in 
all other types of cases.  These findings are expected and are consistent with the attitudinal 
model of judicial decision-making, and prior literature (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1999, Unah and 
Hancock 2006).   
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Interestingly, the results of Model 6 demonstrate that the impact of the SG as amicus 
depends upon the ideological direction advanced in salient cases.  When the SG files a 
conservative amicus brief in a salient case, the justices are likely be influenced positively; when 
the SG files a liberal brief, the justices do not respond in a statistically significant matter (and the 
sign is even in the negative direction).  As SG Liberal Amicus is not statistically significant, I 
report only the odds ratios and marginal effects of the SG Conservative Amicus.  The odds ratio 
of SG Conservative Amicus is .429, indicating that the odds of a liberal justice vote decrease by 
2.33 times when the SG advocates the conservative position as amicus than when the SG does 
not.  Likewise, the marginal effects reveal that when the SG argues the conservative position, a 
justice is 20.8 percent less likely to cast a liberal vote, than when the SG does not advocate the 
conservative position as an amicus.   
Therefore, when the justices encounter salient cases at the Roberts Court, they respond to 
the persuasion attempts of the conservative SG amicus brief, but not the liberal SG amicus brief.   
Of relevance here is the fact that the SG has filed 14 conservative briefs, 7 liberal briefs, and 3 
unspecifiable briefs in salient cases before the Roberts Court during the 2007-2011 terms.  Thus, 
not only is the SG more likely to assume a conservative stance as an amici in salient cases, but 
the SG is also most likely to be persuasive taking a conservative position in these cases.  Perhaps 
this sheds some small light on why the Roberts Court has developed a more conservative 
reputation, as it appears to be more persuaded by the federal government when the government 
advances a conservative position rather than a liberal one in those cases that matter most.   
Lastly, and of note, while signed in the expected direction, neither Lower Court Direction 
nor Liberal – Conservative Resource Difference is statistically significant in Model 6.  This 
indicates that the justices are not more likely to a statistically significant extent to reverse the 
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decision of the lower court in salience cases, nor are they influenced by the party with a higher 
level of resources in salient cases.  This implies that the justices agree to hear salient cases not 
necessarily to reverse decisions they disagree with, but also to affirm lower court decisions that 
they consider correctly decided.   
In sum, while attitudes are the strongest predictor of how the justices will vote in salient 
cases, amicus briefs and prestigious amici do impact the way the justices vote at the Roberts 
Court in these high profile disputes.  This implies that in salient cases, justices are likely to 
“tune-in”, striving to reach the best and most accurate legal conclusions because of the high 
stakes involved.  Thus, amici play an important role in shaping the direction of our nation’s 
jurisprudence, as they shape, if even at the margins, the most noteworthy decisions of the USSC.  
The fact that the justices who occupy the positions at or near the ideological center of the 
Roberts Court are particularly susceptible to amicus influence in both salient and other cases 
affirms the value of amicus curiae targeting the moderate or swing justices. 
In order to determine whether liberal justices on the Roberts Court respond in a similar 
fashion to the persuasion attempts of amici as conservative justices in salient cases, I estimated 
two further logit models (Models 7 and 8), the first focusing only on liberal justices in salient 
cases, and the second only on conservative justices in these same cases.  The results of these two 
logit models are listed in Tables 5.7 and 5.8, respectively.  Comparing Models 7 and 8, one 
notices both some similarities and some significant differences in the predictors of how 
conservative and liberal justices vote in salient cases.  First and importantly, both liberal and 
conservative justices respond to the persuasive attempts of amici in salient cases.  However, the 
marginal effects reveal that the 5 conservative justices are more persuadable, as a matter of 
degree, than the 4 liberal justices.  The marginal effect is only 2.9 percent for liberal justices,  
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Table 5.7. Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice Votes at 
the Roberts Court, 2007 – 2011 Terms: Salient Cases – Liberal Justices Only 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio Marginal Effect 
Amicus Brief Difference 0.054 (.030)* 1.055 2.9% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference -0.001 (.001) 0.999 -0.8% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief -0.190 (.686) 0.827 -11.7% 
SG Con Amicus Brief 0.176 (.525) 1.193 0.9% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference 0.648 (.141)**** 1.911 6.5% 
Lower Court Direction 1.469 (.448)**** 4.346 15.7% 
Resource Difference 0.005 (.056) 1.005 0.2% 
Constant 1.030 (.321) 
 
 
N 225 
 
 
Prob > chi2 0 
 
 
Percent Correctly Predicted 88.0 
 
 
Percent Reduction in Error 33.99 
 
 
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative). Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors.  *p<.08 **p<.05, ***p<.01, 
****p<.001 (one-tailed). 
 
 
while being 7.7 percent for conservative justices.  However, the higher degree of amicus brief 
impact on conservative justices can probably be explained by the fact that Justice Kennedy is 
included with this group, and given his moderation level, is most likely to welcome amicus 
influence.  Regardless, the basic narrative is the same: amicus briefs matter in salient cases. 
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Table 5.8. Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice Votes at 
the Roberts Court, 2007 – 2011 Terms: Salient Cases – Conservative Justices Only 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Marginal 
Effect 
Amicus Brief Difference 0.041 (.024)* 1.042 7.7% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference -0.001 (.001) 0.999 -4.0% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief -1.877 (.65)*** 0.153 -21.4% 
SG Con Amicus Brief -2.880 (.630)**** 0.056 -24.7% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference 0.015 (.090) 1.015 0.5% 
Lower Court Direction -1.143 (.287)**** 0.319 -26.6% 
Resource Difference 0.069 (.039)* 1.071 7.1% 
Constant 0.277 (.232) 1.042  
N 283 
 
 
Prob > chi2 0 
 
 
Percent Correctly Predicted 79.50 
 
 
Percent Reduction in Error 34.61 
 
 
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative). Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors.  *p<.09 **p<.05, ***p<.01, 
****p<.001 (one-tailed). 
 
 
Second, neither liberal nor conservative justices are significantly affected by a numerical 
advantage of amici in a case, confirming the results of Model 6.   Third, only the liberal justices 
in salient cases appear to respond to the persuasive attempts of prestigious amici.  Thus, the 
liberal justices are more responsive to “who” is filing amicus briefs in salient cases, while 
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conservative justices respond more to the simple ideological advantage of briefs in salient cases.  
Fourth and finally, there is a marked difference in how the two groups of justices respond to 
presence of the SG as amicus in salient cases.  Liberal justices appear to ignore the persuasion 
attempts of the SG, both when the SG is advancing the liberal position and when the SG is 
advancing the conservative position.  This may imply that the liberal justices are less willing to 
show deference to the preferences of the Executive branch in salient cases than conservatives, 
and implies that liberal justices, as a group, are perhaps more activist and more skeptical of the 
government’s persuasion attempts.  On the other hand, the conservative justices are significantly 
impacted by SG amicus briefs in salient cases.  However, while the conservative justices are 
shown to respond positively to the persuasion attempts of the conservative SG (becoming 24 
percent less likely to vote liberally), they respond negatively and significantly to the persuasion 
attempts of the liberal SG (becoming 21 percent less likely to vote liberally).   This finding 
indicates that the conservative justices are generally only open to persuasion when the SG 
advocates the position they are inclined to agree with, and they use the presence of the liberal SG 
as a heuristic to vote against the preferences of Executive branch.   In short, in salient cases, 
conservative justices appear to respond in an attitudinal fashion to the SG as amicus, whereas the 
liberal justices do not seem to put much account in the SG’s preferences either way. 
Lastly, Tables 5.9 and 5.10 are provided to demonstrate whether liberal justices respond 
in a different manner to the persuasion attempts of amici than do conservative justices, when one 
steps back and considers all cases decided during the 2007-2011 terms of the Roberts Court.  
Tables 5.9 and 5.10, respectively, include the results of my final logit models (Models 9 and 10), 
the first focusing only on liberal justices in all cases, and the second only on conservative 
justices in all cases.  In comparing Models 9 and 10, important conclusions can be reached.   
 207 
 
Table 5.9. Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice Votes at 
the Roberts Court, 2007 – 2011 Terms: All Cases – Liberal Justices Only 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Marginal 
Effect 
Amicus Brief Difference 0.054 (.017)*** 1.055 6.2% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference 0.000 (.001) 1.000 -0.3% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief 1.206 (.200)*** 3.340 23.9% 
SG Con Amicus Brief -0.617 (.145)*** 0.539 -15.3% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference 0.082 (.053) 1.085 2.5% 
Lower Court Direction -0.393 (.111)*** 0.675 -9.1% 
Resource Difference 0.031 (.014)* 1.032 3.6% 
Constant 0.799 (.114) 
 
 
N 1428 
 
 
Prob > chi2 0 
 
 
Percent Correctly Predicted 66.11 
 
 
Percent Reduction in Error 7.88 
 
 
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative).  Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors.  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-
tailed). 
 
 
First, both liberal justices and conservative justices respond to the persuasion attempts of amicus 
briefs in the numerically advantaged side, evidencing similar marginal effects (6.2 percent and 
4.8 percent, respectively).  Second, a numerical advantage of amicus cosigners does not 
influence either liberal or conservatives justices when considering all cases as a whole.  Third,  
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Table 5.10. Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice Votes at 
the Roberts Court, 2007 – 2011 Terms: All Cases – Conservative Justices Only 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio Marginal Effect 
Amicus Brief Difference 0.056 (.015)*** 1.057 4.8% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference -0.001 (.001) 0.999 -1.8% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief 0.335 (.138)** 1.399 6.7% 
SG Con Amicus Brief -1.017 (.164)*** 0.362 -13.9% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference 0.045 (.046) 1.046 1.1% 
Lower Court Direction -1.159 (.110)*** 0.314 -26.2% 
Resource Difference 0.084 (.012)*** 1.088 7.4% 
Constant 0.288** 
 
 
N 1836 
 
 
Prob > chi2 0 
 
 
Percent Correctly Predicted 68.30 
 
 
Percent Reduction in Error 12.55 
 
 
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative).  Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors.  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-
tailed). 
 
 
neither liberal nor conservatives justices are significantly influenced by an ideological advantage 
of prestigious amici, when considering all cases as a whole.  Fourth, liberal justices are impacted 
by the persuasion attempts of the liberal SG amicus (23.9 percent marginal effect), and to a 
slightly lesser degree, the persuasion attempts of the conservative SG amicus (15.3 percent 
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marginal effect).  Similarly, conservative justices are impacted by the persuasion attempts of the 
conservative SG amicus (13.9 percent marginal effect), and to a lesser extent, the persuasion 
attempts of the liberal SG amicus (6.7 percent marginal effect).   In sum, it appears to be the case 
that conservative and liberal justices are more alike than they are different when it comes to 
amicus impact in all cases.  Both conservatives and liberals respond to amicus brief persuasion 
attempts, both respond to the persuasion attempts of the SG as amicus, and both groups are not 
significantly impacted by a numerical advantage of amicus cosigners or prestigious amici. 
I think that seven basic conclusions can be drawn from the presentation and interpretation 
of the foregoing logit models, graphs, and predicted probabilities tables.  First, an ideological 
advantage of amicus briefs influences how the justices vote on the Roberts Court when 
considering all cases, criminal procedure cases, and salient cases.  While the marginal effects and 
impact of amicus brief advantage is relatively small when the briefs are more closely numerically 
balanced in a case, they are statistically significant and in the expected direction.   This effect 
only increases in magnitude as the amicus disparity increases in a case.    
Second, the influence of amici depends on the case context.  An advantage of amicus 
briefs was shown to matter in all cases, in criminal procedure cases, and in salient cases, but not 
in civil rights and liberties cases, economics cases, or judicial power and federalism cases. 
Amicus cosigner advantage was shown not to matter in any set of cases except those involving 
civil rights and liberties. Prestigious amici advantage was shown to matter in all sets of cases 
except those involving criminal procedure.   
Third, the influence of amici depends on a justice’s level of moderation.  The marginal 
effects graphs of those models depicting statistically significant amicus influence each show that 
the justices become more responsive to amici as they become more moderate in their ideologies.  
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Justices Thomas and Scalia (to a lesser extent) are the only two justices who resist amicus brief 
influence.   
Fourth, the influence of amici often depends on their identities. An ideological advantage 
of prestigious amici was shown to matter in all sets of cases except those involving criminal 
procedure. Further, an ideological advantage of prestigious amici was shown to matter even in 
those issue areas where total amicus advantage did not, including civil rights and liberties cases, 
economics cases, and judicial power and federalism cases. 
Fifth, the justices generally respond favorably to the SG’s amicus persuasion attempts, 
and the marginal effects are substantial.   The only issue area in which the SG amicus did not 
exert a significant impact was criminal procedure, and also among liberal justices in salient 
cases.   
Sixth, there is not much difference in the way that conservative and liberal justices 
respond to amicus briefs.  Other than conservative Justices Thomas and Scalia (sometimes), both 
liberal and conservative justices generally respond positively to amicus attempts at influence.  
Seventh, attitudes matter, and they matter a lot.  The most consistent predictor variable 
across the models and the one of greatest magnitude was the influence of judicial ideology on the 
direction of the justice vote.  This is expected and consistent with the attitudinal model of 
judicial decision-making.  Conservatives tend to vote conservatively and liberals tend to vote 
liberally at the Roberts Court.  However, despite this natural observation about human nature, it 
has been shown that amicus briefs are often able to buck the natural tendencies of justices, at 
least at the margins, by appealing to the justice’s “better natures” and their sense of fidelity to the 
law.   
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B. Pearson’s Correlation Tables and Interpretation 
Each of the above logit models is useful for assessing the impact of amici on the 
ideological direction of justice votes on the Roberts Court while controlling for other known 
predictors of justice votes.  However, none of these models provide a means of directly and 
easily comparing the impact of amici on the justices side-by-side.   In order to provide a more 
readily intelligible comparison of amicus impact on the various justices of the Roberts Court, 
Tables 5.11- 5.15 rank the influence of amici on the justices based upon a measure of the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between the specific justice and the amicus variable of interest.   
The Pearson correlation coefficient is a measure of how well two variables are related, showing 
the linear relationship between two variables.  The coefficient measures between -1.0 and 1.0.  A 
coefficient of -1.0 means that there is a perfect negative correlation between the two variables, 
while a coefficient of 1.0 means that there is a perfect positive correlation between the two 
variables. A coefficient of 0 shows that there is no linear relationship between the two variables. 
For purposes of this dissertation, a coefficient of .1 or higher will be deemed not only 
statistically significant, but also substantively meaningful, meaning that the amicus variable of 
interest is correlated in a significant way with the ideological direction of the justice vote.  While 
a Pearson’s Correlation of .1 or higher does not prove the amicus variable of interest impacted 
the ideological direction of the justice’s vote, it does indicate a significant level of association 
between the two.   Further, such a measure allows for a direct, side-by-side comparison of the 
justices, shedding light on which justices are most and least influenced by amici.   
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Table 5.11. Ranking of Roberts Court Justices Based Upon Pearson Correlation Between 
Ideological Direction of Justice Vote and Liberal-Conservative Amicus Brief Difference 
Rank Justice Amicus Brief Diff 
1 Elena Kagan .219** 
2 Anthony Kennedy .174**** 
3 David Souter .152* 
4 Stephen Breyer .122** 
5 Ruth Bader Ginsberg .112** 
6 John Paul Stevens .094 
7 Sonia Sotomayor .072 
8 Samuel Alito .064 
9 John Roberts .057 
10 Clarence Thomas .055 
11 Antonin Scalia .032 
*p<.10 **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.001 (two-tailed) 
 
  
Table 5.11 ranks the justices of the Roberts Court based upon the Pearson correlation 
between the justice and Liberal-Conservative Amicus Briefs Difference.  Table 5.11 shows that 
Justice Kagan has the highest Pearson correlation of the justices (.219), suggesting that Justice 
Kagan is the justice who is most influenced by an ideological advantage of amicus briefs.  
Justice Kennedy ranks second, with a Pearson’s correlation of .174.  Justices Souter, Breyer, and 
Ginsburg also show a statistically significant correlation between their votes and an ideological 
advantage of amicus briefs. Justices Thomas and Scalia have the lowest Pearson correlation 
scores, and are not statistically significant. This is an interesting finding, as Justices Thomas and 
Scalia are the two most conservative justices (as measured by either Segal-Cover or Martin-
Quinn scores), and as they are also the two least ideologically moderate justices according to my 
Judicial Moderation measure.  Thus, the two most conservative (and least moderate) justices 
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seem to be most resistant to the influence of amicus briefs.  This confirms the findings of my 
logit models above.  However, the most moderate justice (Kennedy) and the third most moderate 
justice (Kagan) evidence the greatest amicus brief influence.  This is also generally consistent 
with the findings of the logit models included above.  
The influence of an ideological advantage of amicus briefs on Justice Kagan is also 
notable as she is the newest member of the Roberts Court, joining the USSC for the 2010 term.  
Perhaps the “freshman effect” (or “acclimation effect”) plays a role here in making it more likely 
for amicus briefs to influence Justice Kagan than the other justices.  Various studies have shown 
that new Supreme Court justices (“freshman” in their first couple of years on the Court) are more 
ideologically moderate, restrained, indecisive, and susceptible to influence than those justices 
who have sat on the USSC for longer periods or than that same justice at a later point in his/her 
career (e.g., Brenner 1983; Hagle 1993; Hurwitz and Stefko 2004).  Thus, the significant 
correlation between the ideological direction of Justice Kagan’s votes and an advantage of 
amicus briefs in the same ideological direction may be related both to her ideological 
moderation, and to her newness on the Court.  Further, her susceptibility to amicus brief 
influence may also by related to the fact that immediately prior to her confirmation to the USSC, 
Kagan served as the U.S. Solicitor General for the Obama Administration.  One would expect 
that the person who has held the highest office as the nation’s leading advocate on behalf of the 
United States before the USSC would have a particular appreciation for, and be amenable to, 
cogent and persuasive legal arguments contained within amicus briefs in her search to reach the 
most accurate resolutions to cases and controversies that come before her.  
A final note regarding Table 5.11 is in order.  Those justices viewed as liberal, together 
with the consummate “swing” Justice Kennedy, are ranked 1-7, while the four justices deemed to 
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be most conservative rank 8-11.  This would indicate that the liberal justices, as a bloc, are more 
receptive to amicus brief influence than are the conservatives on the Roberts Court.  This result 
may be related to a difference between liberal and conservative justices as to how they view the 
judicial role, or it could simply be that the conservative justices, as a group, are less likely to vote 
against their ideological tendencies than liberal justices, regardless of outside attempts at 
influence.  
Table 5.12 ranks the justices of the Roberts Court based upon the Pearson correlation 
between the justice and Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigners Difference.  Table 5.12 shows 
that Justice Kagan, once again, has the highest Pearson correlation of the justices (.230), 
suggesting that Justice Kagan is the justice who is most influenced by an ideological advantage 
of amicus cosigners.  Justice Kennedy, once again, ranks second, with a Pearson’s correlation of 
.121.  These are the only two justices who have a statistically significant relationship between the 
ideological direction of their vote and an ideological advantage of amicus cosigners, which 
should not be surprising given their high moderation levels.  Justices Thomas and Scalia actually 
have negative correlations – not surprising given their seeming resistance to amicus influence.  
Most of the discussion surrounding Table 5.11 applies to table 5.12.  Other than these 
similarities, the main conclusion to draw from Table 5.12 is that, across the board, apart from 
Justice Kagan, the impact of amicus cosigners is less than the impact of amicus briefs on the 
justices, if present at all.  This finding is consistent with the results of foregoing logit models. 
Table 5.13 ranks the justices of the Roberts Court based upon the Pearson correlation 
between the justice and Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference.  Table 5.13 shows 
that Justice Kagan, for the third straight time, has the highest Pearson correlation (.190) of the 
 215 
 
Table 5.12. Ranking of Justices Based Upon Pearson Correlation Between Ideological 
Direction of Justice Vote and Liberal-Conservative Amicus Cosigner Difference 
Rank Justice Amicus Cosigner Diff 
1 Elena Kagan .230*** 
2 Anthony Kennedy .121** 
3 David Souter .07 
4 Ruth Bader Ginsberg .066 
5 Stephen Breyer .06 
6 Sonia Sotomayor .037 
7 John Roberts .019 
8 John Paul Stevens .015 
9 Samuel Alito .005 
10 Clarence Thomas -.022 
11 Antonin Scalia -.031 
*p<.10 **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.001 (two-tailed) 
 
 
Table 5.13. Ranking of Justices Based Upon Pearson Correlation Between Ideological 
Direction of Justice Vote and Prestigious Liberal-Conservative Amicus Difference 
Rank Justice Prestigious Amicus Diff 
1 Elena Kagan .190** 
2 Anthony Kennedy .100* 
3 Sonia Sotomayor 0.059 
4 Ruth Bader Ginsberg 0.026 
5 Antonin Scalia 0.011 
6 John Roberts 0.006 
7 Stephen Breyer 0.004 
8 John Paul Stevens 0.002 
9 Clarence Thomas -.033 
10 Samuel Alito -.052 
11 David Souter -.092 
*p<.10 **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.001 (two-tailed) 
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justices, suggesting that Justice Kagan is the justice who is most influenced by an ideological 
advantage of prestigious amici in a case.  Likewise, Justice Kennedy ranks second, with a 
Pearson’s correlation of .100.  Just as with the relationship between justice votes and Liberal-
Conservative Amicus Cosigners Difference, these justices are the only two who have a 
statistically significant relationship between the ideological direction of their vote and an 
ideological advantage of prestigious amicus.  If nothing else, one should be detecting a recurring 
theme regarding amicus influence: Justices Kagan and Kennedy lead the pack.  Justices Thomas, 
Alito, and Souter actually have negative correlations, but these are not statistically significant.  
The main conclusion to draw from Table 5.13 is that, considering all cases between 2007-2011 
terms, apart from Justices Kagan and Kennedy, the impact of an advantage of prestigious amici 
is not discernible for justices on the Roberts Court.   
Turning to Table 5.14, one observes a different story altogether.  Looking at the 
Pearson’s correlation between a justice’s vote and SG Liberal Amicus, one sees that all justices at 
the Roberts Court evidence a statistically significant correlation.  This indicates that all justices 
are statistically more likely to vote liberally when the SG files a liberal amicus brief in a case 
than when the SG does not file a liberal brief, even Justices Scalia and Thomas.  As expected, 
liberal justices tend to be more receptive to the influence of SG Liberal Amicus than conservative 
justices.  Justice Sotomayor ranks first (.269), with Justices Breyer (.251) and Ginsburg (.205) 
following.  Still, Table 5.14 demonstrates the deference that the justices give to the Solicitor 
General, regardless of ideology or moderation levels.  Interestingly, Justice Alito is the 
conservative justice who seems most responsive to the SG when the SG advocates a liberal 
position – ranking higher than the moderately conservative Justice Kennedy, as well as higher 
than liberal Justices Souter, Kagan, and Stevens.  Also worth highlighting is the fact that Justice 
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Table 5.14. Ranking of Justices Based Upon Pearson Correlation Between Ideological 
Direction of Justice Vote and SG Liberal Amicus 
Rank Justice SG Liberal Amicus 
1 Sonia Sotomayor .269**** 
2 Stephen Breyer .251**** 
3 Ruth Bader Ginsberg .205**** 
4 Samuel Alito .189**** 
5 David Souter .172** 
6 Elena Kagan .163* 
7 Anthony Kennedy .148*** 
8 John Roberts .146*** 
9 John Paul Stevens .131** 
10 Antonin Scalia .106** 
11 Clarence Thomas .106** 
*p<.10 **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.001 (two-tailed). 
 
 
Kagan, the only former Solicitor General of the justices, responds significantly the persuasive 
attempts of the SG Liberal Amicus, but is not the leader as with the other amicus variables of 
interest.  
Lastly, Table 5.15 tells a similar story in many ways to that of Table 5.14.  Looking at the 
Pearson’s correlation between a justice’s vote and SG Conservative Amicus, one sees that all 
justices at the Roberts Court evidence a statistically significant correlation. The negative Pearson 
correlation coefficients show that all justices are statistically less likely to vote liberally when the 
SG files a conservative amicus brief in a case than when the SG does not file a conservative 
brief.   Like Table 5.14, Table 5.15 demonstrates the deference that the justices give to the SG, 
regardless of ideology or moderation levels. Noteworthy is the fact that Justice Breyer, generally 
considered to be liberal, demonstrates the highest correlation between his votes and SG 
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Conservative Amicus of all the justices.  Perhaps this can be attributed to Justice Breyer’s 
pragmatic jurisprudence, which emphasizes interpreting the law according to its purposes and 
consequences, instead of simply according to text, tradition, and precedent.  In this light, Breyer 
(2011) has written the following: “What does it mean for the Court to take a ‘practical’ attitude 
toward legal interpretation?  It means the Court will maintain strong workable relationships with 
other governmental institutions.  It means the Court will take into account the constitutional role 
of other institutions, including their responsibilities, their disabilities, and the ways in which they 
function.”  Given this approach, Breyer’s deferential attitude toward the interests of the 
Executive Branch can be explained by his stated desire to maintain a strong workable 
relationship with the other branches of government.    
 
Table 5.15. Ranking of Justices Based Upon Pearson Correlation Between Ideological 
Direction of Justice Vote and SG Conservative Amicus 
Rank Justice SG Con Amicus Brief 
1 Stephen Breyer -.232**** 
2 Anthony Kennedy -.228**** 
3 John Paul Stevens -.225**** 
4 John Roberts -.221**** 
5 Samuel Alito -.218**** 
6 Clarence Thomas -.190**** 
7 Elena Kagan -.173** 
8 Sonia Sotomayor -.163** 
9 David Souter -.159** 
10 Antonin Scalia -.159** 
11 Ruth Bader Ginsberg -.109** 
*p<.10 **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.001 (two-tailed) 
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Also of consequence is the fact that, while Justice Kennedy’s votes significantly correlate 
with both the SG Liberal Amicus and SG Conservative Amicus variables, the correlation is 
stronger when the SG advocates the conservative position.  This correlation may help to explain 
the conservative bent of the Roberts Court, as the “swing” justice on the Roberts Court is slightly 
more impacted by the persuasion attempts of the conservative SG than the liberal SG. 
Together, Tables 5.14 and 5.15, provide strong evidence of the SG’s impact on the 
justices of the Roberts Court.  These two tables suggest that the Roberts Court is similar to its 
predecessors in terms of the deference it affords the SG.  Further, these tables indicate that the 
justices respect and respond to the arguments of the SG when the SG appears as an amicus, 
irrespective of judicial ideology.  This finding is generally consistent with the results of my logit 
models, and makes sense in the context of a separation of powers model of judicial decision 
making (e.g., Epstein and Knight 1999).  This model argues that the justices generally endeavor 
to avoid disposing of cases in a manner which is inconsistent with the preferences of the other 
branches of government. This is so because the USSC depends, in part, on the support of the 
other branches to compensate for its political weaknesses (Dahl 1957; Flemming and Wood 
1997). Therefore, it is understandable that the justices would be receptive to the SG, who 
represents the interests of the Executive branch before the USSC. 
Further, the impact of the SG as amicus on the ideological direction of the justice votes is 
consistent with Funston’s (1975) conclusion that the USSC is primarily a legitimating agency. 
Funston shows that during periods of national partisan and electoral realignment, the USSC is 
more likely to declare federal legislation unconstitutional (805), but over time through justice 
replacement the USSC comes back in line with law-making majorities.  Funston concludes that 
the “traditional concept of the Court as the champion of minority rights against majority 
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demands is largely incorrect” (809), and that the Court’s power to annul is what gives its 
validation worth.  In this light, McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), upholding the expansion of 
federal powers under the Necessary and Proper clause, and not Marbury v. Madison (1803), 
asserting the USSC’s authority to declare federal laws unconstitutional, is really the most 
important case in American constitutional law (809).   
Lastly, this finding of a significant correlation between SG amicus persuasion attempts 
and justice votes also provides an indication that the Roberts Court may be fulfilling the Chief 
Justice’s stated goal of guiding a Court that is modest and restrained, that proceeds with 
humility, and that issues decisions that respect the other branches of government as co-equals. 
 
C. Conclusions and Implications 
The interpretation of the logit models, marginal effects graphs, predicted probabilities 
tables, and the Pearson correlation tables provided in this chapter lead to five basic conclusions 
regarding amicus impact at the Roberts Court.  First, when the SG files an amicus brief, that brief 
is likely to significantly impact the direction of a justice’s vote, regardless of ideology.  This 
evidences the deference the justices accord to the Executive branch.  Second, an advantage of 
amicus briefs in a case, whether total or prestigious, typically impacts the justices more than an 
advantage of amicus cosigners.  Third, this amicus brief impact is more pronounced for moderate 
justices than less moderate ones.  Specifically, Justices Kagan and Kennedy are the two justices 
who appear to be most swayed by the persuasion attempts of amici, and they are the only two 
justices who respond significantly to each of the amicus variables of interest, according to the 
Pearson’s correlation tables.  I interpret this finding as further support for my hypotheses that 
moderate justices are those most likely to be impacted by amici.  In Justice Kagan’s case, amicus 
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impact may also be attributable to the documented “freshman” (or “acclimation”) effect, as well 
as to her former position as Solicitor General.  Fourth, the greater the ideological disparity of 
amicus briefs in a case, the greater the impact on the direction of the justices’ votes.  Fifth and 
finally, while the attitudinal model still best captures the reality of judicial decision-making at 
the Roberts Court, the legal persuasion model best captures the reality of amicus impact.  In 
varied contexts, the justices respond positively to the persuasive attempts of amici, and this 
impact is apparent across most levels of judicial ideology.   
 I think that four basic implications flow from the findings of this chapter that are 
particularly relevant to legal practitioners and scholars.  First, a party or amicus seeking to have 
maximum impact on the justices should attempt to coordinate with other amici, urging them to 
file as many separate briefs as possible in support of their preferred party in a case.  Marshaling a 
coalition of amicus briefs in a case is more effective than marshaling a coalition of amicus 
cosigners.  This is because amicus briefs matter more for their informational content than for the 
number of amici that sign onto the briefs.  Inundating the justices with information in the form of 
multiple amicus briefs appears to be an effective strategy, despite the concerns of some about 
information overload.    
Second, a party or amicus seeking maximum impact on the justices should attempt to 
persuade as many prestigious amici as possible to file briefs supporting their preferred position, 
and the marshaling of these prestigious amici should be given priority over other amici.  This is 
because those amici with more power, experience, and prestige appear to have more sway over 
the justices.   All of the USSC’s friends are not created equal.  Third, and relatedly, a party or 
amicus seeking maximum impact on the justices should attempt to persuade the SG and as many 
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state governments as possible to file amicus briefs in support of their preferred position, as the 
SG and state governments have higher success rates at the USSC than most amici.   
Fourth and finally, given the tendency for moderate justices to be more responsive to 
amicus influence, an amicus should attempt to tailor the arguments and information contained in 
its brief to capture the attention of and appeal to the moderate justices, most notably current 
Justices Kennedy and Kagan.  An amicus’ efforts are best spent on crafting arguments tailored to 
convince those justices most likely to be swayed, and less time and energy should be devoted to 
trying to persuade those justices that are more extreme in their ideologies, as they are less likely 
to be moved.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
According to Sunstein (2003, 150), the greatest invention of the Founders of our 
democratic-republic consisted in “their skepticism about homogeneity, their enthusiasm for 
disagreement and diversity, and their effort to accommodate and to structure that diversity.”  The 
Founders purposed to design a deliberative democracy, “one which combined accountability to 
the people with a measure of reflection and reason-giving” (150).  With this in mind, the 
institutions of the Constitution “reflect a fear of conformity, cascade effects, and polarization, 
creating a range of checks on ill-considered judgments that emerge from these processes” (150).  
In Federalist Nos. 10 and 51 (1788), James Madison confronted the threats posed by 
factions and special interest groups to minority rights and to the effective functioning of a 
democratic-republic. Madison’s solution to the problem posed by factions was novel and 
somewhat counterintuitive:  first you multiply them, then you divide them, and by doing this you 
can control their ill effects: 
Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent upon the society, the society 
itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of 
individuals or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the 
majority.  In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as for 
religious rights.  It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the 
other, in the multiplicity of sects.  The degree of security in both will depend on the 
number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend upon the extent of the 
country and number of people comprehended under the same government. 
 
Thus, The Federalist envisioned a large, extended republic as an antidote to the tyranny 
of factions and as essential to the success of federalism.  Madison wrote in Fed. No. 10: 
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it 
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights 
of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who 
feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. 
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By increasing their number, factions are forced to compromise and form coalitions to 
accomplish their goals.  This has the effect of diluting power so no one faction can control 
another.  In this way, the democratic-republic envisioned by our Founders checks the potential 
tyranny of factions by multiplying and dispersing them.  Thus, a basic Founding idea was to 
design a system that, taking the realities of human nature as given, encouraged the formation of a 
pluralistic society in which no one interest group could easily dominate, yet in which 
deliberation amongst “We the people” and accountability to “We the people” was encouraged.  
Amicus curiae participation in the judicial process is a natural and welcome manifestation 
of this intended design.   Amici curiae briefs serve two core functions that are critical to the 
healthy functioning of a deliberative democratic-republic. First, amici curiae are, by nature, 
reason-giving:  they provide arguments and evidence to support the positions they advance.  
They are meant to be more than mere opinions or bald assertions of self-interest; rather, they are 
meant to provide reasons that judges (and fellow citizens) can, in principle, accept as persuasive 
upon deliberation.  Second, amicus curiae briefs are a vehicle by which interest groups and 
individuals of all stripes bring their concerns, perspectives, and policy preferences before the 
courts (and fellow citizens) for consideration.  In this way, amici curiae promote the free 
exchange of ideas, which is an essential basis for wise legal and policy judgments and, 
ultimately, governmental accountability. 
 
A. Summary of Chapters 
Chapter 1 provided a review of the literature pertaining to the function and influence of 
amicus curiae in our society.  First, the evolution of the role of the amicus curiae in American 
history from “friend of the court” to “friend of the party” was highlighted, along with reasons for 
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this evolution. Second, the essential function of amici as information bearers was described.  
Third, attention was drawn to the continuing debate amongst scholars over the value of amicus 
curiae, and whether amici enhance or impair the functioning of our legal and political systems. 
Fourth, the liberal rules governing amicus participation were described.  Fifth, the increasing 
presence of amici curiae at the USSC was shown, highlighting the growing phenomenon of 
counteractive lobbying by interest groups and its implications.  Amicus participation has 
accompanied over 90 percent of cases over the last couple of decades, and it tends to be 
relatively ideologically balanced.  Sixth, it was noted that certain amicus participants stand out in 
terms of their frequency of appearance before the USSC in the last three decades – e.g., the 
ACLU, the NACDL, the Chamber of Commerce, the Washington Legal Foundation, and the 
Pacific Legal Foundation.  Seventh, Chapter 1 described the often collaborative nature of amicus 
enterprise.  Eighth, Chapter 1 provided a number of reasons why interest groups file briefs and 
the various strategies they employ in this effort.  
The bulk of the literature review in Chapter 1, however, focused on the thorny issue of 
whether or not amicus curiae influence judicial decision-making, and if so, what theory best 
accounts for this influence.  The basic conclusions that can be gleaned from this literature review 
are as follows.  First, it is typically difficult to detect whether or not amici curiae influence the 
way justices vote because judges rarely provide a window into their decision-making process.  
The statements of judges themselves are cagey and sometimes at odds with one another 
regarding the usefulness and efficacy of amicus curiae.  Second, studies are mixed regarding 
whether or not, the degree to which, and in what context amici influence judges, but the weight 
of the literature indicates that amici can and do impact the judicial process.  Examples of amicus 
influence in specific USSC cases, and in specific issue areas, abound.  The two most extensive 
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and rigorous studies to date on amicus influence demonstrate that a litigant’s winning 
percentages can be enhanced with the aid of amicus briefs (Kearney and Merrill (2000)), and that 
justices across the ideological spectrum respond to the persuasive attempts of amici by becoming 
more likely to vote consistently with the position advanced by the amicus than they otherwise 
would be (Collins 2008).  Third, pointing to amicus citation rates in judicial opinions is a valid 
indicator of amicus influence, but it is a rather crude measure, as it can be misleading, and often 
fails to capture amicus impact.   
Fourth, the prevailing view is that the potential impact of an amicus is related to its 
prestige, power, and experience. It could be said that not all amici are created equal in the eyes of 
the USSC.  For example, widespread agreement exists on the prominence and effectiveness of 
the Solicitor General as an amicus participant before the USSC.  Other “repeat players” or 
“institutional litigants”, such as the states, the ACLU, the ALF-CIO, and the Chamber of 
Commerce also are seen as more persuasive. Fifth, amicus impact has also been found to be 
related to the salience of the case, the resources of the party whom the amicus supports, the 
disparity in the number of briefs offered by each side, whether or not the amicus collaborated 
with others, and the ideology of the justice reading the brief – with those at the ideological center 
being most persuadable.  Finally, although fewer studies explore amicus activity and influence in 
the state and lower federal courts than in the USSC, and although amicus activity is not as 
widespread in these courts, similar conclusions have been reached about amicus influence in 
these courts. 
The remainder of Chapter 1 is devoted to the question of what model of judicial decision-
making – the attitudinal model, the legal model, or the interest group model – best accounts for 
amicus influence.  According to the attitudinal model, amicus briefs should have either no 
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influence on judicial decisions, or should have influence insofar as they reinforce a judge’s 
ideology.   According to the legal model, amicus briefs should influence judges regardless of 
ideology, as justices seek to reach the most accurate legal conclusions and amicus briefs can 
provide helpful information in this regard.  According to the interest group model, amicus briefs 
should influence judges who are concerned with the institutional legitimacy and 
representativeness of the court, as amici serve as barometers of public opinion and an indication 
of the array of social interests involved in the litigation.  While not discounting the predictive 
accuracy of the attitudinal model nor the importance of public opinion, the authors of the leading 
empirical studies addressing this question (e.g. Collins 2008; 2007; 2004; Kearney and Merrill 
2000) conclude that the legal model best explains the impact of amici curiae: amicus briefs 
matter insofar as the provide legally relevant information that assists judges in reaching the most 
accurate resolutions. 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the Roberts Court:  its justices, its ideological 
orientation, its major decisions, its supporters and critics, its impact on particular areas of the 
law, and how it compares with prior Courts.  To supplement this discussion, statistics and charts 
describing the Roberts Court were listed.  The jury of scholarly opinion is divided on whether the 
Roberts Court has lived up to the Chief Justice’s pledge to be respectful of the other branches of 
government as co-equals, to make a renewed push for consensus, to reach narrow rulings 
designed to build broad coalitions, and to seek a jurisprudence characterized by modesty and 
humility.  What can be concluded is that the Roberts Court is more like its predecessor Courts 
than it is different.   It is a modestly conservative Court which issues fewer decisions than its 
predecessors.  It exercises as much, if not more, restraint than prior Courts.  While it issues a 
higher percentage of 5-4 decisions that past Courts, it also issues a high percentage of unanimous 
 228 
 
decisions.  Lastly, and most relevant to this study, it is an amicus battleground, attracting more 
friendly fire than any prior Court in our nation’s history.  
Chapter 3 set forth my hypotheses, described the process by which I collected amicus 
data, and detailed the methodology by which I tested for amicus impact at the Roberts Court.  I 
hypothesized that an ideological advantage of amicus briefs would influence the way justices 
vote, independent of judicial ideology (information/legal persuasion hypotheses). I also 
hypothesized that an ideological advantage of amicus cosigners in a case would influence justice 
votes, independent of ideology (affected groups hypothesis).  My median justice hypotheses 
stated that the influence of amicus briefs and cosigners would become more pronounced as the 
justices became more moderate.  My political salience hypotheses stated that amicus influence 
would be less in salient cases, as only the justices that were on the same ideological side as the 
amicus brief advantage would succumb to amicus influence, due to the strong influence of 
judicial attitudes in salient cases.  Lastly, my prestigious amicus hypotheses stated that an 
ideological advantage of prestigious amici would increase the likelihood that justices would vote 
in the ideological direction of the prestigious amicus advantage. 
To test these hypotheses, I presented 11 separate logit models, with the ideological 
direction of the justice vote as my dependent variable.  Controlling for other known predictors of 
judicial decision-making (i.e., judicial ideology; party resources; lower court decision direction), 
these separate models examine amicus influence in all cases, in salient cases, in criminal 
procedure cases, in civil rights and liberties cases, in economics cases, in judicial power and 
federalism cases, on liberal justices in all cases, on conservative justices in all cases, on liberal 
justices in salient cases, and on conservative justices in salient cases.   
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 Chapter 4 discussed my findings regarding amicus participation during the 2007-2011 
terms of the Roberts Court.  A plethora of information regarding the participation levels of amici 
by issue area, by term, by case, and by amicus category was provided.   I highlight here some 
particularly noteworthy conclusions.  First, amicus participation is virtually ubiquitous at the 
Roberts Court.  On average, over 96 percent of the cases at the Roberts Court have amicus 
participation, over 9 amicus briefs are filed per case, and over 61 amici on average participate in 
each case.  In total, over 3,600 amicus briefs, and over 24,400 cosigners participated in just five 
terms of the Roberts Court.  Second, while more liberal amici participate at the Roberts Court 
than conservative amici, the overall levels are relatively balanced, thus confirming the existence 
of an amicus “arms race” at the Roberts Court.  Third, amici participate in significant numbers 
across all issue areas at the Roberts Court.  Fourth, amici frequently act in coalition with one 
another:  for every one amicus brief that is filed, an average of 6.7 amici cosign such briefs at the 
Roberts Court.  Fifth, individuals are increasing as a percentage of total amici, and are the most 
frequent amicus category at the Roberts Court, accounting for 47 percent of total amici. 
However, these individuals typically collaborate together on briefs, for example “brief of 
economics scholars”, “brief of law scholars”, “brief of state legislators”, etc.    
 Chapter 4 also listed the most frequent amicus participants of ten tracked prestigious 
interest groups at the Roberts Court, with the NACDL, Chamber of Commerce, and ACLU 
ranking as the top three.  Of these ten groups, the NACDL, ACLU, and AARP were the most 
frequent liberal amici; while the Chamber of Commerce, Washington Legal Foundation, and 
Pacific Legal Foundation were the most frequent conservative amici.   Lastly, Chapter 4 showed 
those tracked amici who had the highest winning percentage at the Roberts Court.   As expected, 
the Solicitor General was the most successful amicus, supporting the winning position in 72 
 230 
 
percent of its cases, followed, in order, by the Pacific Legal Foundation (71 percent), American 
Bar Association (69 percent), the States (62 percent), and Washington Legal Foundation (60 
percent).  While these winning percentages do not necessarily prove amicus impact, they do 
indicate such.  In sum, Chapter 4 shows that prestigious conservative amici tend to fare better 
than their liberal counterparts, but that liberal amici do not seem to think that lobbying the 
modestly conservative Roberts Court is a lost cause, as they still participate at higher rates than 
conservative amici. 
The main purpose of Chapter 5 was to assess the impact of amicus curiae at the Roberts 
Court.   Through the presentation and interpretation of various logit models, marginal effects 
graphs, predicted probabilities tables, and Pearson’s correlation tables, I attempted to discern if, 
when, how, and to what degree amici influence the ideological direction of justice votes.  The 
totality of Chapter 5 demonstrates that amicus curiae do matter, and that when, how, and to what 
degree they matter depends on the level of amicus brief disparity in the case, the ideology of the 
justice, the issue area of the case, and the prestige of the amicus participants involved.   Not 
surprisingly, the greater the numerical amicus brief advantage in a case, the greater the impact of 
those briefs.  Moderate justices, as a rule, are more influenced by amicus briefs than more 
ideologically extreme justices. Justices Kennedy, the “swing” justice, and Kagan, the “freshman” 
justice, appear to be the two justices on the Roberts Court most influenced by amicus briefs.  
Salient cases, as well as those involving criminal procedure, are most susceptible to the influence 
of an ideological advantage of amicus briefs.  Civil rights and liberties cases are the only 
category of cases amenable to amicus cosigner influence.  Justice votes in all cases, salient cases, 
civil rights and liberties cases, economics cases, and judicial power and federalism cases are 
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influenced by an ideological advantage of prestigious amici.  And the SG as amicus has a 
consistent and powerful impact on justice votes, irrespective of judicial ideology. 
Four basic but significant implications for legal academics and practitioners were drawn 
from the results of Chapter 5.  First, a party or amicus seeking to have maximum impact on the 
justices should attempt to coordinate with other amici, urging them to file as many separate 
briefs as possible in support of their preferred party in a case.  Second, a party or amicus seeking 
maximum impact on the justices should attempt to persuade as many prestigious amici as 
possible to file briefs supporting their preferred position, and the marshaling of these prestigious 
amici should be given priority over other amici.  Third, and relatedly, a party or amicus seeking 
maximum impact on the justices should attempt to persuade the SG and as many state 
governments as possible to file amicus briefs in support of their preferred position, as the SG and 
state governments have higher success rates at the USSC than most amici.  Fourth and finally, an 
amicus should attempt to tailor the arguments and information contained in its brief to capture 
the attention of and appeal to the moderate justices, as those justices are the ones most likely to 
be swayed. 
My findings of amicus brief advantage influence support my information/legal persuasion 
hypotheses.  My findings regarding the influence of amicus brief advantage on moderate justices 
support my median justice information/legal persuasion hypotheses.  My findings of prestigious 
amici advantage support my prestigious amicus hypotheses.  On the other hand, except for civil 
rights and liberties cases, none of my affected groups hypotheses were supported.  Also, my 
political salience attitudinal hypotheses were only partially supported.  The influence of amicus 
briefs in salient cases was not limited to those justices ideologically predisposed to agree with 
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the briefs, as I expected, but bridged the ideological divide.  Thus, the information/legal 
persuasion hypotheses are also applicable to salient cases.  
While not discounting the importance of the attitudinal model of judicial decision-
making, these findings regarding amicus influence at the Roberts Court lend credence to Collins’ 
(2008) “legal persuasion” model.  Amici provide the justices with myriad information and 
arguments regarding the correct application of the law in a case, and highlight diverse 
perspectives on the broader policy implications at stake.  Due to the subjective and indeterminate 
nature of the law, the justices explore alternative avenues to reach what they believe to be the 
correct decision in a case.  It is in this context that the justices are most ripe for amicus influence.  
Justices use amicus briefs to aid their efforts to reach the best and most accurate legal 
conclusions.  The justices of the Roberts Court, in various contexts and in diverse ways, are 
influenced by the information they receive from amici, including information about both the 
legal and broader policy consequences of their decisions.   
 
B. Areas of Future Research 
Future research should focus on when and how amicus briefs actually shape the contents 
of the USSC’s opinions.  Due to the quantitative nature of this study, I was unable to evaluate the 
content of amicus briefs to determine when and how the briefs themselves impact the justices’ 
opinions and legal reasoning (apart from the brief analysis provided in Chapter1 regarding the 
impact of amicus briefs in the PPACA case).  For example, what kinds of arguments and 
information included in amicus briefs are most influential in shaping judicial opinions?  In 
addition, based upon my findings regarding the susceptibility of moderate justices to amicus 
influence, future research should explore whether or not amici tailor their arguments specifically 
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to persuade the moderate or median justices on the USSC, and if so, how successful these efforts 
have been.   
Future research should also expand the focus beyond the governments and ten prestigious 
amicus groups that I tracked in this study to determine the winning percentage and influence of 
other amicus groups at the USSC, in particular those amici whom the USSC invites to 
participate.  Additionally, future research should examine more closely the context in which 
prestigious amici are most and least likely to influence the USSC.   For example, are prestigious 
amici more or less likely to influence justice votes when the overall amicus participation in the 
case is ideologically balanced or when it is lopsided?   Further, studies should address whether 
amicus briefs are more influential when they are collaborative in nature (have multiple 
cosigners), or rather when they stand alone (are only filed by one amicus group).  Lastly, 
additional research should be devoted to exploring the participation and impact of amici in state 
supreme courts, as this is an area that is underexplored and seemingly underappreciated.  
In conclusion, the Roberts Court is akin to a “friendly” firing range, where amici curiae 
target the justices in their pursuit of hitting their policy goals and impacting the development of 
the law.  The black robes worn by the justices of the Roberts Court are like “bullet-proof vests”, 
symbolizing impartiality, fidelity to the law, and imperviousness to social pressures. Amici 
curiae attempt to penetrate these “vests” by finding the areas of susceptibility, by strategically 
firing “bullets” (amicus briefs) designed for maximum impact, designed to convince the justice 
that the amici’s preference is the right course of action, the action most consistent with the letter 
and the spirit of the law.    
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Table A.1. List of Cases Attracting At Least 25 Amicus Briefs, 2007-2011 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of 
Amicus 
Briefs 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus Brief 
Difference  
Holding* 
1 Department of 
Health and 
Human 
Services v. 
Florida 
11-398  
2011 5-4 Liberal 87 -16 Upholds 
Affordable Care 
Act; narrows 
enforcement of 
Medicaid 
expansion (7-2) 
2 Bilski v. 
Kappos  
08-964 
2009 9-0 Liberal 69 6 Allows patents 
for some 
"business 
methods" 
3 District of 
Columbia v. 
Heller 
07-290 
2007 5-4 Conservative 68 -28 Strikes down 
D.C. gun ban 
4 Citzens United 
v. Federal 
Election 
Commission 
08-205 
2009 5-4 Conservative 53 -17 Permits 
corporations to 
spend own 
money on 
political 
campaigns 
5 Florida v. 
Department of 
Health and 
Human 
Services 
11-400 
2011 5-4 Liberal 52 6 Upholds 
Affordable Care 
Act; narrows 
enforcement of 
Medicaid 
expansion (7-2) 
6 McDonald v. 
Chicago 
08-1521 
2009 5-4 Conservative 51 -15 Applies Second 
Amendment gun 
rights to state and 
local 
governments 
7 Microsoft v. 
i4i Limited 
Partnership 
10-290 
2010 8-0 Liberal 48 5 Patent Act 
requires an 
invalidity 
defense to be 
proved by clear 
and convincing 
evidence 
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Table A.1. Continued 
 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of 
Amicus 
Briefs 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus Brief 
Difference  
Holding* 
8 Arizona v. 
United States 
11-182 
2011 5-3 Liberal 47 4 Strikes three parts 
of state 
immigration law; 
allows immigration 
status checks (8-0) 
9 Crawford v. 
Marion County 
Election Board 
07--21 
2007 6-3 Conservative 41 8 Upholds state voter 
ID law 
9 Indiana 
Democratic 
Party v. Rotika 
07--25 
2007 6-3 Conservative 41 8 Upholds state voter 
ID law 
11 Christian 
Legal Society 
v. Martinez 
08-1371 
2009 5-4 Conservative 39 6 Upholds public law 
school's 
nonrecognition of 
campus group that 
excludes gays 
12 American 
Electric Power 
Co. v. 
Connecticut 
10-174 
2010 8-0 Conservative 33 -13 Bars climate 
change suit in 
federal court 
against major 
electric utilities 
13 Brown v. 
Entertainment 
Merchants 
Association 
08-1448 
2010 7-2 Liberal 31 21 Strikes down 
California law 
banning the sale or 
rental of violent 
video games to 
minors 
13 Hosanna-
Tabor 
Evangelical 
Lutheran 
Church and 
School v. 
EEOC 
10-553 
2011 9-0 Liberal 31 11 Exempts religious 
organizations from 
antidiscrimination 
laws in hiring of 
clergy 
15 Stoneridge 
Investment 
Partners, LLC 
v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc. 
06-43 
2007 5-3 Conservative 30 0 Limits security 
fraud suits against 
companies 
vendors, customers 
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Table A.1. Continued 
 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of 
Amicus 
Briefs 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus Brief 
Difference  
Holding* 
15 Wyeth v. 
Levine 
06-1249 
2008 6-3 Conservative 30 -14 Allows failure-to-
warn suits in state 
court against 
drugmakers despite 
federal regulation 
15 Salazar v. 
Buono 
08-472 
2009 5-4 Conservative 30 -8 Deflects 
Establishment 
Clause challenge to 
a Christian cross 
erected on public 
land as a memorial 
to veterans 
18 Quanta 
Computer, 
Inc. v. LG 
Electronics, 
Inc. 
06-937 
2007 9-0 Liberal 29 -3 Extends the 
doctrine of patent 
exhaustion to 
method patents, 
and removes the 
ability of 
patentees to rely 
on patent law to 
restrict authorized 
sales of products 
embodying their 
inventions 
18 Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes 
10-277 
2010 5-4 Conservative 29 -1 Rejects class action 
sex discrimination 
suit against Wal-
Mart 
20 National 
Federation of 
Independent 
Business v. 
Sebelius 
11-393 
2011 5-4 Liberal 29 -1 Upholds Affordable 
Care Act; narrows 
enforcement of 
Medicaid expansion 
(7-2) 
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Table A.1. Continued 
 
Rank Case 
Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of 
Amicus 
Briefs 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus Brief 
Difference  
Holding* 
21 Ricci v. 
DeStefano 
07-1428 
2008 5-4 Conservative 28 1 Requires employers to 
have a "substantial 
basis" to fear 
disparate-impact 
liability before 
adopting race-
conscious policies to 
avoid liability 
21 Alford v. 
Greene 
09-1478 
2010 7-2 Liberal 28 -10 A government 
official can ask the 
USSC to review a 
lower court’s ruling 
that he violated the 
Constitution, even if 
the lower court 
ultimately 
concluded that he 
could not be sued 
for that conduct. 
23 Ricci v. 
DeStefano 
08-328 
2008 5-4 Conservative 27 0 Requires employers to 
have a "substantial 
basis" to fear 
disparate-impact 
liability before 
adopting race-
conscious policies to 
avoid liability 
23 Camreta 
v. Greene 
09-1454 
2010 7-2 Liberal 27 -10 A government 
official can ask the 
USSC to review a 
lower court’s ruling 
that he violated the 
Constitution, even if 
the lower court 
ultimately 
concluded that he 
could not be sued 
for that conduct. 
 
 
 
 257 
 
Table A.1. Continued 
 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of 
Amicus 
Briefs 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus Brief 
Difference  
Holding* 
23 Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc. 
10-779 
2010 6-3 Liberal 27 7 Vermont's 
Prescription 
Confidentiality 
Law is subject to 
heightened 
judicial scrutiny 
because it 
imposes content- 
and speaker-
based burdens on 
protected 
expression 
23 Mayo 
Collaborative 
Services v. 
Prometheus 
Laboratories, 
Inc. 
10-1150 
2011 9-0 Liberal 27 0 Process patents 
that incorporate 
laws of nature are 
not eligible for 
patents 
23 First 
American 
Financial 
Corporation 
v. Edwards 
10-708 
2011 9-0 Unspecifiable 27 0 USSC dismissed 
the writ of 
certiorari as 
improvidently 
granted 
28 Boumediene v. 
Bush 
06-1195 
2007 5-4 Liberal 26 20 Strikes down 
Military 
Commissions Act; 
extends habeus 
corpus to 
Guantanamo 
detainees 
28 Khalad A.F. 
Al Odah v. 
United States 
06-1196 
2007 5-4 Liberal 26 20 Strikes down 
Military 
Commissions Act; 
extends habeus 
corpus to 
Guantanamo 
detainees 
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Table A.1. Continued 
 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of 
Amicus 
Briefs 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus Brief 
Difference  
Holding* 
28 Northwest 
Austin 
Municipal 
Utility 
District No. 1 
v. Holder 
08-322 
2008 8-1 Liberal 26 0 Expands eligibility 
for municipalities 
to "bail out" of 
preclearance 
requirement in 
Voting Rights Act; 
constitutional 
challenge left 
unresolved 
28 Doe v. Reed 
09-559  
2009 8-1 Conservative 26 7 Upholds disclosure 
law for ballot 
measure petition 
signers 
28 AT&T v. 
Concepcion 
09-893 
2010 5-4 Conservative 26 4 Allows companies 
to bar class actions 
under arbitration 
agreements 
33 Arizona Free 
Enterprise 
Club's 
Freedom 
Club PAC v. 
Bennett 
10-238 
2010 5-4 Conservative 25 11 Strikes down 
"matching-fund" 
provision in 
Arizona public 
campaign 
financing law 
*Description of holding is borrowed from Jost’s (2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008) list of major 
cases published annually in CQ Press’ Supreme Court Yearbook. 
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Table A.2. List of Cases Attracting At Least 125 Amicus Cosigners, 2007-2011 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of Amicus 
Cosigners 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus 
Cosigner 
Difference  
 
Holding* 
1 Department 
of Health and 
Human 
Services v. 
Florida 
(11-398) 
2011 5-4 Liberal 1,928 -94 Upholds 
Affordable Care 
Act; narrows 
enforcement of 
Medicaid 
expansion (7-2) 
2 McDonald v. 
Chicago 
(08-1521) 
2009 5-4 Conservative 1,622 -1,269 Applies Second 
Amendment gun 
rights to state 
and local 
governments 
3 Florida v. 
Department 
of Health and 
Human 
Services 
(11-400) 
2011 5-4 Liberal 1,413 348 Upholds 
Affordable Care 
Act; narrows 
enforcement of 
Medicaid 
expansion (7-2) 
4 District of 
Columbia v. 
Heller 
(07-290) 
2007 5-4 Conservative 920 -482 Strikes down 
D.C. gun ban 
5 Boumediene 
v. Bush 
(06-1195) 
2007 5-4 Liberal 625 603 Strikes down 
Military 
Commissions 
Act; extends 
habeus corpus to 
Guantanamo 
detainees 
5 Khalad A.F. 
Al Odah v. 
United States 
(06-1196) 
2007 5-4 Liberal 625 603 Strikes down 
Military 
Commissions 
Act; extends 
habeus corpus to 
Guantanamo 
detainees 
7 Arizona v. 
United States 
(11-182) 
2011 5-3 Liberal 528 219 Strikes three 
parts of state 
immigration 
law; allows 
immigration 
status checks (8-
0) 
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Table A.2. Continued 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of Amicus 
Cosigners 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus 
Cosigner 
Difference  
 
Holding* 
8 National 
Federation of 
Independent 
Business v. 
Sebelius 
(11-393) 
2011 5-4 Liberal 450 -181 Upholds 
Affordable Care 
Act; narrows 
enforcement of 
Medicaid 
expansion (7-2) 
9 Christian 
Legal Society 
v. Martinez 
(08-1371) 
2009 5-4 Conservative 249 7 Upholds public 
law school's 
nonrecognition 
of campus group 
that excludes 
gays 
10 Miller v. 
Alabama 
(10-946) 
2011 5-4 Liberal 237 191 Bars mandatory 
life-without-
parole sentence 
for juvenile 
muderers 
10 Jackson v. 
Hobbs 
(10-947) 
2011 5-4 Liberal 237 191 Bars mandatory 
life-without-
parole sentence 
for juvenile 
muderers 
12 Republic of 
Iraq v. Simon 
(08-539) 
2008 9-0 Conservative 228 226 U.S. Courts do 
not have 
jurisdiction 
over Iraq in 
claims 
involving 
alleged 
misdeeds that 
occurred 
during Saddam 
Hussein’s 
regime 
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Table A.2. Continued 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of Amicus 
Cosigners 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus 
Cosigner 
Difference  
 
Holding* 
13 Republic of 
Iraq v. Beaty 
(07-1090) 
2008 9-0 Conservative 217 215 U.S. Courts do 
not have 
jurisdiction 
over Iraq in 
claims 
involving 
alleged 
misdeeds that 
occurred 
during Saddam 
Hussein’s 
regime 
14 Hosanna-
Tabor 
Evangelical 
Lutheran 
Church and 
School v. 
EEOC 
(10-553) 
2011 9-0 Liberal 195 -31 Exempts 
religious 
organizations 
from 
antidiscriminatio
n laws in hiring 
of clergy 
15 Citzens 
United v. 
Federal 
Election 
Commission 
(08-205) 
2009 5-4 Conservative 192 -22 Permits 
corporations to 
spend own 
money on 
political 
campaigns 
16 Brown v. 
Entertainmen
t Merchants 
Association 
(08-1448) 
2010 7-2 Liberal 182 146 Strikes down 
California law 
banning the sale 
or rental of 
violent video 
games to minors 
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Table A.2. Continued 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of Amicus 
Cosigners 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus 
Cosigner 
Difference  
 
Holding* 
17 Northwest 
Austin 
Municipal 
Utility 
District No. 1 
v. Holder 
(08-322) 
2008 8-1 Liberal 179 0 Expands 
eligibility for 
municipalities to 
"bail out" of 
preclearance 
requirement in 
Voting Rights 
Act; 
constitutional 
challenge left 
unresolved 
18 Microsoft v. 
i4i Limited 
Partnership 
(10-290) 
2010 8-0 Liberal 178 -27 Patent Act 
requires an 
invalidity 
defense to be 
proved by clear 
and convincing 
evidence 
19 Bilski v. 
Kappos 
(08-964)  
2009 9-0 Liberal 166 46 Allows patents 
for some 
"business 
methods" 
19 American 
Electric 
Power Co. v. 
Connecticut 
(10-174) 
2010 8-0 Conservative 166 4 Bars climate 
change suit in 
federal court 
against major 
electric utilities 
21 Kennedy v. 
Louisiana 
(07-343) 
2007 5-4 Liberal 165 89 Bars death 
penalty for child 
rape 
22 Speaker of 
the Arizona 
House of 
Representativ
es v. Flores 
(08-294) 
2008 5-4 Conservative 152 24 State can 
determine its 
own 
requirements 
with regard to 
English 
Language 
Learner 
instruction 
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Table A.2. Continued 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of Amicus 
Cosigners 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus 
Cosigner 
Difference  
 
Holding* 
23 Sorrell v. 
IMS Health 
Inc. 
(10-779) 
2010 6-3 Liberal 146 -58 State's 
Prescription 
Confidentiality 
Law is subject 
to heightened 
judicial 
scrutiny 
because it 
imposes 
content- and 
speaker-based 
burdens on 
protected 
expression 
24 Cuomo v. 
The 
Clearinghous
e 
Association, 
LLC. 
(08-453) 
2008 5-4 Conservative 145 0 Allows state 
enforcement of 
fair-lending laws 
against national 
banks despite 
federal 
regulation 
25 Doe v. Reed  
(09-559) 
2009 8-1 Conservative 144 7 Upholds 
disclosure law 
for ballot 
measure petition 
signers 
26 Exxon 
Shipping Co. 
v. Baker 
(07-219) 
2007 5-3 Conservative 143 103 Cuts punitive 
damages for 
Exxon Valdez oil 
spill 
27 Snyder v. 
Phelps 
(09-751) 
2010 8-1 Liberal 142 -51 Allows peaceful 
protests at 
military funerals 
28 Crawford v. 
Marion 
County 
Election 
Board 
(07-21) 
2007 6-3 Conservative 141 60 Upholds state 
voter ID law 
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Table A.2. Continued 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of Amicus 
Cosigners 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus 
Cosigner 
Difference  
 
Holding* 
28 Indiana 
Democratic 
Party v. 
Rotika 
(07-25) 
2007 6-3 Conservative 141 60 Upholds state 
voter ID law 
28 CBOCS 
West, Inc. v. 
Humphries 
(06-1431) 
2007 7-2 Liberal 141 135 Allows anti-
retaliation suit 
under Civil-War 
era civil rights 
law 
28 United States 
v. Stevens 
(08-769) 
2009 8-1 Liberal 141 28 Strikes down 
federal "animal 
cruelty" law 
 
32 Graham v. 
Florida 
(08-7412) 
2009 6-3 
 
Liberal 139 
 
69 
 
Bars life without 
parole for 
juveniles 
33 AT&T v. 
Concepcion 
(09-893) 
2010 5-4 Conservative 135 75 Allows 
companies to bar 
class actions 
under arbitration 
agreements 
34 Wyeth v. 
Levin 
(06-1249) 
2008 6-3 Conservative 131 -101 Allows failure-
to-warn suits in 
state court 
against 
drugmakers 
despite federal 
regulation 
35 Horne v. 
Flores 
(08-289) 
2008 5-4 Conservative 129 41 State can 
determine its 
own 
requirements 
with regard to 
English 
Language 
Learner 
instruction 
 
 
 
 
 265 
 
Table A.2. Continued 
Rank Case Name 
and 
Docket 
Number 
Term Vote Decision 
Direction 
Number 
of Amicus 
Cosigners 
Liberal - 
Conservative 
Amicus 
Cosigner 
Difference  
 
Holding* 
36 
 
Maples v. 
Thomas 
(10-63) 
2011 7-2 Liberal 126 84 Death row 
inmate showed 
the requisite 
“cause” to 
excuse his 
procedural 
default, which 
occurred when 
his lawyer 
missed a filing 
deadline 
*Description of holding is borrowed from primarily from Jost’s (2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008) 
list of major cases published annually in CQ Press’ Supreme Court Yearbook.  Some holding 
descriptions also provided by http://www.scotusblog.com/.  
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Table A.3. Base Logit Model of the Impact of Amici on Ideological Direction of Justice 
Votes at the Roberts Court, 2007 – 2011 Terms 
Variable MLE Coefficient Odds Ratio Marginal Effects 
Amicus Brief Difference 0.051 (.011)*** 1.052 5.8% 
Amicus Cosigner Difference -0.001 (.000) 0.999 -1.3% 
SG Lib Amicus Brief 0.623 (.107)*** 1.865 5.7% 
SG Con Amicus Brief -0.761 (.105)*** 0.467 -7.3% 
Prestigious Amicus Difference 0.066 (.034)* 1.068 2.0% 
Ideology 1.935 (.155)*** 6.927 11.53% 
Resource Difference 0.057 (.009)*** 1.059 6.5% 
Lower Court Direction -0.747 (.076)*** 0.474 -9.5% 
Constant -0.144 (.088)   
N 3,264 
 
 
 
Prob > chi2 0 
 
 
 
Percent Correctly Predicted 65.66 
 
 
 
Percent Reduction in Error 28.55 
 
 
 
Dependent variable indicates the ideological direction of the individual justices’ vote (1 = liberal, 0 = 
conservative). Numbers in parentheses indicated standard errors.  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-
tailed). 
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Table A.4.  Predicted Probabilities of Observing a Liberal Justice Vote Across Range of 
Judicial Moderation and Amicus Brief Advantage Values for Primary All-Inclusive Model 
Lib-Con 
Amicus 
Brief 
Diff 
Percent Probability of Liberal Vote:  Primary All-Inclusive Model (Model 1) 
 
Least 
Moderate 
Justice 
MQModerati
on=0         
Thomas(.65) 
Less Moderate 
Justice 
MQModeration
=25th 
Percentile=2.0  
Stevens(1.99)   
Souter(2.15)    
Scalia(1.69) 
Mean 
Moderate 
Justice 
MQModeration
=2.43              
Ginsburg(2.51)            
Alito(2.61) 
More Moderate 
Justice 
MQModeration
=75th 
Percentile=2.84       
Kagan(2.86)  
Sotomayor(2.80)    
Roberts (2.89)          
Breyer (2.66) 
Most Moderate 
Justice 
MQModeration
=4.02  
 Kennedy(4.02) 
-15 36.49 25.02 * 22.87 * 20.98 * 16.15 * 
-10 38.22 29.39 * 27.64 * 26.06 * 21.82 * 
-5 39.98 34.19 * 32.99 * 31.88 * 28.78 * 
-3 40.69 36.21 * 35.27 * 34.39 * 31.92 * 
-1 41.11 38.28 37.61 * 36.99 * 35.22 * 
0 41.77 39.33 38.81 * 38.32 * 36.93 
0.57 
(Mean) 
41.97 39.94 39.50 * 39.09 37.92 
1 42.13 40.39 40.02 * 39.67 38.67 
3 42.85 42.54 * 42.48 * 42.42 * 42.24 
5 43.57 44.72 * 44.97 * 45.21 * 45.89 * 
10 45.40 50.24 * 51.29 * 52.27 * 55.12 * 
15 47.24 55.75 * 57.57 * 59.25* 64.01 * 
*Prediction is significant at p < .05. 
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Table A.5.  Predicted Probabilities of Observing a Liberal Justice Vote Across Range of 
Judicial Moderation and Amicus Brief Advantage Values for Salient Cases Model 
Lib-Con 
Amicus 
Brief 
Diff 
Percent Probability of Liberal Vote:  Salient Cases (Model 6) 
 
Least 
Moderate 
Justice 
MQModerati
on=0         
Thomas(.65) 
Less Moderate 
Justice 
MQModeration
=25th 
Percentile=2.0  
Stevens(1.99)   
Souter(2.15)    
Scalia(1.69) 
Mean 
Moderate 
Justice 
MQModeration
=2.43               
Ginsburg(2.51)            
Alito(2.61) 
More Moderate 
Justice 
MQModeration
=75th 
Percentile=2.84      
Kagan(2.86)     
Sotomayor(2.80)   
Roberts(2.89)          
Breyer(2.66) 
Most Moderate 
Justice 
MQModeration
=4.02    
Kennedy(4.02) 
-15 64.04 47.21 43.41* 40.11* 30.85* 
-10 63.01 51.08 48.36* 45.95* 38.91* 
-5 61.98 54.94 53.34* 51.91* 47.63 
-3 61.56 56.47 55.31* 54.29* 51.19 
-1 61.15 57.99 57.28* 56.64 54.73 
0 60.94 58.74 58.25* 57.81 56.49 
0.53 
(Mean) 
60.82 59.14 58.76* 58.43 57.42 
1 60.73 59.49 59.22* 58.97 58.23 
3 60.30 60.98 61.13* 61.26 61.65 
5 59.88 62.44 63.00* 63.5* 64.96 
10 58.88 66.00 67.52* 68.83* 72.58* 
15 57.74 69.39 71.73* 73.71* 79.08* 
*Prediction is significant at p < .05. 
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